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What is the relation between sex, death, and the divine? This question, which is of vital 
importance to Plato and which Freud tacitly takes up by turning to the Symposium at the end of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, can be seen as standing at the foundation of philosophy, theology, and 
psychoanalysis. It ought not to surprise us, then, to observe the vibrant conversation going on between 
Continental philosophers, theologians, and psychoanalysts today. This attempt to untangle and analyze 
the intersection where the “Heavenly Powers”1 of sex and death converge with the divine is that which 
allows Julia Kristeva to state, during a recent interview with Richard Kearney, that of all “the human 
sciences and the social sciences, the only rational approaches to human beings, psychoanalysis . . . 
come[s] closest . . . to the experience of faith.”2 It is that which enables Lacan to assert that “Saint 
Augustine . . . foreshadowed psychoanalysis”3 and to insist that psychoanalysts ought to “become versed 
in Augustine.”4 It is that which compels thinkers like Emmanuel Falque—who advise philosophers of 
religion to speak first and foremost about “finitude, the consciousness and horizon of death”5—to write 
books on Freud and philosophy.6 And it is that which drives the work being undertaken today. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to approach once more the dark mystery of Eros and Thanatos 
which, to paraphrase Dostoevsky, forever struggle with God on the battlefield of the human heart. In 
order to broach this topic, I will attempt to establish a connection between carnal, bodily love and man’s 
relation to the divine. To do so, I will rely upon and further develop what Paul Ricoeur has called “the 
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nuptial metaphor”—the recurring biblical motif that portrays God’s relation to man as a kind of love 
affair, neither reductively sexual nor legalistically marital, but passionate, romantic, protective, desirous, 
even jealous.7 Such an understanding of the connection between sexuality and spirituality is not without 
precedent. Consider, for example, the statement by Ignatius of Antioch from which this work derives its 
title—“my Eros has been crucified”—which Pseudo Dionysius reads as a supreme affirmation of divine 
desire.8 
John Panteleimon Manoussakis, commenting on this link between the carnal and the spiritual, 
writes, “The desire for God is not independent from the desire for the other human . . . One who has not 
felt the latter rarely and with difficulty would seek the former.”9 I would add that, as Jean-Luc Marion 
argues in The Erotic Phenomenon, one who has felt the latter has perhaps already experienced the former, 
if only in a veiled way. Thus, where Freud reads the desire for God as a sublimation of the sex drives, I 
would suggest the opposite: erotic desire often reveals a deeper, more fundamental longing—a longing 
for the divine. 
And yet, Freud might counter, one must consider not only Eros but Thanatos. How does the 
desire for death factor into this religiously-inflected reading of the drives? That human sexuality implies 
both perversion and perfection, that it brings together man’s baseness and his beatitude, is one of the most 
important insights offered by Freudian drive theory. As Freud himself notes, “The highest and the lowest 
are always closest to each other in the sphere of sexuality.”10 But why this is the case remains for Freud a 
great mystery. Here, I would suggest, is where philosophy of religion can make an important contribution. 
Relying on the works of philosophers such as Manoussakis, Kearney, and Marion, theologians, in 
particular Hans Urs von Balthasar, and psychoanalysts such as Freud and Lacan, this work aims to both 
provide a possible answer to this fundamental question and to foster further dialogue between thinkers 
whose fields were born of similar concerns. 
                                                          
7
 See LaCocque and Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies, trans. 
David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) pp. 265-303. 
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For John Panteleimon Manoussakis 
Ad eum autem ducebar abs te nesciens, ut per cum ad te sciens ducerer. 
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Test everything. Retain what is good. 
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Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it but degenerated—into vice. 
~ Beyond Good and Evil (§168) 
This single aphorism expresses the essence of the critique leveled by Nietzsche against 
Christianity. It is a critique which Nietzsche rightly asserts is directed at the foundations of 
Christian thinking itself. Christianity as rationalism, Christianity as Platonism, Christianity as 
fleshless spiritualization and puritanical creed—certainly the history of Christian thought lends 
itself to such interpretations.11 That the followers of the man who declared “I came so that they 
might have life and have it more abundantly” (John 10:10)12 readily adopted the art of death and 
dying (Phaedo 64a), that believers in the resurrection eagerly aligned themselves with a thinker 
who openly despised the body, who viewed the material world as a prison (Phaedo 64e), that 
those who were instructed “Be fertile and multiply” (Genesis 1:28) saw no inconsistency with 
ascending away from sensuous desire toward “higher” intellectual pleasures (cf. 
Symposium/Phaedrus) can be legitimately interpreted as a second betrayal of Christ—only this 
time without the carnality of the kiss. 
For Nietzsche, “there has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross.”13 All of the 
good philosophical thinking done in the name of Christ has only served to move us further from 
                                                          
11
 As Heinrich Heine, anticipating Nietzsche, argues: “The historical manifestation and development of [the idea of 
Christianity] in the real world can already be seen in the first centuries after the birth of Christ, especially through 
an impartial investigation of the history of the Manicheans and the Gnostics. Although the former were declared 
heretical, and the latter denounced and damned by the Church, they still retained their influence on dogma. . . . At 
base, the Manicheans are not very different from the Gnostics. A characteristic of both is the doctrine of the two 
principles, good and evil, which battle each other. . . . everywhere we see the doctrine of the two principles in 
evidence: opposed to the good Christ stands the evil Satan; the world of spirit is represented by Christ, the world 
of matter by Satan; our soul belongs to the former, our body to the latter; and the whole world of appearance, 
nature, is thus originally evil; . . . it is essential to renounce all sensual joys of life, to torment the body, Satan’s fief, 
so that the soul can rise aloft, all the more nobly, into the lucid sky, into the bright kingdom of Christ.” Heine, On 
the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany, 12-13. 
12
 Unless otherwise stated, all biblical references come from New American Bible Revised Edition. 
13
 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, (§39). 
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the life he lived and the death he suffered. (Does not all philosophizing distance us from the raw 
brutality of life and death?). Indeed, the death of Christ—the crucifixion of his tangible, 
touchable, corporeal flesh—has remained, as Paul prophesized it would, foolishness for serious 
philosophers (cf. 1 Corinthians 1:23). (Think, for instance, of Hegel’s desire to transcend the 
messiness of Christ’s bodily death by means of a pure concept).14 Yet those of us foolish enough 
to want to take seriously the scandal of the incarnation, those who would try to answer 
Nietzsche’s critique without merely dismissing it, must “begin by reminding ourselves of this 
simple truth: ‘the Word became flesh’—it was not the flesh that became word, it was not the 
carnal that became spiritual or must become spiritual.”15 
Arguments that have stood at the basis of many Christian philosophies—trifling over the 
immortality of the soul, primary causation, unmoved movers, and the like—begin by neglecting 
this first foolishness.16 In doing so, they miss the radical realism of what Bonhoeffer calls the 
“profound this-worldliness” of Christianity.17 It is this life, this physical, carnal, human life that 
matters. All abstracting away from the world in which we live—the world of bodies and of 
blood, of sex and hunger, of desire, depravity, and death—all thinking that leads us from the real 
world, our world, the only world we experience, the one world we can know, denies the simple, 
scandalous truth that God became man and made his dwelling among us (John 1:14). 
Many Christian thinkers have mistakenly moved away from the world of the body. Many 
have followed the Platonists into the unreal realm of ideas. (As a good friend recently quipped: 
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 He goes so far as to propose that we “re-establish for philosophy . . . the speculative Good Friday in place of the 
historic Good Friday.” Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 191 (emphasis mine). 
15
 Manoussakis, “On the Flesh of the Word,” 306. 
16
 As Pascal says: “The metaphysical proofs for the existence of God are so remote from human reasoning and so 
involved that they make little impact, and, even if they did help some people, it would only be for the moment 
during which they watched the demonstration, because an hour later they would be afraid they had made a 
mistake. . . . That is the result of knowing God without Christ.” Pascal, Pensées, (XIV, 190).  
17
 As quoted in Kearney, Anatheism, 69. 
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“Christianity is not Platonism for the masses, but masses of Christians are Platonists”). To do so 
is to fail to realize that spiritualizing the flesh and its affections “simply amount[s] to getting 
Christianity backwards—it . . . mean[s] to undo Christianity and worse ‘in its name.’”18 
Yet as I sit at my desk writing these words, only a week removed from the celebration of 
God’s scandalous birth, I cannot help but to think that the foolishness of Christ’s flesh has not 
been entirely forgotten. Today we celebrate the Feast of the Circumcision. And it is worth noting 
that the Church has always seen this day as marking the first time that Christ shed his sacred 
blood for the redemption of man. He redeemed man by being a man, by becoming a body with 
all of the parts of a body—even the most intimate and the most profane. Are we capable today of 
thinking what this means? Do we understand, do we value, the corporeality that God has made 
his own? 
No, if anyone has given Eros poison to drink—it has been us. We who find ourselves 
caught between a sterile restlessness and a restful sterility,19 we who reduce sex by our obsession 
and seek to remedy our obsession by calling sex obscene, we who spiritualize the flesh, who long 
to see rather than touch, to transcend rather than incarnate, we who know nothing of Eros save 
the pornographic and the puritanical, the shameful and the ashamed—we have poisoned Eros. 
(And we philosophers—who peddle unreal concepts, ideas—we most of all).20 By remaking Eros 
in our own cracked image, by degrading him with our gaze, by refusing to see him as he is and 
instead clothing him in our shame, we have made for ourselves an empty an idol—one that 
satisfies our voyeuristic need for spectacle (pornography) or provides us with a legalistic 
moralism that allows us to feel justified even when we refuse to love (puritanism). 
                                                          
18
 Manoussakis, “On the Flesh of the Word,” 306. 
19
 Cf. “Love, such as our culture has fashioned it, walks between two abysses: restless desire, and a hypocritical 
wish for constancy—a harsh caricature of fidelity.” Ricoeur, “Wonder, Eroticism and Enigma,” 141. 
20
 Cf. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idol, “Reason in Philosophy,” (§1). 
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Eros has become for us an idol: a false love erected in the place of the living God. But 
Eros himself—not the Eros of our making—is a jealous lover. He will not leave us to our own 
devices. He will not allow us to feed on ashes and pretend that we have found the bread of life. 
We have given Eros poison to drink. He has taken it from us. He has drunk it for us. He has 
degenerated and he has perished. But on the third day he rose again. And with the taste of the 
grave still fresh on his lips, he offered us the very chalice we forced upon him, asking: “Can you 
drink of the cup that I drink?” (Mark 10:38). 
MSC 
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a. Sex and Death 
What is the relation between sex, death, and the divine? This question, which is of vital 
importance to Plato and which Freud tacitly takes up by turning to the Symposium at the end of 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, can be seen as standing at the foundation of philosophy, 
theology, and psychoanalysis. It ought not to surprise us, then, to observe the vibrant 
conversation going on between Continental philosophers, theologians, and psychoanalysts today. 
This attempt to untangle and analyze the intersection where the “Heavenly Powers”21 of sex and 
death converge with the divine is that which allows Julia Kristeva to state, during a recent 
interview with Richard Kearney, that of all “the human sciences and the social sciences, the only 
rational approaches to human beings, psychoanalysis . . . come[s] closest . . . to the experience of 
faith.”22 It is that which enables Lacan to assert that “Saint Augustine . . . foreshadowed 
psychoanalysis”23 and to insist that psychoanalysts ought to “become versed in Augustine.”24 It is that 
which compels thinkers like Emmanuel Falque—who advise philosophers of religion to speak first and 
foremost about “finitude, the consciousness and horizon of death”25—to write books on Freud and 
philosophy.26 And it is that which drives the work being undertaken today. 
The purpose of this project is to approach once more the dark mystery of Eros and 
Thanatos which, to paraphrase Dostoevsky, forever struggle with God on the battlefield of the 
human heart. In order to broach this topic, we will attempt to establish a connection between 
carnal, bodily love and man’s relation to the divine. To do so, we will rely upon and further 
develop what Paul Ricoeur has called “the nuptial metaphor”—the recurring biblical motif that 
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 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 128. 
22
 Kristeva, “Mysticism and Anatheism,” 81. 
23
 Lacan, Ecrits, 93. 
24
 Ibid, 742. 
25
 Falque, “An Anatheist Exchange,” 90. 
26
 See, Falque, Ça n'a rien à voir. 
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portrays God’s relation to man as a kind of love affair, neither reductively sexual nor 
legalistically marital, but passionate, romantic, protective, desirous, even jealous.27 We will 
begin with a phenomenological consideration of the movement of Eros in and through the 
relationship between lover and beloved. By considering how that relationship advances from 
language (word) to touch (flesh) to unity (spirit), we will hope to show that, in many ways, the 
progression of the erotic life on the human level mirrors the self-revelation of the divine through 
the drama of history. 
Like God, human beings long to offer themselves, to present themselves, to give 
themselves, to make themselves known. Yet this revealing, this presenting of oneself to the 
other, is never straightforward but always masked, disguised, concealed even as it reveals. For 
this reason, the erotic or nuptial relationship—which depends upon play, desire, distance, dance, 
a thirst for that which can never be possessed or fully known—offers a fitting metaphor for our 
experience with the divine. Yet the analogy becomes clearer still when we observe that the erotic 
relationship’s movement from word to flesh to spirit bears a striking resemblance to the three 
distinct yet interwoven movements by which God is revealed in and through history: creation, 
incarnation, and eschaton.28 For, if we accept that the world was created through the Word (John 
1:3), that that Word was incarnated in the flesh (John 1:14), and that the Spirit will one day unify 
our disparate fleshes into one eschatological body (cf. Ephesians 4:1-4; 1 Corinthians 10:18), 
then we will have to admit that in the nuptial metaphor we find not only what Aquinas calls the 
analogia entis, but perhaps even the imago dei, the mark of our Creator. 
                                                          
27
 See LaCocque and Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically Thinking Biblically, 265-303. 
28
 Manoussakis, in his reading of Augustine, notes that “the overlapping symmetry between history (from creation 
to eschaton) and the personal history of each one of us is the idea that provides the Confessions with its structure 
and thematic unity.” Manoussakis, The Ethics of Time, 90. 
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To say this, of course, contradicts much of the traditional discourse about the dangers that 
carnal love poses to the spiritual life. In addition to the Platonic ascent away from the body—for 
instance, Socrates’s reiteration of Diotima’s erotic ascent in the Symposium—we can think here 
of Gregory of Nyssa’s view that “God created the consequences of disobedience—sensuality, 
and especially sexuality—along with human nature in his foreknowledge of sin.”29 Yet the 
connection that we hope to draw between carnal, bodily love and the divine is not without 
precedent. Consider, for example, the statement by Ignatius of Antioch from which this work 
derives its title—“my Eros has been crucified”—which Pseudo Dionysius reads as a supreme 
affirmation of divine desire.30 (Let us not forget that, for Ignatius and Dionysius, it is the 
corporeal body of God with all of its wants, desires, and wounds that is crucified). John 
Manoussakis, commenting on this link between the carnal and the spiritual, writes, “The desire 
for God is not independent from the desire for the other human . . . One who has not felt the 
latter rarely and with difficulty would seek the former.”31 I would add that, as Jean-Luc Marion 
argues in The Erotic Phenomenon, one who has felt the latter has perhaps already experienced 
the former, if only in a veiled way. Thus, where Freud reads the desire for God as a sublimation 
of the sex drives, I would suggest the opposite: erotic desire often reveals a deeper, more 
fundamental longing—a longing for the divine. 
And yet, Freud might counter, one must consider not just Eros but Thanatos as well. How 
does the desire for death factor into this religiously-inflected reading of the drives? That human 
sexuality implies both perversion and perfection, that it brings together man’s baseness and his 
beatitude, is one of the most important insights offered by Freudian drive theory. As Freud 
himself notes, “The highest and the lowest are always closest to each other in the sphere of 
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 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 187. 
30
 See, Dionysius, The Divine Names, (IV.12.709B). 
31
 Manoussakis, The Ethics of Time, 105. 
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sexuality.”32 But why this is the case remains for Freud a great mystery. Here, I will suggest, is 
where philosophy of religion can make an important contribution. To do so, it will have to take 
seriously the challenges posed by thinkers such as Nietzsche and Freud—and perhaps even adopt 
some of the major elements of their philosophies. To that end, it is worth reconsidering the 
traditional understanding of Eros as the (masculine) god of ascent, the drive toward unity, 
wholeness, and truth. 
b. Offering a New Understanding of Eros33 
Richard Kearney, whose work is situated in the space where psychoanalysis and 
philosophy of religion overlap, tells us that “the life-drive Eros” manifests itself as “a desire for 
its other.”34 Immediately, this raises a question: how can Eros—“which seeks to push together 
and hold together” separate organisms35—preserve otherness while that the same time pursuing 
unity? For Freud, Eros is a drive which opposes otherness, one which swallows up alterity in its 
unending quest for wholeness. As Lacan captures with his famous formulation “There’s such a 
thing as One” (Y a d' l' Un): “in Freud’s discourse . . . Eros is defined as the fusion that makes 
one from two, as what is supposed to gradually tend in the direction of making but one from an 
immense multitude.”36 This drive toward oceanic oneness, toward a primal unity which can 
never be fully achieved, is at every moment contested by “another factor that poses an obstacle 
to this universal Eros . . . Thanatos, the reduction to dust.”37 (Whether or not these two drives 
actually oppose one another is a question to which we will return to in the pages to come). 
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 Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, 162. 
33
 I am incredibly grateful to Brian Becker of Lesley University whose careful reading of my work helped me to 
make explicit its central thesis which was, prior to his feedback, only expressed implicitly. 
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 Kearney, “God Making,” 4-5. 
35
 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 97. 
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But if “Eros is defined as the fusion that makes one from two,” where then is the other? 
And, conversely, if Eros emerges as the drive that desires “its other,” what justifies the rejection 
of the Freudian view? In this text, we will propose a new understanding of Eros, one which 
counters Freud’s by linking the pursuit of an illusory past of oceanic oneness to Thanatos, which 
sees in the (phallic) Eros of old—the Eros of Plato and Freud—a god of wholeness who cannot 
account for the “jouissance of the body” that exists “beyond the phallus,” the “something more” 
(en plus) of female desire.38 This erotic surplus—which Kearney (and Lacan)39 links to the love 
of God, the God who “is relation,” who is the “Trinitarian dance” of perichoresis40—is a love 
that pours itself out, a love that forgoes power, that refuses to objectify, to subjugate, to grasp, a 
love of divine recklessness and divine abandonment, of surrender, vulnerability, powerlessness, 
self-gift.41 
It is no secret that the history of philosophy has often neglected the feminine, feared it, 
suppressed it, relegated it to the realm of the irrational and untrue. (For Lacan, this is because “in 
her essence” woman “is not-whole”—that is, she cannot be contained by “the nature of words”42  
but exceeds the limits of language, experiences the ineffable: “that woman knows nothing of this 
jouissance . . . is underscored by the fact that in all the time people have been begging them, 
begging them on their hands and knees . . . to try to tell us, not a word!”).43 Yet Nietzsche, of all 
people, surprises us by pondering: “Supposing truth is a woman—what then?”44 And he follows 
                                                          
38
 Ibid, 74. 
39
 See, Ibid, 68. 
40
 Kearney, “God Making,” 5. 
41
 It is essential to note here that the love that offers itself to the other, that makes itself vulnerable, powerless, 
capable of being accepted or rejected, is not a form of masochism (which is really just a disguised lust for power). 
Masochism, as Freud says, is “Sadism which cannot find employment in actual life” and is thus “turned round upon 
the subject’s own self.” Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, 158n2. 
42
 Lacan, Encore: Seminar XX,  73. 
43
 Ibid, 75. 
44
 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, “Preface.” 
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this startling query up with the assertion that “Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not 
letting us see her reasons.”45 
This feminizing of truth is an implicit and essential aspect of the revaluation of Eros 
which we will posit in this text. For if truth is a woman, then he who is “the way and the truth 
and the life” (John 14:6)—the one who we will later identify as Eros crucified—will reveal to us 
a far different understanding of Eros than we have heretofore garnered on our own.46 As we will 
see, it is this insight which will allow us, in our sixth chapter, to posit a “basic similarity between 
human love and Trinitarian love,”47 to assert that “bodily love is intrinsically linked to, and even 
a sign of, the Trinitarian relations.”48 But before we get there, we will have to ask what this new 
understanding of Eros—this Eros of the extra (en plus), this Eros of feminine jouissance (which, 
incidentally, Lacan links to the face of God)49—looks like. 
Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil, tells us that “What inspires respect for woman, and 
often enough even fear, is her nature, which is more ‘natural’ than man’s.”50 He admires her 
“inner wildness, the incomprehensibility, scope, and movement of her desires and virtues” and 
notes that “she appears to suffer more, to be more vulnerable, more in need of love, and more 
condemned to disappointment than any other animal.” This combination of “fear and pity,” 
which for Nietzsche reaches its climax in woman, “tears to pieces as it enchants.”51 That 
Nietzsche uses the essential elements of Greek tragedy—fear and pity—to define the nature of 
woman should give us pause and perhaps cause us to reconsider the standard readings of his 
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 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, “Preface,” (§4). 
46
 As Kearney reminds us, the Wisdom of God—who, Paul tells us, is Christ (1 Corinthians 1:24)—is called “Sophia 
(a feminine noun).” Kearney, “God Making,” 5. 
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 Sweeney, “Bodily Love and the Imago Trinitatis,” 117. 
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 Ibid, 119. 
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purported misogyny.52 Who, after all, could miss the resonances between his understanding of 
the feminine—“which tears to pieces as it enchants”—and the “dismembered god” of Greek 
tragedy, the god of mystery, intoxication, overfullness, agony, ecstasy, joy: the suffering 
Dionysius who was himself “torn to pieces . . . and now is worshipped in this state”?53 
Understanding Eros in these more “natural,” carnal, womanly terms moves us in a very 
different direction than Plato and his disciples are want to go. It leads us away from the 
disembodied intellectualizing of the philosophers—whose God of purity and oneness remains 
alien to this world, uncontaminated by the desires of the flesh—and brings God down to earth, 
situating him “as the third party in the business of human love,” the unexpected other in the 
“ménage à trois” of human intimacy.54 More than that, it supports our central thesis that what 
must be crucified is the Eros of Plato, the Eros of Freud, the Eros which strives for wholeness, 
stasis, peace, the return to an illusory Eden of oceanic oneness and truth. That Eros, we hope to 
show, is no more than Thanatos in disguise. It must be granted the unmaking it so cunningly 
strives for. It must be allowed to die. 
And once that Eros has been crucified? Might it be injected with new life? Might there be 
a rebirth, a resurrection? It is our contention that the Eros we seek, the triune Eros of relation, 
unity (not identity) between self and other, initiates a “metamorphosis” of Eros (to use 
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Emmanuel Falque’s language) which brings about an encounter between the finite and the 
divine. But—and this is the essential point—that encounter takes place within and by means of 
finitude, not in some celestial realm beyond the heavens, beyond all being. Like Kierkegaard’s 
knight of faith—whose “absolute relation to the absolute”55 represents a “leap into life,”56 who 
remains “in finitude” and learns to “delight in it as if finitude were the surest thing of all,”57 who 
“belongs entirely to finitude . . . belongs entirely to the world”58—like the knight, the descent of 
Eros reveals that “Temporality, finitude—that is what it is all about!”59 It reveals, contrary to our 
expectations, that “the gesture of choosing temporal existence, of giving up eternal existence for 
the sake of love . . . is the highest ethical act of them all,”60 that in order to ascend, one must be 
willing to descend, to become a servant, the last of the last, the lowest of all (Mark 9:35).  
c. Why God? 
It will be asked, first, whether the reader must accept the tenants of faith—that God is 
love, that that love is Trinitarian in nature, that God became man, etc.—in order to entertain the 
arguments put forth in this work; and, secondarily, why bring God in at all, why not confine 
oneself to the limits of reason, the lumière naturelle of the philosophers? To address these 
concerns in order, I would suggest first that, just as one need not be a Marxist to find the reading 
of Das Kapital a worthwhile endeavor nor a Thomist to draw life from Dr. King’s Letter from 
Birmingham Jail, so too can one find fruit in the work of a Christian existentialist without ending 
in prostration before the altar. Whether one is a Christian or not, one must admit that the 
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Freudian understanding of love leaves little room for love in that it makes no room for the other. 
If one would object to this solipsistic view of the human person, one would do well to seek 
support wherever he can find it. (“Whoever is not against us is for us” (Mark 9:40)—a wise 
saying reserved not exclusively for Christians). Augustine tells us that in order for there to be 
love, there must be “three things: the lover, the beloved, and the love.”61 Freud’s understanding 
of Eros closes off this possibility. One could, I think, side with Augustine without necessarily 
accepting his recourse to the divine. 
To answer the question why bring God in at all, I would remind readers of Ricoeur’s 
famous criticism of the attempts to radically separate philosophy and theology; he calls them a 
kind of “controlled schizophrenia.” For me, such a divorce is never fully attainable. And if it 
were, I am not sure it would be advisable. According to Nietzsche, philosophy is the attempt to 
articulate and make sense out of one’s perspective, one’s experience of the world. Well, theology 
is something that one experiences in the world. Questions about the nature and existence of God, 
about the problem of senseless suffering, about the quasi-mystical pull of violence and depravity, 
about the unnamable, unspeakable beauty that resides at the heart of things, the miraculous 
encounter with kindness, self-sacrifice, and love—these too are things found in the world. The 
idea that philosophy is somehow made purer or more philosophical by excluding them is, I think, 
rooted in a false premise about what philosophy is and what it does. 
Philosophy, according to the stoics, is therapy for the soul. (A theologically charged 
assertion in its own right). But if the philosophy I espouse is going to be therapeutic—that is, if it 
is going to offer some degree of consolation for the traumas of life—it can only be so by 
embracing the problems of life, the problems that life presents, including theological ones. Never 
has there been a man who lived without the question of God. Indeed, it is a defining 
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characteristic of man that he alone questions God. And to pretend that this is not the case in order 
to obtain some sort of quasi-scientific objectivity is a betrayal of philosophy’s first and most 
important dictum: I know that I know not. Or, put differently, I know that I only know the world 
through my limited, finite perspective.62 I am not God. But by speaking of him I can, perhaps, 
guard against my propensity to deceive myself into thinking that I am. 
This is one reason to allow philosophers to take up and consider theological questions—
philosophy is, after all, concerned with truth and this fundamental truth ought never to be lost. 
But there are other reasons as well. William James, for instance, sees philosophy as having the 
potential to “redeem religion from [the] unwholesome privacy” of religious sentiment. “Feeling,” 
he tells us, “is private and dumb, and unable to give account of itself.” 63 Philosophy, therefore, is 
necessary if one is to make sense of and articulate the experience of faith. 
We are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in 
any of our functions. . . . Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical 
experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery our thinking 
mind inhabits. The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own 
clothing on us. Moreover, we must exchange our feelings with one another, and in 
doing so we have to speak, and to use general and abstract formulas. Conceptions 
and constructions are thus a necessary part of our religion; and as moderator amid 
the clash of hypotheses, and mediator among the criticisms of one man’s 
constructions by another, philosophy will always have much to do.64 
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Put simply, we cannot but philosophize about our personal experiences; consciousness and 
communication demand it. And religious experiences are experiences, just like any other. As 
Manoussakis has recently argued, the attempt to bifurcate experience into religious and non-, 
sacred and profane, makes little sense when we consider that “we have no other recourse to the 
world than experience . . . and, therefore, we cannot justifiably talk of religion as if religion 
constituted, or rather was constituted by a predetermined set of phenomena other than that single 
experience through which we are in-the-world.” 
We cannot speak of multiple experiences even if experience is always manifold. 
Experience as such cannot be more than one thing. Surely, one may object, we 
have an experience of more than one thing. Yes, but whether one experiences the 
most trivial and mundane thing or the mysterium tremendum, experience is 
experience. . . . To the one, then, who would like to know as to what kind of 
phenomena we are willing to admit within such a phenomenology of religion, our 
answer is all. All phenomena are religious for no exclusion can be justified, and 
therefore all philosophy is a philosophy of religion, if one still wishes to designate 
it so.65 
Thus to dismiss the theological questions that arise naturally from experience itself or to try to 
exclude them from philosophical discourse is as foolish as it is impossible. Insofar as philosophy 
is a tool for helping us to understand our lives, it must not shy away from even the most 
speculative lines of inquiry—for, speculation too is born of that singular experience we call life. 
A different yet not unrelated reason for allowing philosophers to engage in theological 
discourse stems from the hermeneutic insight that no thinker thinks impartially. Every 
philosopher, we must admit, has a story—a history of lived (and read) experience that he brings 
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to thought. The cogito does not exist in a vacuum. Thought is always already formed and 
informed by what comes before, what precedes it. Ricoeur’s often cited introductory question—
d'où parlez-vous? Where do you speak from?—reminds us that we all speak from somewhere, 
none of us is capable of uttering the first word.66 And if, as Manoussakis argues, “the language of 
the community within which I am born or reborn”—the language that “predates me”—always 
structures my understanding of both myself and the world in which I live, then the question 
where do you speak from? must be answered at a personal level if one is to be honest about the 
philosophy one puts forth. 
As a Catholic philosopher writing in the wake of the death of God but also after the 
theological turn in phenomenology, I find myself in the precarious position of trying to discern 
how to live in and understand the contemporary world while at the same time remaining separate 
from it. I am a student of Kearney’s and Manoussakis’s, a beneficiary of the Second Vatican 
Council, an inheritor of both the emancipation and destruction wrought by the sexual revolution. 
My thinking bears witness to these inescapable biographical facts—as it does, I am sure, to 
countless others. Yet this does not strike me as a knock against the philosophy I propose. To 
engage with the world in which one lives and to work to see that world made anew is the 
obligation of every person of faith. To attempt to better understand oneself, one’s motives and 
desires, what prejudices one has acquired simply by living, is—or ought to be—the goal of every 
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philosopher. Where these two objectives meet in me is in the approach I have adopted for 
practicing philosophy. 
Balthasar famously called for a theology “of adoration and prayer,” a theology practiced 
“on one’s knees.”67 His meaning, I think, was this: theology is not theology if it is not worship, 
speaking to the one it is speaking of. But prayer, we are told, is to be done with the door closed, 
offered in the secrecy of the bedroom (Matthew 6:6). It is my contention that such an 
understanding of theology opens the space for another mode of thinking: a philosophy that is 
lived and acted out, that concerns itself with the cares of this world, a philosophy of the streets. 
What would such a philosophy look like? The answer, I think, will depend upon the philosopher 
who lives it. But such a lived philosophy will invariably represent what Falque has called the 
“quest for a common name,” the attempt to express and explore what is “common for all 
people.”68 
For me, the Natural Reason of Thomas, the Natural Light of Reason, is nothing 
but the quest for a common name. . . . Instead of saying “you need reason in order 
to be able to ascend to God,” he says: “with the Jews I have the Old Testament in 
common, with the heretics I have the New Testament in common, but with the 
pagans I have nothing in common so I need to find this common thing I call 
reason.” My hypothesis, then, is this: one does not have to follow Thomas 
Aquinas to the letter, but one should be true to his spirit. . . . I understand [his 
spirit] as an openness to the novelty of one’s time (for Thomas that was the 
introduction of Aristotle), transforming it in the light of Christianity.69 
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If theology begins with God’s self-articulation, with his expressed plan and purpose for the 
world, philosophy has a different starting point. Unlike the theologian, the philosopher begins 
with this world—the world of experience, the world that is “common for all people”—and, 
finding it lacking, he may ultimately end at God. Or he may not. But if he does, the glimpse of 
God garnered will be very much shaped by, seen through the lens of, creaturely existence. 
I said a short time ago that faith requires of us that we work to see the world made anew. 
But in order to do so, one must be willing to meet the world where it is at and not expect from 
the world that it has already been made anew. And the philosopher, more than any other, must 
begin by understanding where this world is at. According to Falque, “what we have in common 
today is no longer reason as it was for Aquinas. We think after Nietzsche, after Freud, so what 
we have in common is finitude, the consciousness and horizon of death.” Thus, he insists, “If it is 
finitude that we all—believers and nonbelievers, Christians and pagan alike—have in common, 
then it is about finitude that we should first talk.”70 To this possible starting point, Kearney adds 
another: “Eros is what Christians have in common with the Greeks, the atheists, and so-called 
pagans. A sort of erotic lumière naturelle.”71 
Sex and death. Eros and Thanatos. The “Heavenly Powers” of life and destruction. For 
the philosopher living in the world, such topics are unavoidable. That examining them should 
lead one to the question of God need not be the case. But for those of us who already carry that 
question with them, those who wrestle with God like Jacob wrestled with the angel, examining 
the most mysterious and monstrous aspects of the human condition could not lead anywhere else. 














Oedipus and Adam: the Genesis of Eros and the Infancy of Man 
During a recent reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, I was struck by the fact that, as 
the final pages approach, Freud shifts from a scientific analysis of drive theory to a more 
philosophical musing on two ancient myths. First, he discusses the Platonic myth found in the 
Symposium which links the drive for sexual union with a desire to return to an earlier state of 
human existence, a time when a third type of human—neither male nor female but fully both—
walked the earth. Then in a footnote, he quotes from a similar narrative found in the Upanishads 
which describes the splitting of Yājñavalkya—an individual “so large as man and wife 
together”—into two separate individuals: a husband and wife. What attracted my attention was 
not Freud’s decision to include these stories; as he himself notes, both myths hint at the 
regressive character of the drives, the need to restore an earlier state, the compulsion to repeat. In 
this context, his choice to use them for the purposes of illustration makes sense. What interested 
me, however, was that with these two lesser-known myths, Freud opts not to mention a third, 
more prominent one—one which also points to the desire to restore an earlier state. I am 
speaking, of course, of the Adamic myth found in the Book of Genesis. 
In a 1911 letter to Jung, Freud questions the credibility of the Adamic myth. Commenting 
on the narrative which serves as the foundational text for the three Abrahamic religions, Freud 
calls the myth “a wretched, tendentious distortion devised by an apprentice priest.”72 He asserts 
that it is nothing more than the remnants of two separate stories woven together to form a single 
narrative, observes that “there is something very strange and singular about the creation of Eve,” 
and later concludes that “the surface versions of myths cannot be used uncritically for 
comparison.”73 Here, one might think, we find Freud’s reason for not to employing the Adamic 
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myth when analyzing the drive to repeat. The creation of Adam from inorganic clay, the creation 
of Eve from the rib Adam, the prelapsarian paradise in which they live, their subsequent 
banishment from that paradise, the constant search in the Abrahamic tradition for a messiah who 
will return man to his earlier, unblemished state—all of this seems analogous to Freud’s theory 
of the regressive nature of the drives. Yet perhaps he neglects these obvious connections 
because, as he states, he believes the author of the myth to be biased and untrustworthy. 
No. For, Freud himself notes that the myths which he does include are of “a fantastical 
kind,”74 that they are merely “analogies,”75 and that, like all thinkers who seek to answer ultimate 
questions, he is not impartial but “dominated by deep-rooted internal prejudices.”76 He plainly 
acknowledges that the narratives used are meant to shed a poetic light on the scientific reality of 
the regressive nature of the drives. And he openly admits to using “figurative language” in order 
to get at truths which are not yet biologically verifiable. (An admission, by the way, which many 
devotees of sciencism—today’s most prevalent religion—refuse to make; namely, that scientific 
“truths” can only be expressed through, and are thus subject to, metaphor and language).77 If this 
is the case, why then does Freud neglect the Adamic myth? Why does he avoid a narrative which 
appears to be wholly analogous to his claim that the essential character of the drives is 
regressive? 
a. The Primacy of Death: at the Limits of Philosophy 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud asserts that the biological progression of all life 
can be seen as the movement from nonliving matter to living being to death, a return to the 
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inanimate state from which life first arose. The drive to repeat, then, is a movement back toward 
death, a repetition which leads the living organism closer to its primary, inorganic stasis. 
According to Freud, the state which the repetition compulsion unconsciously seeks to recapture 
is “an old state, an original state that the living being has left at some time, and toward which it 
strives to return through all the detours of evolution.”78 Yet for Freud, there can be no state older, 
none more originary, than death itself: “If we may accept as an observation without exception 
that every living being dies for internal reasons, returning to the inorganic, then we can only say 
that the goal of all life is death, and, looking backwards, that the nonliving existed before the 
living.”79 All life tends back toward the death from which it came. 
From a Freudian perspective, then, death is primary. Life represents a brief interruption in 
the inorganic—death—but it inevitably returns to its original, inanimate state. This, we must 
admit, is not only a philosophically defensibly position but represents the philosophical position 
on the origin of life, the one to which those who wish to remain within the confines of 
philosophy must adhere. Indeed, at the very foundation of philosophy, just prior to the death of 
Socrates, we find it being argued in the most empathic of terms that “what comes from being 
dead . . . is being alive” (Phaedo 71d) and all subsequent philosophies have taken death—
corruption, degeneration, falling away (think of the Plotinian katastrophē)—as their starting 
point. According to Freud, life arises out of nonliving matter “through the influence of a 
completely inconceivable force.”80 And whether you call that force “the Good,” “the One,” or 
“the Unmoved Mover” matters little, the point remains the same: life comes from death and 
longs to return to it. 
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It is for this reason, I suspect, that Freud neglects the Adamic myth. For, while the Greek 
and Hindu understandings of the cosmos give credence to this assumption—in Greek mythology 
Chaos, the primordial void, precedes the existence of the world; in Hindu vedic cosmology, time 
is cyclical, existence arises out of nothingness and fades back to it in a constant ebb and flow—
the Genesis narrative stands in stark opposition to it. Contrary to the philosophical perspective, 
Genesis asserts that the world was created by a personal, loving Godhead with a definite plan 
and purpose and, what is more, that it was created good. (Though, of course, we could say that 
because God created the world ex nihilo, nonexistence is in a very real sense the deepest reality 
of the created world, that ours is a world “bordering on nothingness”).81 Thus while the Freudian 
assumption is that death is primary—that existence moves from death to life back to death—the 
Abrahamic tradition posits that life is primary—that existence moves from the fullness of life in 
God to created life which is subsequently interrupted by death back to the fullness of life, the 
redemption of creation by its Creator. One view is purely philosophical. The other is theological. 
The first is attained through reason, the second through revelation. 
From the first pages of this work, we have made it clear that, though we speak as 
philosophers, we will not shy away from theological speculation. Indeed, as Nietzsche often 
reminds us, we must “guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason,’ 
‘absolute spirituality,’ ‘knowledge in itself.’”82 Rather, it is better to admit with Freud that “each 
person is dominated by deep-rooted internal prejudices”83 and that none of us have a monopoly 
on the truth, especially when it comes to matters as mysterious as the origin of life.84 Let us then 
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acknowledge our willingness to take up and consider thoughts that come from beyond the 
boundaries of pure philosophical thinking. Let us say that, “given the present obscurity in the 
theory of drives, it would be inadvisable to reject any idea that promises to enlighten,”85 even if 
that idea comes from scripture. Let us utilize the myth that Freud himself neglects, the Adamic 
myth found in Genesis, and consider what, if anything, it can tell us about the insights garnered 
from philosophical and psychoanalytic thought. 
b. The Primacy of Life: Beyond the Limits 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud picks up and further examines the dualistic 
theory of the drives which is prevalent throughout his corpus. As his views evolve, develop, and 
become more nuanced, he begins to see the drives as existing between the poles of Eros, the 
sexually charged life drive, and what later commentators would term Thanatos, the purely 
destructive death drive.86 Recounting the progression of his thought, Freud writes:  
[T]he sex drive transformed itself for us into Eros, which seeks to push together 
and hold together parts of a living substance . . . These speculations then have 
Eros operating from the beginning of life and acting as a “life drive” in contrast to 
the “death drive,” which arose through the animation of the inorganic. These 
speculations seek to solve the riddle of life by assuming these two drives 
struggling with each other from the very beginning.87 
For Freud, Eros is a drive which serves to further life by seeking the union of separate beings—
be it the union of cells which makeup a living organism or the union of organisms which 
reproduce life in their offspring. The death drive, on the other hand, seeks the oblivion of the 
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living being by returning it, through death, back to its original, inorganic state. Thus from a 
Freudian perspective—a perspective which holds that existence moves from death to life to 
death—Eros acts as a “detour to death” which interrupts Thanatos’s regression back to nonbeing. 
Death, the end of all tension, is pleasurable. Eros, which awakens tension in nonliving matter by 
awakening life, is beyond the pleasure principle. 
If, however, we reexamine Freud’s drive theory by altering its premise, if we begin with 
the scriptural assumption that the movement of life is from Creator to creation through death to 
Creator, then we will conclude upon an entirely different understanding of the drives. For, if the 
Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end of all things is Life itself 
(cf. Revelation 22:13; John 14:6), then we must conclude that Eros and not Thanatos is the 
regressive drive. After all, the regressive drive seeks to reproduce an old state, an original state 
which the living being left at some time. If, then, we accept the assertion that all life comes from 
the Godhead, that the Godhead is the source of life, then we can only say that the goal of all life 
is life and, looking backwards, that the living existed before the nonliving. 
That we have now offered a hypothesis which represents the exact opposite of the one 
expressed by Freud ought not to surprise us. After all, we began our analysis by inverting his 
base premise. More surprising, however, may be our next assertion. For, if we hold Eros to be 
the regressive drive because the beginning of all life is God who is Life itself and thus any 
movement toward life must necessarily be a regressive movement, then we must maintain, 
simultaneously and paradoxically, that Eros is also progressive. For, God stands not only at the 
beginning but also at the end of all life. Thus the erotic tendency is one which seeks to repeat an 
earlier state—the Alpha, the first, the beginning of all things—but it is also one which looks 
forward to, progresses toward, prefigures a final state—the Omega, the last, the end of all things. 
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Eros longs to recapture prelapsarian existence while simultaneously striving toward 
eschatological beatitude. It is the life drive and the goal of all life is life. 
At first glance, it may seem that our discovery of the paradoxical nature of Eros as a drive 
which is simultaneously regressive and progressive has undone the Freudian duality mentioned 
above. To some extent is has. But ought we to now conclude that there is no death drive? If the 
life drive is both regressive and progressive, ought we to assert that Thanatos has been done 
away with? Not at all. For like Freud, we must acknowledge that the existence of a purely 
destructive drive toward death is experientially verifiable. Episodes such as war trauma attest to 
its reality.88 
But what is the function of this death drive? Where does it come from and how does it 
operate? If the beginning and end of life is life and death is an interruption into life then death 
must be assumed to be derivative. Unlike Freud who sees Eros and Thanatos as “struggling with 
each other from the very beginning,”89 we now assert that death has inserted itself into life as a 
perversion, not an equal.90 But in order to understand how this came to be, we must return to an 
earlier state. We must begin at the beginning. Thus we will leave our discussion of the death 
drive here and detour, by way of the Adamic myth, back to a time before death entered the 
world, to the paradisal existence of the Garden—an existence which we all long to recapture. 
c. Myths of Origin 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud posits a hypothetical account of how the Oedipus complex 
may have first manifested itself in the human psyche. Theorizing that the complex originally 
resulted in the patricide of a primitive, dominant father at the hands of his sons, he writes: 
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One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured 
their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. United, they had the 
courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them 
individually . . . The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and 
envied model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring 
him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them 
acquired a portion of his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps mankind's 
earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and a commemoration of this 
memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things—of 
social organization, of moral restrictions and of religion.91 
We will return to this Freudian myth shortly. For now, however, we ought to note that Freud opts 
once again to neglect the Adamic narrative; he chooses to construct a speculative account of the 
first manifestation of the Oedipus complex rather than testing his theory on the already prevalent 
story of origin. 
While the connection to the scriptural narrative is less apparent here than it is with the 
regressive theory of the drives, we see indications from the first mention of the creation of 
man—“the Lord God formed the man out of the dust of the ground and blew into his nostrils the 
breath of life, and the man became a living being” (Genesis 2:7)—that a Freudian psychoanalytic 
account of man’s constitution can be applied. At the moment of his creation, man saw himself as 
at one with all that existed. As a product of the earth, he was linked to the whole of creation.92 
Unlike the world itself, which was created ex nihilo, man was created out of creation. Thus from 
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his beginning he was tied to that from which he was made. (See, “you are dust, and to dust you 
shall return” (Genesis 3:19)). But in addition to this connection with creation, man also shared a 
unique bond with his Creator. After all, it was God’s breath that filled his nostrils and provided 
him with life. Thus the Genesis text makes clear that the prelapsarian man’s original constitution 
was one of intimate connectedness with the entirety of existence, both created and uncreated.93 
How does this sense of undelineated unity experienced by the first man relate to Freudian 
psychoanalytic thought? Freud begins Civilization and Its Discontents by relating a critique of 
his The Future of an Illusion offered by his friend Romain Rolland: 
[Rolland] entirely agreed with my judgment upon religion, but . . . he was sorry I 
had not properly appreciated the true source of religious sentiments. This, he says, 
consists in a peculiar feeling, which he is never without, which he finds confirmed 
by others, and which he may suppose is present in millions of people. It is a 
feeling which he would like to call a sensation of ‘eternity,’ a feeling as of 
something limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘oceanic.’94 
This oceanic feeling, Freud later concludes, is nothing more than a regression by the individual 
to his most infantile state.95 It is a longing for and movement toward the primary stage in the 
development of life, a time when one experienced “a more intimate bond between the ego and 
the world about it.”96 In the earliest experiences of infancy, an individual does not yet identify 
himself as distinct from the outer world. Rather he feels a sensation of “eternity,” an unbounded 
connection with all things: “originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an 
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external world from itself.”97 “An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the 
external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so, 
in response to various promptings.”98 
For Freud, the oceanic feeling described by Rolland is nothing more than a return to the 
mode of existence that preceded such promptings, a movement back toward the unboundedness 
of infancy. This feeling of limitlessness which Freud believes to be experienced in the infancy of 
the individual is described in Genesis as having been experienced in the infancy of mankind. Just 
as a newborn neglects to distinguish himself from his mother’s breast (the outside world), so too 
did the first man neglect to individuate himself from the entirety of existence. In the Genesis text, 
the Adamic figure is not identified as distinct, separate, or alone until after God has handed down 
his command not to eat from the tree at the center of the Garden (Genesis 2:18). Prior to that, he 
had felt himself to be at one with all that existed. 
d. Law and Individuation 
As was stated above, Freud’s oedipal theory posits the introduction of various external 
promptings as the main cause for the individual’s first recognition of himself as distinct from the 
outer world. Of these promptings, the earliest and most significant is the imposition of the law by 
the child’s father. After birth, the infant seeks the full gratification of his desires through 
unrestricted access to his mother’s breast. But this unrestricted access is restricted when the 
father intervenes; he imposes a law upon the child in the form of a prohibition by saying No to 
the child’s desire for full gratification. He restricts the child’s unlimited contact with the mother. 
Once the imposition is put in place, the infant is confronted by the raw otherness his mOther, as 
Lacan famously put it. The infant no longer sees himself as at one with her breast. Rather he 
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begins to distinguish his ego from the external world. In doing so, he recognizes his uniqueness 
from the rest of existence and develops what Freud terms the “original reality-ego,” an ego 
which “distinguishes outer and inner by means of a sound objective reality.”99 
This account of the genesis of the individual is strikingly similar to the account found in 
Genesis of the first man’s recognition of himself as distinct from the rest of creation. In the 
scriptural text, the Adamic man is confronted by his first external individuating encounter when 
“The Lord God gave the man this order: You are free to eat from any of the trees of the garden 
except the tree of knowledge of good and evil. From that tree you shall not eat; when you eat 
from it you shall die” (Genesis 2:16-17). In the command handed down from God we clearly see 
a parallel to the Freudian theory of the imposition of the law by the oedipal father. The first 
man—the child in oedipal terms—was originally constituted with an oceanic feeling of 
unrestricted access to the whole of existence. He felt intimately connected with all things and 
thus saw no difference between himself and the outer world.100 But once he encountered the 
restriction placed upon his desire for infinite gratification by God—the oedipal father—he 
immediately distinguished himself from the rest of creation.101 And it was at this point that the 
drive to restore an earlier state, the regressive side of Eros, was first felt by man. 
This becomes all the more evident when we consider that, immediately following his 
decree, God observed, “It is not good for the man to be alone. I will make a helper suited to him” 
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(Genesis 2:18). Prior to the imposition of the first law, there is no textual mention of the fact that 
the man was alone. Rather he saw himself as united to the earth from which he was made and to 
the God from whom he received the breath of life. Following the emergence of the law, however, 
the Adamic man began to distinguish himself from everything else. (For instance, in Genesis 
2:19 he names the various animals formed by God. The naming of creatures is a clear 
recognition on the part of the first man that those creatures are external to, and not at one with, 
his existence. Only after he sees that they are separate from him does he feel the need to give 
them distinct names). Moreover, it was at this point that Eve—the suitable partner with whom 
the first man could be physically united and thus mimic the union he had previously felt with the 
whole of existence—was created. 
It now becomes clear that, in oedipal terms, the imposition of the law by God (the father 
figure) acted as an external prompting which caused the first man (the infant) to recognize 
himself as distinct from the entirety of existence thus destroying his oceanic feeling of 
connectedness with the whole world (his oneness with his mother’s breast). Just as the child first 
recognizes his own autonomy because of the restriction imposed upon him from without, so too 
did the Adamic man first understand his isolation and individuation after God commanded that 
he not eat from the tree of knowledge. 
e. The Sins of Space and Time 
For Freud, the restriction placed upon the child’s unimpeded access to his mother by his 
father marks not only the first instance of individuation for the child but also the first instance of 
internal conflict. Never before has the infant been told No. Never before has he been restricted. 
He must now deal with the frustration brought on by the fact that his father has stolen from him 
that which he desires most: full gratification. In doing so, his father has forced particularity and 
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limitation upon what had previously seemed like an infinite existence. Hatred wells up in the 
child. He desires to kill his father. And yet something within him still loves and admires the man 
who protects him. Turmoil rages within. This inner conflict constitutes much of the individual’s 
mental life. From his infancy through his adulthood, his internal constitution consists of dealing 
with this perpetual struggle. 
Although the Genesis narrative neglects to explicitly mention whether or not the Adamic 
man harbored conflicted feelings toward God, it is clear from his actions that, following the 
imposition of the law, the first man’s constitution was radically altered. The moment that he was 
made aware of his own uniqueness was the moment that he became conscious. And that moment 
marked both the beginning of man’s existence as body and the beginning of his temporality.102 It 
introduced man to the distinctions of space and time. First, it individuated man in space. Because 
God’s command marked off a single tree from every other—“From that tree you shall not eat”—
it revealed to man the otherness of each individual thing, unsettling the quasi-Thalesian unity he 
had previously known. The introduction of the law made man the one who shall not eat from the 
tree thus underscoring his radical alterity and isolating him from the world around him, the world 
that was not him, a foreign world, unfamiliar, alien, unknown. 
But in addition to this physical individuation, God’s decree also sparked in man the 
awareness of his finite temporality. For, when the law was imposed, man was awakened to the 
fact that he exists at an in-between. He exists in time. After the imposition of the law, he first 
recognized a past—the time before the law—and became aware of a future—his desire to 
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ultimately restore a past which no longer existed. He was not at the beginning nor had he reached 
his end but was in the middle, in time, finite, limited, isolated, alone. 
In a footnote above (35n90) we saw that for Augustine, God’s imposition of the law 
revealed to man the fundamental experience of his primordial separation, the sin of his being 
distinct, other, separate from God. Manoussakis, commenting on the Confessions, draws our 
attention to “Augustine’s emphasis on the literal meaning of infancy, as his ‘unspeaking stage’ in 
life” in order to clarify this very point.103 Certainly it was odd choice for the Bishop of Hippo to 
begin his Confessions with a discussion of “my earliest days and my infancy, which I do not 
remember.”104 Why, one might ask, would Augustine find it necessary to confess that which he 
had done as an infant? Why confess that of which he has no memory, that for which he cannot 
reasonably be held responsible, that for which he ought to feel neither shame nor guilt? 
Like Freud, Augustine insists that we never possessed the type of mythical purity that we 
often associate with infancy.105 For both men, our attempt to recapture a youthful innocence 
which we once experienced but have since lost is a vain illusion. (Listen to how factiously Freud 
summarizes the dominant cultural view: “Children are pure and innocent, and anyone who 
describes them otherwise can be charged with being an infamous blasphemer against the tender 
and sacred feelings of mankind. Children are alone in not falling in with these conventions”).106 
We were never pure. We were never good. The infant’s “oceanic” feeling is just that: a 
feeling.107 It was never a reality. No infant is actually one with all that is. Each of us is always 
already separate, always already alone: “Who is there to remind me of my infancy (for sin there 
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was: no one is free from sin in your sight, not even an infant whose span of earthly life is but a 
single day)?”108 
According to Manoussakis, Augustine sees man’s separation, fallenness, sin as 
manifesting itself first “in the distinction within/without, inside/outside . . . The first experience 
of fallenness is the separation from others, in terms of a distance in space.”109 That which is not 
God is separate from God. And space is the most obvious sign of man’s separation. (Think of 
how Augustine’s inability to conceive of God in anything but spatio terms distances him from 
God).110 For Augustine, the infant’s existence in space, his distinctness, his individuation inhibits 
him from being at one with the other (especially the divine Other). Space implies distance. I am 
me and not you because I am here and you are there. If I was here and you were here—if we 
were to both occupy the same space—then we would both be me or we would both be you. The 
distinction between self and other would collapse. But this is impossible. Space separates. It 
isolates. It forces us apart. 
For Augustine, the infant is the least equipped to deal with such isolation because, as his 
name implies, he is “incapable of speech.” The one who cannot speak, the in-fant (Latin), is the 
one most secluded within himself. “Little by little I began to notice where I was and I would try 
to make my wishes known to those who might satisfy them; but I was frustrated in this, because 
my desires were inside me, while other people were outside and could by no effort of 
understanding enter my mind.”111 It is this recognition of where he is that causes him to begin to 
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identify his otherness from the world around him. The infant finds himself in sin when he notices 
that others, who are not where he is, exist outside, that they are not him, and that they cannot 
intuitively know his desires, they cannot enter his mind. 
Yet if space is that which divides us from the other, it is not the sole individuating factor. 
“To this one, immediately, Augustine adds a second one: the separation from oneself, in terms of 
a distance in time.”112 For Augustine, the second sign that the infant is fallen and thus in sin is 
temporality. “My infancy has been so long dead now, whereas I am alive. But you, O Lord, are 
ever living and in you nothing dies, for you existed before the dawn of the ages and before 
anything that can be called ‘before.’”113 Here Augustine draws our attention to the radical 
dissimilarity between his own temporal being and the eternal being of the ever-living God. For 
God, “to be and to live are not two different realities, since supreme being and supreme life are 
one and the same.”114 But this cannot be said of man. For, if man’s being and his life were the 
same then Augustine would not only remember his infancy, he would find his infancy still 
present to him today. The fact that man is in time and time is in man means that man is separated 
from God who is timeless,115 from others (“our ancestors”) with whom he shares continuity but 
not unity, and from himself—a self “so long dead,” continually dying as it fades further and 
further into a nonexistent past. 
Augustine sums up the sin of separation made evident by our individuation in space and 
time when asks, “And if I was even conceived in iniquity, and with sin my mother nourished me 
in her womb, where, I beg of you, my God, where was I, your servant, ever innocent? Where, 
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Lord, and when?”116 The answer to this question, as we have seen, is the answer provided by 
Freud, the answer offered by our reading Genesis—we were never truly innocent, never 
“limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘oceanic,’” never connected to the whole of existence as the 
Adamic man believed. “Both experiences, separation from others, namely space, and separation 
from oneself, namely time, are but two aspects of the same condition, of the diastemic [i.e. 
distanced, separated] nature of the fallen creation.”117 
f. Eat and You Shall Die: the Birth of Thanatos 
Following his recognition of his separation and individuation from the world outside him, 
from his God, and even from himself, the Adamic man was then separated further: “So the Lord 
God cast a deep sleep on the man, and while he was asleep, he took out one of his ribs and closed 
up its place with flesh. The Lord God then built the rib that he had taken from the man into a 
woman” (Genesis 2:21-22). The first man was undoubtedly pleased with his father figure for 
having provided him with a companion—one who, by their communal life together, could help 
him to transcend his finite individuation and begin to satisfy his erotic drive toward unity. The 
language of oneness with which he describes the first woman tells us as much: “This one, at last, 
is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; This one shall be called ‘woman,’ for out of man this 
one has been taken” (Genesis 2:23). Yet though he now had a suitable partner, he did not have 
the full, unrestricted infinity which he desired most of all. He was still limited, still finite, still 
lacking. His regressive Eros still longed to recapture the time before the imposition of the law. 
His progressive Eros still drove him forward toward a life lived more abundantly. He could not 
achieve a repetition of his original state and had yet to reach the eschatological fulfillment of his 
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perfection. He was no longer at the beginning, not yet at the end, restricted by space and time—
but he longed to be as limitless as God . . . Enter the serpent. 
In Genesis 3 we are introduced to the story’s great antagonist, the most cunning of all 
animals, the serpent. From the time of the earliest scriptural exegetes, the serpent has been 
identified with Satan. For our purposes, however, it is more important to recognize him as the 
one who gave voice to the internal struggle which had taken root in the heart of the first man.118 
Though the text speaks of the snake as in dialogue with the woman, it also makes note of the fact 
that “her husband . . . was with her” (Genesis 3:6). We can infer, then, that when the serpent 
asked “Did God really say, ‘You shall not eat from any of the trees in the garden’?” (Genesis 
3:1), he stated aloud a question that had haunted the Adamic man from the moment the first law 
was imposed: why has God restricted me? The woman—who was created after the imposition of 
the law—replied by explaining God’s command (cf. Genesis 3:2-3). The man, however, 
remained silent. He could not speak. For, the serpent had given voice to his innermost struggle. 
His Creator had restricted him, cut off his feeling of unity, left his erotic drive toward the 
abundance of life unfulfilled—and for that he hated his Creator. Yet his Creator had created him, 
provided him with a companion, given him dominion over the earth—and for that he loved his 
Creator. The internal conflict raged on. 
At this point it is important return to the Freudian Totemic myth quoted above. We ought 
now to note that one of the key tenets of Freud’s theory is the recognition by the child that, in the 
face of his father’s restriction, he is helpless. Though he may be frustrated and internally 
conflicted, though he may hate his father, though he may even desire to kill his father, he also 
realizes that he is weaker than his father. And thus he is unable to resist the enforcement of the 
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law. This discrepancy between the strength of the restrictor and the weakness of the restricted is 
lessened, however, when the child finds himself among companions who harbor similar 
resentments toward their father. Freud quotes Atkinson: “The patriarch had only one enemy 
whom he should dread . . . a youthful band of brothers living together in forced celibacy [i.e. 
with a restricted, unsatisfied erotic drive] . . . A horde as yet weak in their impubescence they 
are, but they would, when strength was gained with time, inevitably wrench by combined 
attacks, renewed again and again, both wife and life from the paternal tyrant.”119 When faced 
with the reality that they as individuals are too weak to overcome the restrictions put in place by 
their dominant father, the Totemic children join together in rebellion. “United, they [have] the 
courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them 
individually.”120 They kill their father and—in an attempt to satisfy their oedipal drive toward 
oceanic oneness—reclaim access to their mother. 
Returning now to the Genesis narrative, we find that we are confronted by yet another 
striking similarity. Frustrated by the fact that he had been truncated, individuated, cut off from 
infinity, and forced to live under the law, the Adamic man harbored hatred toward God. 
Recognizing this hatred in her companion, the first woman began to feel isolated from her 
partner. For, hatred is the opposite of Eros and its drive for unity. Where Eros unites, hatred 
divides. The first woman thus identified her own distinctness from the man whose rib had given 
her life. Upon hearing the man’s discontent voiced through the mouth of the snake, she too began 
to build up resentment toward her Creator. Filled with malice, the two banned together in 
murderous rebellion against their heavenly Father. 
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. . . the snake [voicing the desires of Adam] said to the woman: “You certainly 
will not die! God knows well that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened and 
you will be like gods, who know good and evil.” The woman saw that the tree 
was good for food and pleasing to the eyes, and the tree was desirable for gaining 
wisdom. So she took some of its fruit and ate it; and she also gave some to her 
husband, who was with her, and he ate it (Genesis 3:4-6). 
This first instance of human pride constituted nothing short of the attempted murder of God. For, 
what is sin but an attempt to destroy God and replace him with the self?121 Implicit in such an act 
is, of course, the assertion that God is not the greatest good—that the will of the self is greater 
than the will of God. But a God whose will could be so easily usurped is a God whose will is 
flawed. And a God with a flawed will is himself flawed, destructible, subject to decay. Thus 
when the first man preferred himself to his God and chose himself over and against his God, he 
banned together with the first woman and the two attempted history’s first patricide—or, to be 
more accurate, history’s first deicide.122 As Meister Eckhart notes, to sin against God is to “do 
violence to God and kill Him.”123 
In short, the original sin was the Adamic spouses’ attempt to make gods out of 
themselves: “you will be like gods.” But what does this mean, to make gods out of themselves? It 
can only mean that they perverted their erotic drive by attempting to fulfill its end by their own 
means. Their drive for life was a drive for communion, a drive toward godliness. But godliness 
can only be gained through unity, connectedness, oneness with he who is Life itself. And it can 
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only be accomplished on his terms. By attempting to bring about self-divinization, they perverted 
their Eros and, in its place, introduced death into the world. Thanatos was born. In this purely 
destructive act, the drive toward death made itself manifest. It has plagued the human psyche 
ever since. 
Thanatos, then, is neither regressive nor progressive. It is perversion. It is sin. It seeks to 
accomplish the abundance of life sought by Eros on its own terms. Eros is a unitive drive. It is a 
drive that necessitates otherness, a drive that finds its fulfillment in communion with the other. 
Further, it is a drive which seeks to redeem the whole of human history. From its place in the 
present, its regressive nature harkens back to the moment of Creation while its progressive nature 
extends forward toward the Eschaton. Thanatos is a movement away from communion, a purely 
destructive drive which seeks to undo unity. Unlike Eros, which affirms the goodness of time, 
Thanatos denies temporality by attempting to bring about the end goal here and now, by means 
of itself. It refuses to allow the end to unfold in the fullness of time.124 While the regressive and 
progressive tendencies of Eros are satisfied from without—by a God who restores man to glory 
and delivers him to eschatological beatitude—the perversion of Thanatos seeks self-fulfillment, 
self-glorification, self-actualization which can only result in self-destruction. Eros is led to life 
by the other. Thanatos is led to death by the self. Eros is grace from without. Thanatos is sin 
from within. Eros is the fullness of time and the unity of existence. Thanatos is the negation of 
time and the void of nothingness. And as Freud—sounding oddly reminiscent Milton: “It was 
from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving 
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together, leaped forth into the world”—notes, these two drives have struggled and will struggle 




Creation: Eros as Word 
In the last chapter, we saw that for Augustine, man’s recognition of his finite, temporal 
existence—the fundamental experience of his primordial separation made manifest in the 
limitations placed upon him by space and time—reveals his fallenness, his fragmentation, his 
distance from the world, himself, his neighbor, and his God. Yet as Augustine’s emphasis on the 
isolation of the unspeaking stage of infancy makes clear, the sins of separation are not without 
remedy even in this fallen world. Language, Manoussakis tells us, emerges in the Confessions as 
an “effort to cope with separation by allowing the subject to enter the world of the symbolic 
substitution—a world shared with other subjects whereby the communication of symbols creates 
a community in place of a lost unity [and] allows the subject to communicate its desires to itself 
and to others.”125 In language we see for the first time man’s erotic striving toward unity.126 To 
repeat a point made in the previous chapter, human language does not arise until after man has 
become aware of his individuation in space and time following the imposition of the law (cf. 
Genesis 2:19). It is that awareness—that experience of separation and isolation—that gives rise 
to the desire for unity which language seeks to provide. 
a. Diastema: Language in a Fallen World 
Augustine, we noted above, begins his Confessions with infancy not only because the 
infant is born into the fallenness of space and time but also because the infant is the least 
equipped to deal with his isolation. The in-fant—he who is without speech—is woefully 
confined within himself: “I would try to make my wishes known to those who might satisfy 
them; but I was frustrated in this, because my desires were inside me, while other people were 
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outside.”127 The first experience of trauma, Manoussakis writes, is precisely this “separation 
from others, in terms of a distance in space.”128 Yet the child is not without recourse. The 
unspeaking phase of human existence does not last forever. Soon the child moves beyond 
infancy and develops the ability to cope with his limited condition: 
I was no longer an infant who lacked the faculty of speech, but a boy who could 
talk . . . I gradually built up a collection of words, observing them as they were 
used in their proper places in different sentences and hearing them frequently. I 
came to understand which things they signified, and by schooling my own mouth 
to utter them I declared my wishes by using the same signs. Thus I learned to 
express my needs to the people among whom I lived, and they made their wishes 
known to me; and I waded deeper into the stormy world of human life.129 
“Language here, as in Freud’s celebrated example of the child’s game while uttering 
alternatively the words ‘fort/da,’ becomes the means to cope with and remedy a painful 
absence,” the absence of the other.130 Language bridges the space between self and other by 
reaching out of the self and making known to the other the self’s wants and wishes. It also allows 
the other to share his desires with the self. Thus although space continues to separate and divide, 
language reaches across the abyss and counteracts its isolating effects. 
But language not only seeks to repair the separation forced upon man by space; it also 
wars against the disjointing effects of time. We said earlier that time separates us from ourselves. 
Augustine’s infancy, his past-self which is “so long dead,” no longer exists. In fact, he is so far 
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removed from that former-self that he cannot remember it at all.131 Yet it is language—the stories 
told to him by those who knew him as an infant—that helps him to remember that which cannot 
be remembered. It is narrative—the stories he tells himself about himself—that provides some 
semblance of unity to his fragmented existence.132 
Still, if language arises as a potential remedy for man’s fallenness—the separation that 
divides the self from both itself and its other—the solution offered by language can only ever be 
partial. For, as a “symptom of separation,” the unity that language brings is always already 
grounded in and regulated by man’s fallen nature.133 (As Lacan notes, “by communing in 
speech,” we testify to the fact that we are not “one” with one another).134 Employing the use of 
the concept diastema—a concept developed by the 4th century Church Father Gregory of Nyssa 
(one which Marion links to Augustine’s distentio animi: the dissention of the soul in time)135—
Manoussakis argues that language is necessarily limited by the “qualitatively infinite abyss” that 
separates the created world from the uncreated God.136 
[F]or the bishop of Nyssa, diastema is a sine qua non condition of the creation . . . 
and the negative α-διαστατος is reserved only for the divine. The reasons for this 
distinction are quite apparent: one of the primary meanings of diastema is 
“dimension,” in the sense we use this term today to speak of the four dimensions 
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of our universe. Diastema presupposes and requires a dimensional world (i.e. a 
material and temporal world) where things have length, height, depth, and 
duration. Diastema, thus understood, is translated as interval (in both spatial and 
temporal senses) . . . It is . . . the insurmountable distance that separates the 
uncreated God from creation.137 
“Such a separation,” Manoussakis continues, “has far-reaching consequences for language.”138 
For, there can be no language without the distance of space and the duration of time;139 “the very 
birth of language is organized by the spatial and temporal interplay between presence and 
absence—the need to make present, if only in symbolic form, what is absent.”140 
Because language operates in this fallen, diastemic world and as a consequence thereof, 
language can—contrary to its unitive intent—be the cause of disunity and pain. It is “the source 
of misconceptions and misunderstandings” which only emphasizes “my separation from the 
Other . . . all the more, even while attempting to reach out and communicate oneself to 
another.”141 It is necessarily limited, confined by the same restraints (namely space and time) that 
it seeks to overcome.142 It can be used for propaganda and manipulation, it can speak falsity and 
lead to self-deception, it can do violence and it can destroy.143 
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The ambiguous nature of language, Manoussakis tells us, “is centered on the 
supplementary function of its signification, where the absent thing is rendered present by its 
corresponding sign.”144 Language thus “creates an illusion of presence under which the absence 
of what is absent remains hidden.”145 (Think here of Plato’s criticism of the poets and sophists 
who only re-present, using false images, a shadowy likeness of a truth that resists their 
disingenuous attempts at articulation). But the problem of language extends further still. For, if 
language can provide some semblance of relief for the painful isolation felt by a self trapped 
within itself, so too does it open up the possibility of muteness—a possibility which furthers 
man’s isolation by inclosing him deeper within himself, ensnaring him in an unfreedom of his 
own making. 
b. det Indesluttede: Language and the Sickness unto Death 
In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard tells us that “Language, the word, is precisely 
what saves, what saves the individual from the empty abstraction of inclosing reserve.”146 For, 
language “does indeed imply communication” and communication implies community, a 
common unity between the self and others. Inclosing reserve, on the other hand, “is precisely 
muteness.”147 It is “the demonic”: “an unfreedom that wants to close itself off,”148 a self that 
“closes itself up within itself,”149 that “closes itself off more and more from communication.”150 
The demonic does not close itself up with something, but it closes itself up within 
itself, and in this lies what is profound about existence [Tilvaerselsen], precisely 
that unfreedom makes itself a prisoner. Freedom is always communicerende 
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[communicating] (it does no harm even to take into consideration the religious 
significance of this word); unfreedom becomes more and more inclosed 
[indesluttet] and does not want communication.151 
Kierkegaard, like Augustine before him, recognizes the healing power of the word. It is language 
that reaches beyond the self and, by allowing the self to communicate with others, frees the self 
from itself—a self otherwise concerned only with itself, a self isolated and alone. 
Yet if freedom is always communicating, still, Kierkegaard warns, not all communication 
leads to freedom.152 In fact, it often happens that the muteness of inclosing reserve is born of the 
failure of language. “All misapprehension,” Kierkegaard asserts, “stems from speech.”153 For, 
“comparison is implicit in talking, especially in conversation”154 and “All worldly worry has its 
basis in a person’s unwillingness to be contented with being a human being, in his worried 
craving for distinction by way of comparison.”155 While silence—especially the relational silence 
of the good156—“means nothing at all by way of comparison,”157 the chatter of human language 
operates by means of comparison. (I am speaking of this and not that, she is better than he but 
worse than her, not now but later, etc.). To speak is to compare. To use language is to single out 
one aspect of existence and designate it over and against everything else. And this comparing, 
inescapable as it may be, causes man to become dissatisfied with being what he is. 
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According to Kierkegaard, when I compare myself with another, I fail to appreciate the 
inherit value and dignity that I possess simply by being what I am. When I compare, I become 
envious; I wish to be something more than what I am. Or I grow proud; I exalt some aspect of 
my being—some “distinction”—above my humanity itself. I prioritize the part over the whole, 
the accident over the essence, and foolishly believe that my worth lies in something beyond the 
simple yet glorious fact that I am a human being. 
Comparison, which is inseparable from language, incloses me deeper and deeper within 
myself. It robs me of the freedom that I am and imprisons me by convincing me that I ought to 
strive for the unfreedom that I am not. “[I]f a human being . . . is contented with being a human 
being, he does not become sick with temporal things, he remains in the place assigned to him; 
and if he remains there, then it is true that he, by being a human being, is more glorious than 
Solomon’s glory.”158 But language is not content with allowing man to simply be what he is. It 
always adds or detracts, attempts to enhance or diminish, makes distinctions by way of 
comparison. Language is “sick with temporal things,” comparing this to that, and craving more 
than the place assigned to it. (Think of our earlier discussion of Thanatos, its unwillingness to 
accept things as they are, its attempt to fulfill itself by means of itself). 
“Let us consider Solomon,” Kierkegaard continues. “When he puts on his royal purple 
robes and sits majestically on his throne in all his glory—well, then there is also ceremonial 
address, and the one speaking says: Your Majesty.”159 Language, Kierkegaard makes clear, acts 
like the king’s royal robes; it masks man’s humanity like the fig leaves that hide the nakedness of 
Adam (Genesis 3:7). Solomon, a man, becomes “Your Majesty” when compared with his 
subjects. He is exalted by ceremonial ad-dress just as “the one speaking” is lowered by having to 
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address him in such a manner. And yet this—to continue the parallel with the Adamic myth—is 
nothing but a means of concealing his shame (cf. Genesis 2:25).160 For, “when the most solemn 
term of address is to be used in the eternal language of earnestness, then we say: Man!”161 
Man! Not “Your Majesty.” Not “King.” A word that situates Solomon in the exact place 
he is meant to be, the place assigned to him at birth. To address Solomon as a man “does not 
mean that we are speaking disdainfully. On the contrary, we are using the highest term of 
address, because to be a human being is not lower than diversities but is raised above them.”162 
While the eternal language of earnestness remains silent about the superficial differences 
between man and man—for, such differences amount to nothing at all—human language must 
compare and its comparisons are most untrue. In comparing the diversity among individuals, it 
compares nothing to nothing. It conceals the glorious truth of man’s humanity behind the untruth 
of superfluity. It closes man up within himself turning his freedom into a prison, his language 
into a muteness which says nothing at all. “And from the spiritual point of view, that person who 
. . . has cunningly shut himself in and thereby trapped himself, has in fact . . . trapped himself 
unto death.”163 
For Kierkegaard, the comparison implicit in human language gives rise to the muteness 
of inclosing reserve, the sickness of despair. It causes man to compare himself with others, to 
fixate on his comparisons, to crave distinction and clothe himself in the (illusory) distinctions 
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bestowed upon him by himself and others. More than that, it leads him to become dissatisfied 
with being what he is. 
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard tells us that this dissatisfaction, this desire to be 
other than what one is, is precisely despair. It is the desire to rid oneself of oneself, to consume 
oneself, to reduce oneself to nothing at all.164 Although despair may seem to be caused by some 
external thing, when one despairs, one actually despairs over being himself and over his inability 
to do away with himself. 
For example, when the ambitious man whose slogan is ‘Either Caesar or nothing’ 
does not get to be Caesar, he despairs over it. But this also means something else: 
precisely because he did not get to be Caesar, he cannot bear to be himself . . . 
[T]his self is now utterly intolerable to him. In a deeper sense, it is not his failure 
to become Caesar that is intolerable, but it is this self that did not become Caesar 
that is intolerable; or, to put it more accurately, what is intolerable to him is that 
he cannot get rid of himself.165 
Despair, the sickness unto death, is for Kierkegaard a symptom of our fallen human nature. No 
one is free from its crippling effects.166 Every one of us is trapped within a prison of his own 
dissatisfaction. (Either one despairs over not wanting to be himself or one despairs over wanting 
to be himself. In the latter scenario, the self “wants to be master of itself or to create itself,”167 “to 
enjoy the total satisfaction of making itself into itself, of developing itself, of being itself”168—
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which of course reveals a deep-seated discontent with what one is: a contingent being who can 
never possess the kind of limitless self-determination that it craves).169 
This dissatisfaction with being a human being causes man to fixate on himself, to inclose 
himself within himself, to become a prisoner in the prison of the self. Here, then, we see why 
Kierkegaard calls language the serpent in the Garden.170 Here we begin to understand why he 
refers to it as “the power of the devil.”171 For, it is language that tempts man to despair by 
tempting him to compare and it is language that reveals man’s despair because he cannot but 
compare. Language is the fallenness in which man lives.172 Or, worse still, it is root cause of the 
perversion of man’s erotic drive toward unity. It is language, after all, spoken through the mouth 
of the snake that gives voice to man’s Thanatonic desire. It is language that convinces man: “you 
will be like gods” (Genesis 3:5).173 
c. Proballein and Promittere: Language Sends Us Forth 
We have dedicated a good amount of this chapter to the inability of language to heal the 
ruptures of space and time. The failure of language to achieve its intended aim and the dangers 
that follow therefrom reveal why language stands at the foundation of the erotic life and does not 
constitute its completion. Yet as Heidegger quoting Hölderlin tells us: “where danger is, 
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grows/The saving power also.”174 And language, we must reiterate, is the first movement of 
Eros’s healing drive toward unity. Before they can do anything else, lovers must speak. They 
must express their desire—both to themselves and to one another—in words or gestures, through 
conversation or by speaking without speaking in a glance, a look, a biting of the lip, a running of 
the fingers through the hair. And if this first movement of Eros is incomplete in itself, still it 
gestures at and prefigures a fulfillment yet to come. Language, we have seen, is problematic. But 
language is also promise. It is, as Julia Kristeva has said, love.175 Language reaches out of itself 
and extends toward the future, sending us forth with a desire that longs to be fulfilled. 
d. Pharmakon: Language as Poison and Cure 
The problem of language—that language is problematic—but also the promise—that it 
can be used to heal—is one of the earliest insights offered by philosophy. In the first lines of the 
trial of Socrates, we are introduced to the idea that language in itself is neither healing nor 
harmful but can be used or abused to varying ends. It has the potential to communicate “the 
whole truth” even when “spoken at random and expressed in the first words that come to mind;” 
but it can also carry us away “in spite of [ourselves]” when it is spoken “persuasively,” even if 
“hardly anything of what [was] said is true” (Apology 17a). Here, Plato makes the distinction 
between content and style, between what is said and how it is said (a distinction that will one day 
lead Augustine, the accomplished rhetorician, to give up his worldly aspirations and pursue 
higher things).176 This dichotomy between the proper use of language (“the excellence . . . of a 
speaker lies in telling the truth” (18a)) and its abuse is personified in the distinction made by 
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Plato again and again between two types of speakers: philosophers, who “put [their] trust in the 
justice of what [they] say” (17c), and sophists, who “toy with words” and express themselves in 
“embroidered and stylized phrases” (17c) in order to deceive others with their “many lies” (17a). 
And yet, what does it mean to put one’s trust the justice of one’s words when one readily 
admits that he does not know what a word like “justice” really means (Republic 354c)? (Have we 
not been warned that it is precisely the sophist who makes use of such indefinable terms in 
defense of his position (Phaedrus 263a-b))? That language is for Plato a pharmakon—a drug 
which, though neutral in and of itself, can be used to heal by those who know what they are 
doing and abused as a poison by those who know not—has been demonstrated at length.177 Of 
interest to our discussion, however, is the link that Derrida, in his reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, 
draws between the ambiguity of language as pharmakon (medicine/poison) and the pharmakeus 
(magician/sorcerer/poisoner) who makes use of that pharmakon. For, as Derrida notes, if the 
drug of language in the hands of the sophist is used for sorcery, if it has the power to carry others 
away in spite of themselves, so too is it a bewitching agent when employed by the 
philosopher.178 And if the pharmakeus who goes by the title “sophist” is merely a magician who 
toys with words, the pharmakeus known as “philosopher” is that par excellence.179 After all, he 
alone knows that no one knows what the words they are using mean (cf. Apology 21a-23b; 
Phaedrus 263a). 
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Rightly, then, has Socrates been accused of making the worse argument into the stronger 
and teaching others to do the same (Apology 19b). Rightly has it been said that he is “always in a 
state of perplexity,” that he “bring[s] others to the same state,” that he is “bewitching and 
beguiling . . . simply putting [others] under a spell” (Meno 80a). Indeed, Meno goes so far as to 
suggest that if Socrates were to leave the city of Athens, he would be persecuted for “practicing 
sorcery” (80b). Perhaps this is why, with the lone exception of his mandated military service, the 
father of philosophy has never left the city of his birth (Crito 52b). Perhaps he knows that outside 
of the city walls, he will be recognized for what he is: a sophist of the highest order. Perhaps he 
has spent so much time among the men of Athens that he has bewitched them and concealed 
from them the face of a satyr hidden behind his philosopher’s mask (cf. Symposium 215b-c). 
For Derrida, this unintended association between philosophy and sophistry reveals a 
deeper truth about language itself. If the philosopher is really the sophist in disguise and thus the 
sophist par excellence—so convincing in his sophistry that he conceals his identity as a sophist 
altogether—then all discourse is sophistry, all language deception, the logos of the philosopher 
nothing more than mythos behind a mask. But if Derrida’s reading is correct, if Plato unwittingly 
discloses the reciprocity that exists between Socrates and the sophist when trying to distinguish 
the two, why then, contrary to Meno’s warning, is Socrates arrested and tried as a sophist—in 
Athens? Are his fellow Athenians so shrewd as to discover that which every subsequent reader of 
Plato until Derrida has missed? 
No, Derrida is right to notice that the setting of the Phaedrus reveals something 
remarkable about the text;180 he is right to read into the setting a subtle affirmation of the 
importance of mythos over and against logos; but he is wrong to think that Socrates’s little 
excursion “beyond the city walls” (Phaedrus 230d) places him on the side of the sophists. As we 
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will see, if Socrates the pharmakeus bears a resemblance to those who Plato refers to by using 
the same name, it is not because he is one of them but because in order to cure an illness—in this 
case the sickness that is the human condition—a physician must know how to administer drugs. 
e. Logos and Mythos: Truth and What Truth is Like 
In his reading of the Phaedrus, Derrida draws our attention to the beginning of the text 
where Socrates is lured “outside the city walls” by Phaedrus’s promise to discuss the speech of 
Lysias (Phaedrus 227a-c). That the entirety of the dialogue occurs beyond the city limits is, he 
rightly insists, no minor detail. “The topoi of the dialogue are never indifferent. The themes, the 
topics, the (common-)places, in a rhetorical sense are strictly inscribed, comprehended each time 
within a significant site.”181 Of all the Platonic texts, the Phaedrus is the only one staged outside 
of Athens. Its setting in the countryside along the river Ilissus can thus be read as 
“correspond[ing] to an infallible calculation or necessity” which dictates the tone and direction 
of the conversation to come.182 Here, Plato tells us, is the place where, according to legend, 
Boreas (the personification of the north wind) abducted Oreithuia, daughter of the Athenian king 
(229b). At the supposed site of this myth, “Socrates begins by sending myths off.”183 “To give 
myths a send-off: a salute, a vacation, a dismissal;” “Not in order to reject them absolutely, but, 
on the one hand, not bothering them, leaving them alone, making room for them, in order to free 
them from the heavy serious naïveté of the scientific ‘rationalists,’ and on the other, not 
bothering with them, in order to free oneself for the relation with oneself and the pursuit of self-
knowledge”—this, according to Derrida, is the aim of the Phaedrus.184  
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Yet, as Derrida himself will note, this attempt to leave mythos behind is twice interrupted 
in the dialogue by the telling of two original Platonic myths. And what is more, by setting the 
conversation at the scene of a myth, Plato already gestures at the relation between philosophy 
and narrative, truth and the stories we tell. If, as Derrida asserts, the “hermeneutic adventure” of 
deciphering myths is to be left “to the sophists,”185 how then ought we to interpret the myth-
making of Plato? What can it mean to say that “Socrates begins by sending myths off” if we 
know that, at the end of his life, he welcomes them back again (Phaedo 107a-115a)? 
Let us attend to the text more closely to see if we can decipher an answer to these 
perplexities. “Phaedrus, my friend,” Socrates begins, “Where have you been? And where are you 
going?” (Phaedrus 227a).186 Phaedrus answers that he has spent the morning listening to 
Lysias’s speech on Eros and that he is now going for a walk outside of the city. To this Socrates 
replies, “So Lysias, I take it, is in the city?” (227b). We begin already to see the contrast that 
Plato is drawing between Socrates and Lysias, the philosopher and the sophist. While Lysias’s 
speeches (logoi) are given within the city itself, Socrates is “free to come along and listen,” 
engaging in dialogue beyond the city walls (227b) at the site of an ancient myth (229b). Contrary 
to Derrida’s assertion that Socrates’s trip outside of Athens places him in the realm of the 
sophists, leaving the city actually represents a departure from the land where sophistry reigns 
supreme:187 
Phaedrus, whose name means ‘bright’, ‘beaming’ and ‘radiant’, which suggests 
presence and aligns him with logos, takes a walk outside the city as a respite from 
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his fatiguing immersion in logos. It is here that he encounters Socrates . . . Insofar 
as Phaedrus is associated with the logoi delivered within the confines of the city, 
Socrates is an outsider and, up to this point, is aligned with the occult and 
ambiguous nature of mythos.188 
To further underscore the point, consider that Lysias, the sophist—one of the “intellectuals” 
(sophoí) who Socrates chides for demythologizing the story said to have taken place beyond the 
city walls (229c)—remains within the limits of the city while Socrates, the philosopher, has 
received a “divinely inspired release from normally accepted behavior” (265a) and thus finds 
himself outside of the polis among the Muses in the land of mythos (237a).189 
What our reading of the Phaedrus now makes clear is that, contrary to Derrida’s 
assertion, it is actually the sophist and not the philosopher who “begins by sending myths off.” It 
is the man who calls himself wise—sophistḗs literally means “wise man,” a title which Socrates 
explicitly rejects in favor of “wisdom’s lover” (Phaedrus 278d)—and not the lover of wisdom 
who believes he can dispense with myths by “explain[ing] them away and mak[ing] them 
plausible by means of some sort of rough ingenuity” (Phaedrus 229e). The philosopher, on the 
other hand, knows that he is not wise, that “human wisdom is worth little or nothing” (Apology 
23a), and thus he has “no time for such” demythologizing (Phaedrus 229e). Hence, whereas 
Derrida reads Plato as establishing the logos/mythos binary, a closer reading of the text actually 
reveals something subtler and more nuanced—the attempt by Plato, through the creation of 
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original myths, to transcend such binary thinking all together.190 (That such a move anticipates 
Nietzsche ought, I think, to make us reevaluate the standard readings of Nietzsche).  
In order to see this, we have first to understand that, when cutoff from one another, both 
logos and mythos are incomplete. Logos without mythos falters because it never fully captures 
that of which it speaks, never articulates, never expresses a truth that always transcends it; thus it 
depends upon story, analogy, metaphor, myth.191 (Hence, Nietzsche’s critique of the supposed 
objectivity garnered through scientific inquiry and logical deduction: “When they see to their 
horror how logic coils up at these boundaries [of thought] and finally bites its own tail—
suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, tragic insight which, merely to be endured, 
needs art as a protection and remedy”).192 Mythos, on the other hand, when given without reason, 
becomes nonsensical—meaningless, purposeless, trivial, banal. (Hence, Plato’s disdain for the 
poets who “do not compose their poems with knowledge, but by some inborn talent and by 
inspiration, like seers and prophets who also say many fine things without any understanding of 
what they say” (Apology 22c)). Said differently—and to borrow a line of thinking from Kant—
unreflective mythos is dumb, logos without artistry is blind. Both speak falsely. Both lead astray. 
That Derrida (mis)reads Plato as merely attempting to transform mythos into logos 
reveals his bias: he only sees half of the picture. And while it is certainly true that “Plato 
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succeeded in overcoming the mythical, demonic, and orgiastic character of Greek cults” with his 
philosophy,193 it is equally true that his philosophy—and the philosophy of his teacher—was 
born of the failure of logos, the realization that “human wisdom is worth little or nothing,” that 
even the wisdom of the wisest man is worthless (Apology 23a-b). Thus for Plato, the philosopher 
must make use of mythos and, indeed, must work to transform logos into mythos. It is the goal of 
the dialogues to reconcile logos with mythos, to get these two creatures who share one head to 
use their head to work together. 
Plato does this, in part, by creating new stories. (A new art-form says Nietzsche).194 Not 
unreflective, senseless stories like the poets of his day but stories that move his readers toward an 
inexpressible truth by telling them what that truth is like.195 For, although he insists that the gods 
alone are capable of attaining knowledge of truth in its fullness, still, he says, it is “humanly 
possible” to provide an analogy, an image of what that truth might be like (246a). This saying 
what truth is like, this understanding of the analogy of being, is the wedding of logos to mythos. 
It is Plato’s approach to philosophy itself—an attempt to overcome the failures of inarticulate 
logos and unthinking mythos by giving oneself over to a divine madness, the Eros that inspires 
the lover of wisdom to ascend from the beauty in this world toward the beauty of truth itself 
(249c-e). 
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f. Pharmakos: New Myths, New Sacrifices, a New Religion 
That our reading of Plato’s Phaedrus conflicts with the reading put forth by Derrida 
ought not to dissuade us from borrowing freely from his work, especially when it promises to 
enrich our own. If we disagree with his assertion that, in the figure of Socrates, Plato 
inadvertently presents us with an image of the reciprocity that exists between the philosopher and 
the sophist—that logos is nothing but mythos in disguise—still we are forced by his commentary 
(and indeed by the text itself) to question why Plato chooses to use the same term, pharmakeus, 
to refer to both the father of philosophy and those descended from the father of lies. Here, 
Derrida’s introduction of the missing term, pharmakos—which Plato never utters but which 
Derrida, by “untangl[ing] the hidden forces of attraction linking a present word with an absent 
word in the text of Plato,”196 connects to pharmakon, pharmakeus—is particularly insightful. 
As Derrida tells us, “pharmakos (wizard, magician, poisoner)” is “a word that can, on one 
of its faces, be considered the synonym, almost the homonym, of . . . pharmakeus (which Plato 
uses), but with the unique feature of having been overdetermined, overlaid by Greek culture with 
another function. Another role, and a formidable one.”197 It is by the attending to the cultural 
usage of this unuttered term that we begin to make sense not only of Plato’s decision to call 
Socrates a pharmakeus but also of his understanding of the role of philosophy and the unique 
way the philosopher administers the pharmakon of language. 
“The character of the pharmakos,” writes Derrida, “has been compared to a scapegoat. 
The evil and the outside, the expulsion of evil, its exclusion out of the body (and out) of the 
city—these are the two major senses of the character and of the ritual.”198 The pharmakoi, we are 
told, were typically put to death. They were offered as sacrifices to the gods for the purification 
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of the city. Derrida quotes at length from the 12th century Byzantine poet John Tzetzes’s 
reckoning of the matter: 
The (rite of the) pharmakos was a purification of this sort of old. If a calamity 
overtook the city by the wrath of God , whether it were famine or pestilence or 
any other mischief, they led forth as though to a sacrifice the most unsightly of 
them all199 as a purification and a remedy to the suffering city. They set the 
sacrifice in the appointed place, and gave him cheese with their hands and a 
barley cake and figs,200 and seven times they smote him with leeks and wild figs 
and other wild plants. Finally they burnt him with fire with the wood of wild trees 
and scattered the ashes into the sea and to the winds, for a purification, as I said, 
of the suffering city.201 
That such a sacrificial offering should be made to the gods for the sake of the polis, the people, 
that “the wrath of God” might be satiated by such a sacrifice, a murder that leads to purification 
and unity, ought, I think, to immediately bring to mind other, more prominent ritualistic murders. 
(Indeed, has Derrida not shown us that a text may, and positively does, contain within itself not 
only that which it contains but also that which it excludes, that which is outside, other, the trace 
of everything left unsaid?). In the context of the dialogues, for instance, the resonances with the 
death of Socrates are obvious. Not only has the god ordered this “most unsightly” of men to 
sacrifice wealth and honor and even the wellbeing of his family to live the life of an 
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impoverished philosopher (Apology 23b), he has placed him in the city as a “gift” and “gadfly” 
meant to rouse the people into reforming their impure ways (30e). And when the men of Athens 
refuse, they sacrifice him—forcing this pharmakeus to ingest a pharmakon the day after the 
annual rite of the pharmakos has taken place (Phaedo 58a-c).202 
It is here, in connection with Plato’s depiction of Socrates as a sacrificial victim put to 
death for the purification of the city, that we begin to make sense of why Plato ascribes to 
Socrates the role of pharmakeus. For, just as Plato creates new, analogical myths which by 
expressing what truth is like overcome both the reductive literalism of the sophists (logos) and 
the unreflective mythmaking of those who “say many fine things without any understanding of 
what they say” (Apology 22c), so too is he able to provide an antidote to the poisons 
administered by two types of poisoner (pharmakeus) by undoing them, as it were, from within. 
If the philosopher is meant to be a kind of doctor of the soul—able to heal the harm 
wrought by both the sophist who poisons with false words and by that older, cruder pharmakeus, 
the sorcerer, the priest—then he will need to be an expert at administering drugs. He will need to 
know how to lead the soul away from anything that might contaminate it—be it the untruth of 
lies or the impurity of lusts. But, as Nietzsche says, “The more abstract the truth is that you 
would teach, the more you have to seduce the senses to it.”203 And if that means employing the 
use of a noble lie (Republic 414b-c) or mortifying the body in order to free the soul from 
association with it (Phaedo 64a-66d), that is what the philosopher will do. He will become a 
pharmakeus of the highest order—one skilled in the use of poison, but who employs his 
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knowledge to cure rather than harm. And if, as is often the case, his patients refuse to accept the 
treatment that would heal them, if they are unaware (even willfully ignorant) of the fact that they 
are sick, how then will he be able to reach them . . . if not by taking the prescription himself? 
Indeed, is this not what Socrates does? 
In the character of Socrates, in the dialogues of Plato, we see time and again the 
overcoming of an old ideal by means of a new one—an overcoming which supplants the old 
from within. The logos of the sophists and the mythos of the poets are overcome by a new kind 
of mythos, a new art-form; one which draws readers nearer to logos by seducing them with 
mythos. The pharmakeus known as the sophist and the pharmakeus known as the priest are 
overcome by the pharmakos named Socrates; he who by his death reveals a deeper truth and 
brings a greater purification than either the intellectual or the religious has heretofore known. In 
the figure of Socrates, ancient wisdom and mythic religion are not done away with. They are 
sublimated, raised up and reborn as the love of wisdom, the ascent of the soul to the realm of the 
gods. From the death of Socrates, a new religion is born.204 And with it comes, as he himself has 
prophesized (Apology 39c), an endless lineage of disciples. 
And yet, before whom or what do these proselytes bow? What god is this? What kind of 
religion? The answer might surprise us. For, it is one with which we are familiar even today. 
(Though perhaps it goes by a different name?).205 The religion that Plato invents is a religion 
which uses “reason to put an end to . . . superstition,”206 one which brings “purification” through 
knowledge, salvation by means of “pure thought” (φρόνησις), one which “is not any more of the 
body, as [were] the religious rites [of old] . . . but rather [represents] a purification from the body, 
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as we can now speak—for the first time perhaps—of a purified mind (διάνοιαν κεκαθαρµένην, 
67c4).”207 A purified mind. And philosophy is the means of purification: “the new ritus (a ritual 
without ritual, as it is fitting, perhaps, for this ‘religion without religion’), the disciplina, which, 
when practiced rightly, ὁρθῶς . . . can ensure for its adherent the attainment of pure 
knowledge.”208 To be sure, this drug is as potent as it ever was. It is the cult of truth, the cult of 
objectivity, the lust for certainty and power. And, subsequently, it is the cult of death, the drug 
administered to kill— 
g. Thanatos: A False Eros and the Language of Death 
The cult of death? The drug administered to kill? Yes. After all, “the one aim of those 
who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death” (Phaedo 64a). 
“True philosophers,” we are told, “are nearly dead” (64b). For them, “there is good hope that 
death is a blessing,” even “a great advantage” (Apology 40c-d). Thus “a man who has truly spent 
his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face of death” (Phaedo 63e). He 
has spent his life “training for dying” (67e): 
Consider then, my good sir, whether you share my opinion, for this will lead us to 
a better knowledge of what we are investigating. Do you think it is the part of a 
philosopher to be concerned with such so-called pleasures as those of food and 
drink? 
By no means. 
What about the pleasures of sex? 
Not at all. 
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What of the other pleasures concerned with the service of the body? . . . Do you 
think he values these or despises them, except insofar as one cannot do without 
them? 
I think the true philosopher despises them. . . . 
A man who finds no pleasure in such things and has no part in them is thought by 
the majority not to deserve to live and to be close to death; the man, that is, who 
does not care for the pleasures of the body. 
What you say is certainly true (64d-65a). 
This, we are told, is not a denunciation of philosophy but, on the contrary, one of the virtues of 
this new religion, this drug which promises to cure the ills of man.209 After all, “the true 
philosopher desires . . . pure knowledge” and “‘It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever 
to have pure knowledge [εἰ µέλλοµέν ποτε. καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι] we must escape from the 
body.’ To obtain such purity of knowledge the philosopher must strive to dissociate his soul from 
his body as much as possible, effecting a continuous anticipation or rather mortification, during 
each and every day of his life, of that separation that will finally occur only at his last hour.”210 
And yet, need we to read this as a sort of covert nihilism, a concealed death drive hidden 
at the heart of Platonic philosophy? Certainly there is ample evidence to justify that 
interpretation. Yet let us, out of deference to Plato, offer another (even if we ultimately settle 
upon the first). For, if we are to define death as “the separation of the soul from the body,” if we 
are to say that “we believe that death is this, namely, that the body comes to be separated by 
itself apart from the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body,” (64c) 
                                                          
209
 “We have to see Plato’s rationalism not as a cool scientific project such as a later century European 
Enlightenment might set for itself, but as a kind of passionately religious doctrine—a theory that promised man 
salvation from the things he had feared most from the earliest days, from death and time.” Barrett, Irrational Man, 
84. 
210
 Ibid, 7. 
62 
 
oughtn’t we to say that one dies every time one thinks? Oughtn’t we to assert that reason 
represents a kind of death, a movement away from the body, away from experience, away from 
life itself? Oughtn’t we to insist that philosophy is death par excellence because to practice 
philosophy is to die again and again, to train oneself to leave this world and the cares of this 
world, to continually lose oneself in abstractions, in the unreality of thought? 
An example may help to elucidate the point: A man is invited to a dinner party. He agrees 
to go. He takes great pains with his appearance. He bathes, he dresses, he puts on his finest 
sandals. He wants to look his best. Along the way, he bumps into an old friend whom he 
convinces to join him. He assures this friend that he will be a most welcomed guest. But, as 
Homer says, when two men go together, one has an idea before the other and, as they walk, the 
first keeps slowing down, lagging behind, getting caught up in thought. Eventually he stops 
completely. He stands as motionless as a corpse. But all the while he is thinking. He is making 
plans, solving riddles, recollecting the past, analyzing himself, his actions, his thoughts. His body 
is present but his mind is somewhere else. Where it is, nobody knows. Is he even alive? Has his 
heart stopped beating midstride? Wherever he is, his life has passed him by. He is not in this 
world. He is existing after life, outside of it. For, while his body is here, his soul has been 
separated. It has separated itself. It now occupies the illusory space of thought. This man is dead 
to life, dead to his friend, dead to his senses and his surroundings. If someone were to call to his 
name, still he would not come back to this world. He would remain unaware of that speaker’s 
presence. He is existing beyond his body in the realm of “pure” thought, the Platonic otherworld 
populated not by persons but ideas. 
This is what it is to think. Thought removes us from experience. It distances us from life. 
It separates the soul from the body. For Plato, philosophy is practiced “in the proper manner” 
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when this dying is done in the service of life, when one returns to life informed by that which he 
has encountered in the death that is reflection. (Thus, “the unexamined life is not worth living” 
(Apology 38a) might just as easily be reformulated: “unless a grain of wheat falls to the ground 
and dies, it remains just a grain of wheat; but if it dies, it produces much fruit” (John 12:24)). 
Such a reading of the Phaedo helps to illuminate the arguments offered for the immortality of the 
soul; arguments which, when taken at face value, appear to be offered in jest. For, if one dies 
every time one thinks—if man, in so far as he is the rational animal, is the dying animal, the 
creature capable of fleeing this world whenever he reflects—then it makes sense to say that 
“what comes from being dead . . . is being alive” (71d) and that the “soul existed before we were 
born” (77a). After all, every time the soul returns to the body from thought it returns from death 
to life, is born again in a new body. The body of lived-experience is not a static thing. It is 
forever changing, born and reborn at every instant. And the soul that comingles with this new 
body comes back to life bearing with it the trace of the death it left behind. The theory of 
recollection, like the Cartesian cogito, posits that “pure knowledge”—or, to use Descartes’s 
language, “clear and distinct ideas”—can only be accessed “as long as I am thinking.”211 
Wisdom can only be attained when the soul is separated from the body in thought, “when we are 
dead,” and never when we are touching, sensing, feeling, experiencing, never “with the body,” 
“not while we live” (66e). 
If we accept this reading, what then can be said of Plato’s views on death itself? What if 
anything can be ascertained about his thoughts on the final death, death defined not as “the 
separation of the soul from the body” but as the loss of existence, the extinguishing of all life? It 
is by turning our attention to another Dialogue—one concerned (or so we are told) with sex and 
not death—that we begin to sense our answer. In his reading of the Symposium, Derrida keenly 
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observes the resemblance that the character of Socrates bears to the description of Eros given by 
Diotima. “Behind the portrait of Eros, one cannot fail to recognize the features of Socrates, as 
though Diotima, in looking at him, were proposing to Socrates the portrait of Socrates.”212 And 
of course, Eros too bears that famous moniker, pharmakeus: tempter, diviner, priest. “Neither 
living nor dead, he forms ‘the medium of the prophetic arts, of the priestly rites of sacrifice, 
initiation, and incarnation, and incantation, of divination and sorcery (thusias-teletas-epodas-
manteian)’ (202e).”213 
Does this likening of Socrates to the god of erotic love free Plato from the charge of 
nihilism levelled against him? Could it be that Plato comes down decisively on the side of life; 
that, as we have insinuated, the goal of philosophy is to learn to die in order to live more fully? 
Bear in mind, as you read the following, the connections we have established between, on the 
one hand, Socrates and Eros, and on the other, Socrates and the sacrificial victim: 
In general, the pharmakoi were put to death. But that, it seems, was not the 
essential end of the operation. Death occurred most often as a secondary effect of 
an energetic fustigation. Aimed first at the genital organs. Once the pharmakoi 
were cut off from the space of the city, the blows were designed to chase away or 
draw out the evil from their bodies. Did they burn them, too, in order to achieve 
purification? . . . they burnt [them] with fire . . . and scattered the ashes into the 
sea and the winds, for a purification . . . of the suffering city.214 
Purification by means of destruction: fustigation aimed at the genitals, evil beaten out of the 
body by force, the incineration of the body and the scattering of the ashes into the sea and 
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through the air. No, there is nothing erotic about this immolation, this desecration of the human 
form. There is nothing life-affirming about this purified ascent. 
For us, Eros is he who has been crucified, he whose body has not only been broken but 
exalted, lifted up (cf. John 3:14). He is the tangible, the touchable, the carnal, the Word made 
flesh. For Plato, Eros ascends. He leaves the fetters of the body behind, sacrificing the flesh on 
the altar of the word, making of it a burnt offering which purifies the soul. (Note that the 
pharmakos is sacrificed for the “the suffering city,” the polis, which is used, by way of analogy, 
as an image of the soul in the Republic). In him, the carnal becomes spiritual, undone, as it were, 
from within. “But here lies the trap: for the philosopher-priest is already a fake priest—a self-
proclaimed and (self-)idolized priest and thus truly an idol.”215 Nietzsche’s condemnation of 
philosophers proves true: “these honorable idolaters of concepts . . . threaten the life of 
everything they worship.”216 It is they who have given Eros (Socrates) poison to drink. He died 
of it. But in dying, he gave birth to philosophy: to reason, rationality, and the world of pure 
ideas.217 
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Incarnation: Eros as Touch, Caress, Kiss 
Language stands at the foundation of the erotic drive toward unity. Yet as we have seen, 
the danger of language is that it creates for us a “world of the symbolic substitution”218—a false 
world that allows us to communicate with one another by means of the use of symbols, signifiers 
that remove us further and further from the world in which we live. (If thought is a kind of death, 
it is so at least in part because thought depends upon language). If, then, we are to resist the 
allure of the Platonic otherworld, if we are to silence the siren call of pure knowledge, pure 
ideas—which amount to pure nothingness and a purified death—we must descend into the 
bodily, experiencing fully this carnate, human existence, excluding nothing, not even the 
strangest, the most enigmatical, neither the heights nor the depths of the sacredly profane. But 
can this be done? Can the erotic impulse—which is first spoken into existence—be made 
manifest in and through our fragile bodies? Can the word descend? Can the language of love 
become flesh and dwell among us?219 
Heidegger tells us that “the hand is, together with the word, the essential distinction of 
man. Only a being which, like man, ‘has’ the word (μύϑοϛ, λόγος), can and must ‘have’ ‘the 
hand.’” He continues, “The hand sprang forth only out of the word and together with the word. 
Man does not ‘have’ hands, but the hand holds the essence of man, because the word as the 
essential realm of the hand is the ground of the essence of man.”220 Said differently, it is through 
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man that the word becomes incarnate. Word made flesh—or, better yet, word made hand—is the 
essence of man, an essence that man holds in his hands. As Costica Bradatan notes, “like 
language, the hand is what makes our life properly human. . . [it] distinguishes us decisively 
from animals.”221 (Returning, for a moment, to our previous discussion of the Adamic narrative, 
we now note two striking elements: first, what man is—the breath (word) of life breathed into 
the flesh of the world (Genesis 2:7); second, what he does—he names (2:19) and he works the 
earth with his hands (2:15)).222 
If a word is spoken but not felt, if it does not touch us, move us, call us to action, then it 
does not register, does not connect. It remains as self-inclosed, as meaningless, indeed as mute, 
as if it were not spoken at all. More so. For, as our dialogue with Derrida has shown, even words 
left unsaid can be interpreted and understood. But a fleshless word, like a fleshless soul, is a dead 
thing. It is literally non-sense, that which cannot be sensed. It may be pure, but its purity is born 
of its refusal to associate with the messiness of the world—a refusal which, as we have said, 
amounts to a denial of life itself. Actions, so the saying goes, speak louder than words. Actions 
speak? How can an action speak if it is not first and foremost a word? Actions speak louder than 
words—they speak with more force, with more meaning—because they are words incarnate, 
words made manifest in the mouths and hands of those who live them into existence. 
a. The Soul that Touches or Self-knowledge at a Price 
In De Anima, Aristotle tells us that “the soul . . . acts like a hand.”223 Unlike unthinking 
sensation, which receives the external world as “wax receives the impression of the signet-
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ring,”224 the soul does not merely receive knowledge passively but reaches out and touches “the 
objects of thought” which “reside in sensible forms.”225 (Interestingly, Augustine too speaks of 
the “mental hand” and of how “remembered items . . . come to hand easily . . . as soon as they 
are summoned”).226 It is for this reason, Rosen argues, that “it is not sight but touch, which is the 
most philosophical of the senses . . . we grasp the forms of the things which are, and thereby 
know them . . . Knowing is touching.”227 Yet, as Manoussakis rightly observes, “It is not . . . any 
kind of touching that exemplifies knowledge but grasping. The soul stretches out toward the 
things, like a hand ready to feel and hold them in its grip.”228 Indeed, common language betrays 
the connection: we attempt to grasp difficult ideas, to get a hold of them, to handle them, we 
latch on to their meanings. 
This relation between the head and the hand, the rational soul and the sensing body—as 
Kant says, the hand is “the window on to the mind”229—is, Heidegger insists, the essence of 
man. Manoussakis, commenting on Heidegger, asks, “Dare we say that without his hands man 
would have been unable to think?”230 For him, “man began thinking, and still thinks, with his 
hands, that is, according to a fundamental structure implied by the paradigms of touch.”231 
Indeed, it is not until the hand has become a hand—not until it has learned to hold, handle, and 
manipulate its other—that man has become man, the creature capable of rational thought. 
The origin of humanity, as both historians and anthropologists agree, is to be 
traced back to the invention of tools. . . . Thus, the hand became emancipated 
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from being used only as a tool—it now manipulates the tools it had itself 
produced. With much of its duties transferred to tools, the hand became free—it 
became creative. In fact, the two moments must have coincided: the creation of 
the first tool by the hand marks the moment when the hand ceases to be a tool. It 
is now recognized as that which it has always been, but only now can I become 
aware of it: my body. The awareness of my body and consequently . . . my self-
awareness as a subject have always been dependent upon this dialectical relation 
between the grasping hand and its tool. The tool always refers back to the hand, 
for the one is meaningful only in relation to the other. The tool is precisely what is 
graspable: our first concept (Begriff).232 
That Manoussakis locates the birth of the thinking subject in the advent of the body—the 
recognition of self as body, “I am a body”—and grounds the advent of the body in the 
emancipation of the hand—the freedom of the hand to grasp and manipulate the world around 
it—points to the fundamentally corporeal nature of the human psyche. As Aristotle says, “no one 
could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise of perception,” without the use of 
one’s hands.233 
But perception, we have said, is that which receives the impression made upon it by the 
outside world. Thus it is in this connection between the hand that touches and the soul that 
knows that we begin to see the dependence of the self on its other. Unlike the purely receptive 
sense organs, the soul is both passive and active—extending itself beyond itself in order to 
receive that which exists independent of it. As Freud’s celebrated posthumous fragment states: 
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Psyche ist ausgedehnt. Or, as Chrétien argues, the “soul is the act of touch.”234 Yet the act of 
touch always implies duplicity: the soul that touches, in touching, is touched.235 “Hence the 
reciprocity of the haptic phenomenon: there cannot be touch that is not ‘touched’ back—to touch 
already means to make oneself tangible.”236 And that which exists independent of the soul is that 
which confronts the soul with itself. “For in ‘touching’ the things it seeks to know, the soul-hand 
is also ‘touched’ back by the world. As ‘touched,’ in the act of comprehending, the soul becomes 
aware of itself. It becomes aware of itself as a soul that ‘touches’ the world.”237 Thus we only 
ever “sense ourselves . . . obliquely, in the sensing of the other. ‘Tactile experiencing of the other 
is simultaneously self-experiencing, since otherwise I would not be the one experiencing.’ But 
without the other made available to me by my body there would have been no self-experience or 
self-awareness at all. . . . ‘I feel myself only by a favor of the other. It is the other who gives me 
to myself.’”238 
Is this encounter with the self by means of the (soul-)hand’s touch upon the other—be it 
another human being or the otherness of the outside world—an example of the erotic unity for 
which we have been searching? No. For, if the other brings me to myself, this “favor” of the 
other is not offered but taken—and, if necessary, taken by force: “It is by virtue of the violence 
of the hand (its grasping, seizing, and killing the Other) that I first become aware of myself as a 
separate and distinct self.” 239 After all, the soul is like the hand and “The hand brings about the 
‘work’ of destruction.”240 In order to know the self by means of the other, one must first “know” 
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(i.e. grasp) the other. But to know the other is to objectify the other, to make of the other a thing 
to be known. And to know the self by means of the other is to use—and, consequently, to 
abuse—the other as a tool for self-knowledge. 
Manoussakis tells us that “One presupposes . . . things-to-be-thought as things-to-be-
grasped, things that, in the grasp of mental comprehension, are to be turned into ‘tools.’” “You 
know something,” he insists, only “once you know how to use it. Knowledge amounts to 
instrumentality.”241 But if “things become known to us by their usage qua ‘tools,’” how much 
more do we “know” the other only by the ways in which he presents himself as useful or not, 
fulfilling or failing to fulfill the role we have ascribed to him? (Think, for instance, of Sartre’s 
famous analysis of the expectations placed upon the tradesman—the waiter, the grocer, the 
auctioneer, the tailor—by society: “A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, because such 
a grocer is not wholly a grocer. Society demands that he limit himself to his function as a 
grocer”).242 For Manoussakis, “We never quite know a thing in itself; we know only its function, 
that is, its instrumentality.”243 Again, if this can be said of objects, how much more can it be said 
of persons? Is there anything more impenetrable than the soul of another human being? Can it 
not be said that the “human body directly constitutes the monstrance of what is invisible,”244 
what is most hidden—the other’s secret transcendence?245 
But if we only know the other as object, as tool to be grasped and manipulated at will, 
how then does our knowledge of the other lead us to an understanding of the self? 
The Other is the Other because he or she appears as a tool for me in a way that my 
body cannot present itself. . . . The Other’s accessibility or resistance to my touch 
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(mental or sensory) furnishes me with a sense of myself qua myself. I am myself 
because I can grasp, hold, or seize the Other—who, precisely because of my 
capability to handle him or her, is not I. The notion of the I cannot come before or 
independently of the Other. The soul cannot touch (i.e., know) itself but in 
touching the Other. Self-consciousness is a by-product excreted by the process of 
sensing the Other.246 
Self-consciousness as the result of excretion, the wasteful by-product of the attempt to grasp, 
objectify, and violate the other. It is not a happy image. But when we recall the conclusion of our 
last chapter, the fact that it is by means of the concept (Begriff) that philosophers usher in the 
death of God—“these honorable idolaters of concepts [diese Herren Begriffs-Götzendiener] . . . 
threaten the life of everything they worship”247—and when we recognize that, in order to “know” 
the other, one must first make the other knowable, graspable, a tool—“The tool is precisely what 
is graspable: our first concept (Begriff)”248—then we begin to comprehend the monstrous price at 
which self-knowledge is bought, the cost of being a self, of being human.249 
b. The Caressing Hand or the Impossibility of Desire  
“A thing,” Manoussakis writes, “cannot be loved . . . it can only be used.”250 This insight, 
coupled with the belief that one cannot not treat the other as a thing, is perhaps the root cause of 
Ivan Karamazov’s rebellion against “the whole world of knowledge,” his insistence that no 
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amount of knowledge is worth the suffering we humans inflict upon one another.251 Love, he 
says, is impossible.252 One can only “love one’s neighbor abstractly,”253 that is, not as a person 
but as an idea (Begriff), my idea, that which I can grasp, pin down, objectify. For Ivan, we are 
incapable of loving real, flesh and blood human beings. “If we’re to come to love a man, the man 
himself should stay hidden, because as soon as he shows his face—love vanishes.” It is the face 
of the other—that is, his physicality, his body—that makes him so unlovable. It is because he has 
“a bad smell, or a foolish face, or once stepped on [my] foot” that I find him so revolting.254 
Yet, as Levinas has convincingly argued, the face of the other is precisely that which 
“resists possession, resists my powers.”255 (Perhaps this is why Ivan (each of us?) finds the face 
so unlovable?). “The face presents itself, and demands justice.”256 It “speaks to me and thereby 
invites me to a relation incommensurate with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or 
knowledge.”257 According to Levinas, the face is the “total resistance to the grasp,”258 that which 
“overflows images which are always immanent to my thought, as though they came from me.”259 
My attempt to enslave and objectify the other with the grasp of my soul-hand falls in upon itself. 
The face represents a “refusal to be contained. . . . it cannot be comprehended, that is, 
encompassed.”260 It cannot be known. It must be loved.  
But if the grasp fails precisely at its point of departure, if “The Other as Other evades my 
grasp, slips through my fingers [and] what I am left with is only the outer skin, an empty 
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garment,”261 how then can I enter into a relation with the other, a relation to which the face of the 
other invites me? How can I love without insisting that the other stay hidden, without hiding him 
beneath my attempt to know/grasp him? How can I allow him to reveal himself from himself, to 
show himself as he who can never be reduced to my concept, my knowledge, the projection of 
my image onto the body of a man? 
The grasp, we have said, brings self-knowledge by means of oppression: “the privilege of 
touch consists” in giving me “the knowledge of my body through the body of the Other . . . 
‘[whose] body appears to me originally as . . . an instrument which I can utilize with other 
instruments.’”262 According to Manoussakis, the subjective realization that “I am a body” is 
brought about “by the act of grasping,” by my objectification of the other who has fallen into my 
hands.263 Thus to refuse to grasp, to relinquish power, the power that I exercise over the other, is 
to renounce my subjectivity, to make myself graspable, an object, a thing to be cared for or 
condemned, consecrated or cursed. One cannot love a thing. One can only love a person. Thus if 
I am to be a lover, if I am to love another and not simply a projection of myself, I must first forgo 
my desire to possess the object of my love. I must instead become for my beloved a gift, an 
offering which when given may be accepted or rejected, received with gratitude or denounced 
and disowned. The lover does not grasp. He does not use force. The lover presents himself as an 
object, weak and vulnerable, so that the subjectivity of the beloved may emerge. He touches in 
order to offer himself as touchable. He denies his desire so that the desire of the beloved may be 
realized through the renunciation of his own. 
How might this be accomplished? What becomes of the grasping hand when it loosens its 
grip, when it lets go of all it has known? “The domestication of the grasping hand,” Manoussakis 
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writes, “has given rise to the caress.”264 “Whereas the grasping hand sought to establish distance 
by affirming dominance over the Other (a subjugated human being, a hunted animal, a seized 
object), the caress is nothing else than the continuous annihilation of the distance that separates 
me from the Other.”265 The caress, Sartre insists, is primarily concerned with the other as other. 
It is a desire for the otherness of the other, “an attempt to incarnate the Other’s body,”266 “to 
impregnate the Other’s body with consciousness and freedom.”267 “The caress is not a simple 
stroking; it is a shaping. In caressing the Other I cause her flesh to be born beneath my caress, 
under my fingers.”268 According to Sartre, the lover desires the other as “pure flesh”—that is, he 
desires her as “the pure contingency of presence,” that which is not concealed behind 
“movements,” “action,” “situation,” or “possibilities.”269 “By flesh we do not mean a part of the 
body such as the dermis, the connective tissues or, specifically, epidermis . . . But the caress 
reveals the flesh by stripping the body of its action, by cutting it off from the possibilities which 
surround it; the caress is designed to uncover the web of inertia beneath the action—i.e., the pure 
‘being-there’—which sustains it.”270 
In caressing the other, the lover desires the beloved as a person, not an object or actor. He 
desires her as “touched passivity,” that is, the pure being-there of a body which has been stripped 
of all of its accidents and has become what it truly is—a body “made flesh.” But in order to 
approach the flesh of the other, the lover must himself become flesh, must forsake the grasp of 
the hand and instead offer himself as a passivity which, in touching, is touched: 
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To take hold of the Other reveals to her her inertia and her passivity . . . but this is 
not to caress her. In the caress it is not only my body as a synthetic form in action 
which caresses the Other; it is my body as flesh which causes the Other’s flesh to 
be born. The caress is designed to cause the Other’s body to be born, through 
pleasure, for the Other—and for myself—as touched passivity in such a way that 
my body is made flesh in order to touch the Other’s body with its own passivity; 
that is, by caressing itself with the Other’s body rather than by caressing hers.271 
For Sartre, “it is not a question so much of taking hold of a part of the Other’s body as of placing 
one’s own body against the Other’s body. Not so much to push or touch in an active sense but to 
place against.”272 Thus the activity of the grasping hand—the hand that reaches out and 
manipulates its object at will—is relinquished. The lover, for the sake of the beloved, adopts a 
passivity which, in touching itself with the flesh of the beloved, causes “her flesh to be born 
beneath [his] caress, under [his] fingers.”273 
And yet, his “fingers which [he] run[s] over her arm are inert at the end of [his] 
hand”274—the lover refuses to violate the beloved, to turn her into an object, a tool for self-
knowledge. Instead, he makes of himself an offering, a gift of flesh which, through pleasure, 
brings the beloved to herself (and him along with her). 
Thus the revelation of the Other’s flesh is made through my own flesh; in desire 
and in the caress which expresses desire, I incarnate myself in order to realize the 
incarnation of the Other. The caress by realizing the Other’s incarnation reveals to 
me my own incarnation; that is, I make myself flesh in order to impel the Other to 
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realize for-herself and for me her own flesh, and my caresses cause my flesh to be 
born for me in so far as it is for the Other flesh causing her to be born as flesh. I 
make her enjoy my flesh through her flesh in order to compel her to feel herself 
flesh. . . . Thus in desire there is an attempt at the incarnation of consciousness . . . 
in order to realize the incarnation of the Other.275 
The caress, it would seem, is the unmaking of the grasp, the renunciation of the self out 
of love for the other. “Each stroke of my hand assures the Other of my resignation from violence, 
of the relinquishing of my power to grasp, seize, or kill him. Each stroke of my hand abdicates 
my authority as a subject to whom the Other is forced to be subjected.”276 Rather, it is I who 
have become an object for the sake of the other, I who am now subjected to the other’s will: “in 
order to allow the Other’s subjectivity to manifest itself as such, I have to resign from mine. I 
have to undertake or undergo a self-willed kenosis. I let myself become an object for the Other. I 
make myself open and vulnerable to the Other’s touch.”277 In doing so, the experience of myself 
as body—the “I am a body” of subjectivity—is “abandoned” and the possibility of experiencing 
myself as having a body—that is, being an object for the other—arises.278 
Manoussakis is unambiguous on this point: 
In the caress the Other is not any more the Object of my grasp but the intangible 
Subject of my touch . . . My caress offers recognition to the Other’s subjectivity, 
witness to the Other’s transcendence, a transcendence beyond the realm of the 
things palpable by my hand—for it would be meaningless for me to caress an 
object or a thing. In caressing the Other, I have already recognized the Other as 
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Other and not as a thing to be felt or known. Under my caress the Other is not a 
‘tool’ assigned with a given function . . . the caress seeks the infinite but an 
infinite mysteriously immanent, that is, embodied in the body of the Other.279  
In caressing the other, in touching her flesh with the passivity of my flesh, I seek to annihilate the 
distance that separates us. My hand passes over the warmth of her body; she freely accepts my 
touch, my fingers in her hair, her mouth, on her skin; there is excitation and rapid breathing, 
pleasure—hers and mine—I can no longer tell where hers ends and mine begins. Who is 
touching whom? I am lost in the dizzying proximity of flesh on flesh, warm on warm, she and I 
achieving an intimacy, a nearness, a reciprocity of desire and of touch that neither could have 
experienced alone— 
And yet . . . “Such is the impossible ideal of desire: to possess the Other’s transcendence 
as pure transcendence and at the same time as body.”280 But this ideal is impossible, this desire 
futile, because “The Other’s free subjectivity is precisely that which cannot be touched,”281 that 
which can never be penetrated or possessed, that which I cannot enter, will never fully know. 
According to Manoussakis, “the caress only ‘veils’ distance as its very condition. . . . The caress 
is not the contact of flesh with flesh, but rather the approach of a body toward another.”282 And 
this approach which veils distance, this attraction of one body to another, “amounts to a 
forgetfulness of the violence of touch,” a forgetfulness which conceals from the lover and 
beloved the hideous truth that “the caressing hand is nothing else than the grasping hand that 
forgets or resigns from its violence.”283 
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The caressing hand is the grasping hand. It is the grasping that forgets (deceives itself 
into forgetting?) its own violence, the essence of its being. But is not such a hand—the hand that 
conceals its pitiless, objectifying grasp—doomed, sooner or later, to become what it already is? 
Is not such a hand secretly working to achieve its unspoken desire, its thirst for power, 
domination, destruction, and death? Is there not, ever at work, a pernicious and pervasive 
compulsion to repeat? 
c. The Chiasmus of the Kiss or a Possible Way Forward 
Beyond the subject/object distinction revealed by contrasting the grasp with the caress is, 
according to Manoussakis, the unity or chiasmus of the kiss. “The ‘I am a body,’ yielded by the 
act of grasping, and the ‘I have a body,’ revealed to me through the caress” are not “merely two 
different phenomena of one and the same reality (essence or nature), but rather two distinct 
manifestations that are brought to unity by a chiastic ‘kiss.’”284 For Manoussakis, the kiss 
symbolizes man’s (erotic) striving for “perfect unity.” It is for this reason that “the kiss resists 
conceptualization,” that no “concepts, paradigms, or metaphors could be employed in order to 
think the kiss.”285 “Our thought suffers primarily from the lack of concepts by which to think the 
kiss—for the kiss itself is a symbol (in the literary sense of sym-ballein: to put together two 
halves) and is thus unable to be represented with anything other than itself.”286 
The metaphor comes from the ancient practice of two people breaking between 
them a piece of pottery, a coin, or a seal with each keeping one fragment of it, as a 
reminder and future evidence of the kinship or friendship between them. When 
the holders of each half meet again they would put together (συμβάλλειν) the two 
pieces and thus affirm (or prove) their relationship with each other. For that 
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reason, each fragment of the divided coin or seal was called a “symbolon.” It is 
easy to see how the union of lips, the two mouths brought together in kissing, 
stands as a symbol of this practice of symballein. As if my mouth were one of two 
matching tallies, to be “fitted” on the Other’s mouth, like two pieces of a puzzle 
fit together. The kiss is a symbol of this symbol, a symbolism of an intimacy that 
affirms itself as it strives to achieve perfect unity.287 
Symbolically, the kiss reveals to us “our longing for union with our ‘other half.’”288 (The reader 
will, no doubt, recognize the resonance not only with Plato’s Symposium but also with our 
opening comments on Beyond the Pleasure Principle). But the kiss also brings unity to the “two 
fragmentary views of my body,” the I am and I have discussed above.289 
How does the kiss bridge the gap between these “two different ways of affirming 
myself”?290 According to Manoussakis, the kiss, like the caress, represents a kind self-willed 
kenosis in which the lover renounces his will for the sake of the beloved. “The mouth or, more 
precisely, the possibilities of the mouth reveal the implied intentions of the hand: the grasping of 
an object implies biting while the caressing of the Other implies kissing.”291 If in the caress I 
offer myself as an object to my beloved—if I give myself to her as the toucher who in touching 
is made touchable—then in the kiss I find her response. In the kiss, I find the gift of her reception 
of my self-gift. The caress is my incarnate word’s declaration, “Here I am.”292 It is my self-
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offering kenosis to my beloved for her pleasure and my own. The kiss is her reception of my 
kenotic self-emptying. It is her response, her “may it be done to me according to your word” 
(Luke 1:38), which constitutes a thanksgiving (eucharistia) which empties itself in order to 
receive my “Here I am.” And by emptying herself in thanksgiving—an act as selfless and 
unreserved as my original self-emptying—she offers herself back to me as self-giving, self-
receiving gift. The “I am a body” of subjectivity and the “I have a body” of objectivity 
“crisscross each other in the double manifestation of my body that is united in the chiasmus of 
the kiss.”293 
Like the caress, the kiss finds the lover freely giving himself to the beloved. But unlike 
the caress, the kiss allows the beloved to respond and reciprocate. In the kiss, the beloved 
responds to the self-giving of the lover by receiving his self-gift and by, in the very act of 
receiving, giving both her reception and herself back to the lover as a eucharistic thanksgiving. 
In the kiss, the one who is kissed is never simply kissed but also kisser. She not only receives but 
also gives. And she gives far more than she receives. For, the kisser gives only his kiss, only 
himself. But the one kissed gives her kiss—herself—and infinitely more. She gives the kisser his 
very being. For, if she so chooses, she can reject the kisser’s kiss and thus deny him his being as 
kisser. Her acceptance of his kiss affirms him as kisser and thus makes him who he is. Without 
her reception, he is neither who he is nor who he wants to be. With her reception, he is himself 
and more than he could have ever dreamed to be.  
The beloved’s reception of the lover’s kiss allows the lover to become not only kisser but 
also kissed. He is no longer simply himself as the one who offers his kiss but is now transformed 
into both the one who kisses and the one who is kissed. And at the very moment that he becomes 
both kisser and kissed, he also receives the power to transform the beloved into both who she is 
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as the one kissed and more than who she is as kisser. The kiss, then, constitutes for the lover (1) 
his gift-of-self to the beloved, (2) her reception of his self-giving in the kiss, and (3) the 
transformation brought about by her reception of him into him as both kisser (affirming who he 
is) and kissed (affirming who he could not have been). And the kiss constitutes for the beloved 
(1) her reception of the gift given to her by the lover, (2) her reception’s transformation of the 
lover into both kisser and kissed and (3) his transformation’s transformation of her into both the 
one who is kissed (affirming who she is) and kisser (affirming who she could not have been). 
Thanks to these transformations (and the unity of self/other, subject/object, lover/beloved that 
they occasion), “the ‘I’ of the ‘I have’ fully overlaps and is at last identified with the ‘I’ of the ‘I 
am’”294 and I become for first time what I have always been yet could never be: myself and not 
myself, myself as the other, in the other, revealed through the other, a self conceived by and for 
the sake of love. 
d. Betraying Eros with a Kiss or Biting the Bread of Life 
Yet . . . have not the pretenses of language and the forgetfulness of the hand taught us to 
be wary of any phenomenon that promises to deliver such marvels? Ought not the corrupting 
influence of Thanatos—which, we have said, is only a false Eros, a wolf in erotic clothes—to 
give us pause, especially before so seductive a symbol? Can it truly be that the kiss represents the 
eschatological end of the erotic drive, the “perfect unity” of lover and beloved? Does the kiss 
really unify my fragmented psyche, save my splintered soul? How now? When Manoussakis 
himself points out the natural link between biting and kissing? When it is he who reminds us that 
“the kiss of betrayal” is among “the different types” of kisses?295 (Careful philosophers, lest you 
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hear repeated to you that most dreadful utterance: “are you betraying the Son of Man with a 
kiss?”). 
According to Manoussakis, “The mouth is the arbiter of touch.” “It has been often 
observed that as soon as babies are able to grasp their toys, they bring them to their mouth. In 
that gesture, the infant reenacts a ‘natural’ move: from the hand to the mouth. . . . The mouth 
provides the context within which the hand’s activity becomes meaningful.”296 For Freud, 
however, the exact inverse is true. “Infants,” he writes, “perform actions which have no purpose 
other than obtaining pleasure;”297 and their earliest experience of pleasure comes in “connection 
with taking nourishment,” that is, in the “excitation of the areas of the mouth and lips.”298 Soon, 
infants learn to separate the experience of pleasure from the need for food and thus develop “the 
pleasure derived from sucking”—a pleasure which Freud describes as “a sexual one.” 
Sucking at the mother’s breast is the starting-point of the whole sexual life, the 
unmatched prototype of every later sexual satisfaction . . . This sucking involves 
making the mother’s breast the first object of the sexual instinct. . . . at first the 
infant, in his sucking activity, gives up this object and replaces it by a part of his 
own body. He begins to suck his thumbs or own tongue. In this way he makes 
himself independent of the consent of the external world as regards gaining 
pleasure.299 
From the mouth to the hand is for Freud the natural progression. And from the hand onward: “it 
is . . . an important experience when the infant . . . discovers, in the course of feeling around, the 




 Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 313-14. 
298





specially excitable regions afforded by his genitals and so finds his way from sucking to 
masturbation.”300 
But infantile masturbation is not the only behavior born of sensual sucking. According to 
Freud, the whole sexual life—healthy and perverse—finds its origin in the mouth.301 “Behind the 
sadistic-anal phase of libidinal development we get a glimpse of a still earlier and more primitive 
stage of organization in which the erotogenic zone of the mouth plays the chief role. As you will 
guess, the sexual activity of sensual sucking belongs to it.”302 Far from providing us with an 
inverted hierarchy of the senses which allows touch—and thus “the arbiter of touch,” the 
mouth303—to “occupy the highest and most exalted place,”304 as Manoussakis is want to do, 
Freud finds in the mouth the root cause of perversion.305 “For Freud . . . the kiss is the first 
perversion. It is the prelude to all other perversions, since it is a use of erogenous zones with the 
aim of pure pleasure, separated from the goal of reproduction.”306 
In the kiss, Freud sees not a symbol of “perfect unity” but an example of how “No 
healthy person . . . can fail to make some addition that might be called perverse to the normal 
sexual aim.”307 Consider the following “somewhat puritanical”308 passage from Freud’s twenty-
first Lecture in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: 
However infamous they may be, however sharply they may be contrasted with 
normal sexual activity, quiet consideration will show that some perverse trait or 




 “Both perverse and normal sexuality have arisen out of infantile sexuality.” Ibid, 323. 
302
 Ibid, 327. 
303
 Manoussakis, God After Metaphysics, 137.  
304
 Ibid, 147. 
305
 For Freud, “the abandonment of the reproductive function is the common feature of all perversions. We 
actually describe a sexual activity as perverse if it has given up the aim of reproduction and purses the attainment 
of pleasure as an aim independent of it.” Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 316. 
306
 Miller, Literature as Conduct, 33. 
307
 Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, 160. 
308
 Miller, Literature as Conduct, 33. 
85 
 
other is seldom absent from the sexual life of normal people. Even a kiss can 
claim to be described as a perverse act, since it consists in the bringing together of 
two oral erotogenic zones instead of the two genitals. Yet no one rejects it as 
perverse; on the contrary, it is permitted in theatrical performances as a softened 
hint at the sexual act. But precisely kissing can easily turn into complete 
perversion—if, that is to say, it becomes so intense that a genital discharge and 
orgasm follow upon it directly, an event that is far from rare.309 
The literary critic J. Hillis Miller detects “a faint disgust” in Freud’s views on kissing.310 And 
when we consider another passage from Freud found in a related essay, we begin to understand 
why:  
But even in the most normal sexual process we may detect rudiments which, if 
they had developed, would have led to the deviations described as ‘perversions.’ . 
. . the kiss, one particular contact of this kind, between the mucous membrane of 
the lips of the two people concerned, is held in high sexual esteem among many 
nations (including the most highly civilized ones), in spite of the fact that the parts 
of the body involved do not form part of the sexual apparatus but constitute the 
entrance to the digestive tract. Here, then, are factors which provide a point of 
contact between the perversions and normal sexual life and which can also serve 
as a basis for their classification.311 
Miller remarks, “Who, when kissing one’s beloved, would want to remember that her or his lips 
are no more than the entrance to the stomach and intestines?”312 Who indeed! 
                                                          
309
 Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 322. 
310
 Miller, Literature as Conduct, 34. 
311
 Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, 149-50. 
312
 Miller, Literature as Conduct, 34. 
86 
 
Yet if we share Dr. Miller’s disgust with such realizations, if we find the thought that 
erotic “Love has pitched his mansion in/ The place of excrement” as revolting as Miller clearly 
does,313 perhaps it is because the kiss, for us, remains symbolic—and nothing more. Perhaps we 
prefer the kiss to be metaphorical, an image of perfect unity, the unity of the self which, when 
achieved, leaves little room for the other. (It is telling that Manoussakis, as Augustinian a thinker 
as there is, allows just a hint of that old Gnostic belief in self-divinization to enter his work 
precisely when speaking of that which is meant to be most carnal; the kiss, he tells us, brings 
unity to the “two different ways of affirming myself”).314 
It is true that kissing is related to biting, that “The lips are a boundary . . . portals where 
the inside is exposed to the outside, where the breath of life passes in and out, where food is 
taken in and speech is breathed forth.”315 To kiss, then, is to do more than press the entrance of 
one’s digestive tract to that of the other’s. It is to open oneself to the other, to expose one’s 
insides, what is deepest and most concealed, one’s guts, one’s bowels, one’s soul (psyche 
literally means “breath”). It is to take the other into oneself, to receive the other as one receives 
his daily bread, to ingest him, to scarf him down. The nearness of kissing and biting—sometimes 
kissing involves biting—reveals the desire to consume the other, to devour him, to bring him into 
myself and make him what I am.  
For Manoussakis—and here, he renounces any Gnostic tendencies once and for all—the 
task of Christianity “is not to spiritualize the flesh, but to incarnate the spirit, and in this regard 
the verticality of the Greek schema (Platonic and Neo-Platonic) of ascents and descents has to be 
abandoned for the sake of a communion between exteriority and interiority.”316 That which is 
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outside of me, which is other than me, must enter into me, must become me, must be made my 
flesh and blood, the marrow of my bones. But that is not all. I too must vacate myself, must offer 
myself, must pour myself forth. I must enter into that which is not me, that which transcends me, 
the wholly other. 
This communion between inside and outside, self and other, Manoussakis tells us, is 
made manifest every time we eat a meal: 
Eating is not only a way for recognizing our dependency to each other and to the 
world . . . but by eating we assimilate the world to ourselves, we turn that which is 
outside inside. . . . Ultimately, distance comes down to this opposition between an 
inside (that I identify with myself) and everything else that is outside me. In 
eating, however, this wall of separation collapses—when I am hungry I am really 
hungry for the Other (following Sartre and Levinas)—and eating is one of the 
ways we have in overcoming our isolation that is the result of being scattered 
beings.317 
When I eat, I declare “my dependence on the world, on the cows which provide me with their 
meat, but also on the grass that fed the cows, on the water that fertilized the soil on which that 
grass grew, and so on.”318 (Does this dependence upon the other negate the independence from 
“the consent of the external world as regards gaining pleasure” that I seized for myself as an 
infant through the autoerotism of “sexual sucking”?).319 When I eat, I take into myself the entire 
world, all that exists beyond me.320 And, more importantly, I take in the other—the farmer who 
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worked the land, the butcher who slaughtered the cow, the cook who prepared the meal, the 
waiter who brought it to my table. “No meal is ever solitary—even if I eat alone in the seclusion 
of my room—every meal is a public and communal event. A community established and referred 
to by every bite.”321 
But not only does the world enter into me when it passes through my lips, the portals 
where inside is exposed and outside enters in. Eating also has the power to take me out of myself 
and unite me with that which transcends me. “It is our body that abridges the distance that keeps 
separating us from others, but it is our body that allows us to be united with God—it is not 
accidental that we eat the Eucharist and that the liturgy takes the form of a meal.”322 
Every time one partakes of communion he or she does not change the host into 
their body but it changes them—in an inverse digestion indicative and exemplary 
of inverse intentionality—into Christ’s body. As Augustine was told: “I am the 
food of the mature; grow then, and you will eat me. You will not change me into 
yourself like bodily food: you will be changed into me” (VII. 10.16, 173). The 
Church is turning the world into Christ a mass at a time.323 
Here, in the eucharistic meal, the communion between exteriority and interiority is 
accomplished. Here, the incarnation of the word is achieved. 
Yet it is important to note that this glimpse of the eschaton, this taste of the end toward 
which man’s erotic drive is striving, is not brought about by ascending away from the carnality 
of the kiss. (Receiving the Eucharist unties my body with the body of Christ, his Corpus, his 
flesh and blood; as a communicant, I am not seeking to unify myself or the conflicting ways of 
“affirming myself”). Nor does it simply do away the violence of the mouth. In the Eucharist, the 
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lips that kiss and the mouth that bites are understood to be one and the same mouth, sanctified 
and vulgar, sacredly profane. These lips that would be “kissed with the kiss of truth, for Truth 
has revealed Himself as a person (John 14:6),”324 are instead invited to gnaw on his body, to bite 
it, to betray it, to gnash it between the teeth. (The formulation of the prayer for the consecration 
of the host in the Cannon of the Mass is insightful: “Take this all of you and eat it [Accipite et 
manducate, literally “take and chew”]. This is my body [Corpus], which will be given up for you 
[quod pro vobis tradetur, which is betrayed for you].”). 
Even the kiss of betrayal can be sanctified. (It is odd to think that, in receiving the 
Eucharist, each of us is invited into the role of betrayer, placing the kiss of death upon the bread 
of life; we must never forget our relation to Judas who was invited to receive the first Eucharist 
at the last supper). And at the eschaton, when the incarnate word reconciles all things to himself 
(Colossians 1:20) and makes “all things new” (Revelation 21:5), then the communion between 
exteriority and interiority, self and other, will be fully realized—made manifest in the loving 
embrace of husband and wife (cf. Ephesians 5:32). 
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Eschaton: Sex as Contradiction 
Toward the end of our last chapter we noted that, according to Freud, “No healthy person 
. . . can fail to make some addition that might be called perverse to the normal sexual aim.”325 
Indeed, for him the fact that “unusual kinds of sexual satisfaction . . . are . . . quite common and 
widespread phenomena”326 is attributable to the psychoanalytic hypothesis that “all these 
inclinations to perversion had their roots in childhood, that children have a predisposition to all 
of them and carry them out to an extent corresponding to their immaturity—in short, that 
perverse sexuality is nothing else than a magnified infantile sexuality split up into separate 
impulses.”327 Accordingly, Freud concludes that “people who are normal to-day have passed 
along a path of development that has led through the perversions and object-cathexes of the 
Oedipus complex, that that is the path of normal development and that neurotics merely exhibit 
to us in a magnified and coarsened form what the analysis of dreams reveals to us in healthy 
people as well.”328 
The assertion that we honest, God-fearing citizens closely resemble the pervert, that we 
share his devious predisposition and have already (as children, no less!) carried out his revolting 
crimes, is unsettling to say the least. (It is for this reason, Freud contends, that “sexual 
perversions are subject to a quite special ban.” “It is as though no one could forget that they are 
not only something disgusting but also something monstrous and dangerous—as though people 
felt them as seductive, and had at bottom to fight down a secret envy of those who were enjoying 
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them”).329 Yet, in spite of his fear that we, his listeners, “have been waiting for a long time to 
interrupt and exclaim: ‘Enough of these atrocities!’”330 Freud’s assessment, upon further 
consideration, is perhaps less contentious than he would have us believe. (We won’t go so far as 
to call it prosaic). Wasn’t it a 5th century bishop, after all, who found it necessary to confess 
“whatever sins I did not commit, for what would I not have been capable of, I who could be 
enamored even of a wanton crime?”331 Wasn’t it he who openly admitted to having satisfied his 
“carnal desire” by masturbating in a church during mass?332 (And let us not forget this pious 
saint’s extended discourse on the sinfulness of infants). No, that the human heart is more 
perverse than anything—“beyond remedy,” the prophet insists (Jeremiah 17:9)—is not so 
startling a claim; it is, rather, one of the first discoveries made by any man who honestly 
examines himself. 
“The strongest saints and the strongest sceptics,” G.K. Chesterton remarks, “took positive 
evil as the starting-point of their argument. If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel 
exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two 
deductions. He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he must deny the 
present union between God and man, as all Christians do.”333 That we find so much overlap 
between Freud and Augustine, the psychoanalyst and the orthodox Christian—especially on the 
topic of perversion—ought not to surprise us. (Lacan goes so far as to assert that “Saint 
Augustine . . . foreshadowed psychoanalysis”).334 After all, both attempt to offer an image of the 
phenomena of life by plumbing the depths of the human soul. And it is by doing so, by 
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examining the perpetual struggle which wars in the heart of man and the “violent 
contradictions”335 that manifest themselves in sexuality—make no mistake, the two are 
connected336—that we begin to unearth a deeper, more arresting paradox; one which will 
inevitably lead us beyond the considerations that have concerned us thus far. But more on that in 
the pages to come—  
a. The Omnipotence of Love: Sex as the Highest and the Lowest 
If we are ready to agree with Freud that “normal people too can substitute a perversion . . 
. for the normal sexual aim”337 and that “In the sphere of sexual life we are brought up against 
peculiar and, indeed, insoluble difficulties as soon as we try to draw a sharp line to distinguish 
mere variations within the range of what is physiological from pathological symptoms,”338 then 
we will be forced not only to admit that “the universality of this finding is in itself enough to 
show how inappropriate it is to use the word perversion as a term of reproach”339 but will also 
have to take seriously Freud’s more shocking claim: “It is perhaps in connection precisely with 
the most repulsive perversions” that the beauty and mystery of human sexuality—“the 
omnipotence of love”—shines through.340 Certain perversions, Freud writes, “are so far removed 
from the normal in their content that we cannot avoid pronouncing them ‘pathological’.”341 
Among these pathologies, he lists “cases of licking excrement [and] of intercourse with dead 
bodies,” cases where “the sexual instinct goes to astonishing lengths in successfully overriding 
the resistances of shame, disgust, horror or pain.”342 That such perversions exist is hardly 
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newsworthy. Sexual depravity has been around as long as we featherless bipeds have populated 
the earth. That they somehow reveal the heights of man’s erotic love is, however, a more 
contestable claim. And yet, that is precisely what Freud argues: 
It is impossible to deny that in [such] case[s] a piece of mental work has been 
performed which, in spite of its horrifying result, is the equivalent of an 
idealization of the instinct. The omnipotence of love is perhaps never more 
strongly proved than in such of its aberrations as these. The highest and the lowest 
are always closest to each other in the sphere of sexuality: ‘vom Himmel durch 
die Welt zur Hölle.’343 
“The first two facts which a healthy boy or girl feels about sex,” Chesterton writes, “are these: 
first that it is beautiful and then that it is dangerous.”344 True enough. But is it really the case that 
the beauty of sex is most palpably felt when the danger is most monstrously realized? 
Chesterton, it seems, will not follow Freud down this rabbit hole.345 Will we? 
In The Ethics of Time, Manoussakis notes that “Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle . . 
. offers thematically a close resemblance to the Confessions.”346 And indeed, the influence of 
Freud—particularly with regards to topics that have been psychology’s patrimony: memory, 
temporality, and desire—can be found throughout Manoussakis’s work.347 Yet it is Freud’s 
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introduction of the competing drives Eros and Thanatos that allows Manoussakis to begin to 
approach the mysterious connection Augustine draws between carnal desire and spiritual love. 
(For instance, Manoussakis notes that for Augustine the restlessness (inquietum) of the heart is 
somehow related to the restless (inquieta) time of pubescence).348 
This paradox, emphasized by Freud’s bold assertion that “The highest and the lowest are 
always closest to each other in the sphere of sexuality,” finds an odd resonance in the Epistles of 
St. Paul. In his First Letter to the Corinthians, Paul warns that those who sleep with prostitutes 
will be joined to them as “one flesh” (1 Corinthians 6:16), a formula reserved elsewhere in 
scripture for the sacramental unity brought about by God’s transformation of man and woman 
into husband and wife (cf. Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5; Mark 10:8; Ephesians 5:31). Thus the 
unitive power of God—dare we call it grace?—is manifest even in the most perverse acts of one 
who “sins against his own body” (1 Corinthians 6:18) and, in so doing, sins against the Lord (cf. 
1 Corinthians 6:13). 
That the sexual act implies both perversion and perfection, that it brings together the 
lowest and the highest, man’s baseness and his beatitude, and that this is always the case, that no 
sexual act—no matter how loving, no matter how depraved—can ever be free from the heights 
and depths of human existence is a riddle to which the Catholic theologian Hans Urs von 
Balthasar gestures when he makes the shocking assertion that “sexual desire and the passions 
might be considered a ‘sacrament of sin’”349—(the sacraments being, for Catholics, the highest: 
tangible manifestations of God’s grace. Sin being the lowest: man’s self-willed alienation from 
the love of God). Indeed, according to Balthasar’s reading of Maximus the Confessor, “The 
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built-in sadness of sexual desire is nothing else than the dark contradiction one senses in 
sexuality,”350 the contradiction that weds “sensual desire and death.”351 
“Fear of death” is the hidden thorn that drives us to try to make our nature eternal 
by procreation; from this source, however, only another victim of death can be 
produced. . . . Between “fear of death” and “slavery to sensual desire through love 
of life”, the circle is inescapably closed; the perpetuation of life, for which man 
strives, is in fact a perpetuation of death. . . . the circling wheel of births and 
deaths is a tragedy, in itself beyond redemption.352 
And yet, Balthasar insists, “The role of sexuality . . . is not exclusively this somewhat negative 
one.”353 Rather, “Desire itself . . . is a beneficial force.”354 It brings about “a positive mode of 
union,” the union of man and woman, which represents “the tender love a comrade in mortality” 
and provides “a distant, weak echo of the love of God.”355 “The sexual synthesis is the first level 
of the progressive syntheses by which the world is unified and brought to its perfection in the 
unity of God”356—a staggering assertion to say the least. 
This “adhesion of sexuality to sin,” as Balthasar calls it, is on full display in 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. To be a Karamazov, we are told, is to be both “a 
sensualist” and “a holy fool”: “You, Alyosha, are the quiet type, you’re a saint, I admit; you’re 
the quiet type, but the devil knows what hasn’t gone through your head, the devil knows what 
you don’t know already! A virgin, and you’re already dug so deep . . . You are a Karamazov 
yourself, a full-fledged Karamazov . . . You’re a sensualist after your father, and after your 
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mother—a holy fool.”357 During Dmitri’s trial, Ippolit Kirillovich, the prosecutor, makes the 
following assertion about the defendant and the family into which he was born. 
It is usually in life that when there are two opposites one must look for truth in the 
middle; in the present case it is literally not so. . . . Why? Precisely because we 
are [dealing with] a broad, Karamazovian nature . . . capable of containing all 
possible opposites and of contemplating both abysses at once, the abyss above us, 
an abyss of lofty ideals, and the abyss beneath us, an abyss of the lowest and 
foulest degradation. . . . the whole Karamazov family . . . needs this unnatural 
mixture, constantly and ceaselessly.358 
If sexuality is always bound up with the highest and the lowest, sanctity and degradation, 
if it is that which weds these “two abysses,” the “unnatural mixture” that brings together “a lofty 
nobility” with that which is “so repugnant,”359 then Freudian psychoanalytic theory—which 
posits two drives, Eros (sexual desire) and Thanatos (the desire for death)—cannot but inform 
our understanding of the mystery of sex. And indeed Manoussakis, who is quick to acknowledge 
his own indebtedness to Balthasar360 and Dostoevsky,361 devotes much of his recent work to 
drawing out the implications that Freud’s dualistic drive theory has for Christian theology. 
b. Theater of Cruelty: Sex as the Mysticism of Perversion 
In his recent essay, “Cracked: the Black Theology of Anatheism,” Manoussakis discusses 
the relation between Eros and Thanatos as it concerns artistic creation. Following Sartre, he notes 
that “every act of human creation presupposes destruction.” “The creative forces of Eros emerge 
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from the deep waters of a self at odds with itself, of a cracked self that exists by negating itself 
(Thanatos).”362 
For us humans . . . the creative Eros is never free but always purchased at the cost 
of destruction (Thanatos), inasmuch as human creation, be it artistic or 
technological, is never ex nihilo, but conditioned by the givenness of the world 
which, precisely as given, human creation cannot but alter, refigure, and thus, in 
some sense, negate. Human Eros could never escape Thanatos altogether . . . [F]or 
man creation is negation—man can create because man can destroy.363 
This connection between creation and destruction, this grounding of man’s creativity in his 
ability to destroy, is reminiscent not only of Freud, but also of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy 
where the ordered beauty of the Apollonian finds it “roots” in the chaotic terror of the Dionysian, 
the “substratum” of all life.364 Indeed, Manoussakis acknowledges the influence of “the prophet 
of Sils-Maria.”365 Quoting from some of the more challenging passages of On the Genealogy of 
Morals, he writes, “If this theater of human cruelty [i.e. the world in which we live] . . . is 
pleasing to the gods—and make no mistake, ‘without cruelty there is no festival’—that’s because 
the meaning of pain is pleasure. ‘To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even 
more.’”366 (According to Deleuze, these passages from Nietzsche offer “the only fitting answer” 
to the “essentially religious problem of the meaning of pain”: “if pain and suffering have any 
meaning, it must be that they are enjoyable to someone”).367 
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The notion that pleasure is derived from pain, that one can only make sense of pain if it is 
first and foremost seen as something to be enjoyed, leads Manoussakis to a discussion of 
sadomasochism. We will return to that discussion momentarily. But before we do, let us consider 
once more Freud’s Three Essays on Sexuality. In the section that precedes his analysis of sadism 
and masochism, Freud discusses how the “pleasure of looking [scopophilia] becomes a 
perversion.”368 For him, “seeing” is “an activity that is ultimately derived from touching.”369 Yet 
at times, seeing becomes a movement away from, a replacement for, touching—as in the case of 
voyeurism or when looking is no longer seen as preparation for the normal sexual aim but 
instead has supplanted it.370 This ascending away from touch, away from the body, toward the 
“idealization of the instinct,” as Freud calls it, these perversions “which are directed towards 
looking and being looked at,” share remarkable similarities with sadism and masochism.371 And 
for Manoussakis, this makes sense. “Vision,” he tells us, “presupposes distance and it is rightly 
regarded as the most philosophical of senses . . . Yet Augustine in the course of the Confessions 
becomes increasingly suspicious of the concupiscentia oculorum, the lust of the eyes, in its 
double desire to see and to know, especially of what ought not to be seen and of that which 
cannot be known.”372 
According to Manoussakis, the lust of the eyes can manifest itself in different ways: 
a) In the desire and enjoyment of watching the suffering of others [sadism]; 
b) In the desire and enjoyment of watching the suffering of oneself [masochism]; 
c) In the desire to know or to see what is off-limits (in which case one sees or 
knows with a relative impunity for one is not seen back, or, alternatively in 
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order to gain access to a secret one can offer a sacrifice, a small animal or 
oneself). 
Here, we are told, “the panorama of vision encompasses the whole theater of human 
sinfulness”373 (and we ought, I think, to hear resonances with the passage quoted above from 
“Cracked” in which Manoussakis discusses the “theater of human cruelty”). In both sadism and 
masochism—in perversion, cruelty, and sinfulness in general—we are presented with the 
disincarnation of man. “The more spiritualized a desire is, the more serious or ‘sinful’ it 
becomes.”374 Thus, we see that for Manoussakis, following Augustine, the root of all evil is the 
flight away from the flesh.375 (Indeed, even the pride of the philosophers—who, “in claiming to 
be wise . . . have become stupid”376—is, as Nietzsche says, attributable to “the spiritualization of 
cruelty”: “in all desire to know there is a drop of cruelty”).377 
This spiritualization is nothing other than the “idealization of the instinct” which, as we 
noted earlier, Freud aligns with “the most repulsive perversions.”378 (Here, one might justly 
object that Freud sees the idealization of the instinct as precisely what is highest in man—his 
ability to initiate a “transformation of the sexual instinct” which, “in spite of its horrifying 
result,” overcomes “the resistances of shame, disgust, horror or pain” in the service of love379—
whereas Manoussakis sees man’s ability to spiritualize, his power to turn “something carnal into 
what it is not,” as that which is lowest in man, that which constitutes sin and perversion.380 Yet, 
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we must be careful not to miss one of Manoussakis’s subtler yet more startling points: 
“perversion or, to use a theological term, sin is man’s exclusive privilege.”381 Or, to borrow a 
line of thinking made famous by Kierkegaard, the possibility of sin is what makes man great, the 
actualization of that possibility is what makes him wretched). Thus, both the sadist and the 
masochist—the masochist, of course, being only a sadist who’s destructive impulses “cannot find 
employment in actual life” and have thus turned inward on himself, yet himself posited as 
another382—are able to find pleasure in pain only because they can watch it from a safe distance. 
Returning now to Manoussakis’s discussion of sadism and masochism, we find this point 
made explicit: 
Between the sadist and his victim there is a distance incommensurable with 
geographical space. It is the distance between a subject’s super-ego and its 
objects. Since the other’s pain could never reach him, thanks to the distance 
solidified by the very difference between the other’s pain and his pleasure, the 
sadist enjoys the theater of cruelty from a god-like distance and with a god-like 
impunity. The sadist’s pleasure is the desire to be like God.383 
And yet, Manoussakis goes on, “pleasure as defined here is a perversion of a human being who 
is not and cannot be God.”384 It is for that reason that Freud notes in Civilization and Its 
Discontents that the more “godlike” man becomes, the less happy he is. The spiritualization of 
the flesh, the self-deification of man, the disincarnation of sin, is the destruction of man. It is the 
perversion of man’s Thanatonic drive toward his own annihilation. 
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In sex, this perverse desire to be like God, this idolatry of the self which makes of the self 
a false God, a substitute God, is on full display. Manoussakis, like Freud, identifies in human 
sexuality the destructive “spiritualized pleasure” of the compulsion to repeat. 
Andy Warhol’s observation that “sex is nostalgia for sex” betrays the connection 
between temporality and embodiment insofar as nostalgia is the desire to return, 
to go back to an idealized past that never was . . . to one’s childhood and, 
ultimately, to the mother’s womb. It is, therefore, our desperate effort to escape 
the burden of existence, to refuse the presence of the present and to cancel out the 
promise of the future.385 
This denial of the present that is, this attempt to go back to some illusory past, some wholeness, 
some oceanic oneness that never was, is for Manoussakis, sin itself: “Evil is . . . nothing more 
than the denial of life’s trauma and as such, the nostalgia for non-existence, that is, the nostalgia 
for a timeless existence, which, since it was never given or experienced, means nothing else but 
the nostalgia for nothing itself.”386 
If “Beneath the sound and fury of sadism and masochism the terrible force of repetition is 
at work,” that is because the repetition of sex “affords the finite human being a semblance of 
eternity” satisfying, at least for a time, man’s nostalgia for a “timeless existence,” his desire to be 
like God.387 (Marion calls the tendency of the erotic drive to become “obsessed with the haunting 
memory of the same” a “hell on earth”).388 Here, again, we see the influence of Freud on 
Manoussakis’s work. The compulsion to repeat, Freud tells us, seeks to return man to “an old 
state, an initial state”—the inanimate, inorganic, nonexistence out of which life unexpectedly 
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sprang.389 Thus for Freud, and for Manoussakis, the death-drive is primary: in sex, man exhausts 
himself in pursuing without attaining an impossible return, a return to the womb that ultimately 
represents a return—to the tomb. 
c. Sacred Onanism: Sex as Self-Transcendence 
The dangers implicit in a spiritualized sexuality are, in many ways, on full display in 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s analysis of what he calls “the body of pleasure”—that is, the body of sexual 
pleasure—in Corpus II: Writings on Sexuality. Such a body, Nancy tells us, “is not turned toward 
the world, not even toward the other with whom—since we’re talking about sexual pleasure—it 
is engaged in an exchange.” “It is a body detached from the schemas of perception and operation. 
It is no longer available to sight, or to sensation in general, in any of the usual ways of its 
functional, active, relational life.”390 This lack of “relational life” is, for Nancy, a crucial 
designation of what it means to be a body swept up in sexual pleasure, a body overcome by the 
“blurring of all the distinctions, roles, or operations connected to the functions, actions and 
representations of daily life.”391 (Indeed, as he will say in a later essay included in the same 
book, “the sexual relation represents the unaccomplishment of relation. Or, put a better way, it 
could be said that the sexual in all relation (linguistic, social, affective, aesthetic) resides in the 
dimension of unaccomplishment”).392 
For the body of pleasure, “There is no longer an ‘other’ in the ordinary sense of the word, 
just as there is no self-sameness or fusion.” Rather, when a body finds itself caught up in sexual 
pleasure, it finds itself “caught up in a mingling that is not just a mingling of these different 
bodies but at the same time the blurring” of everything experienced in life, “whether daily or 
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not.”393 Nancy compares the experience to that of an athlete on the field or an actor on the stage: 
the body that burns with sexual pleasure loses the outside world so enraptured is it by its own 
performance. “It is a body mingled with itself and organized by this mingling. It is mingled with 
itself and with another (or others), with self as other. It becomes a stranger to itself in order to 
relate to itself as another or even itself as the other who encroaches upon it and besieges it, in 
order to enjoy it [jouir de lui] and also rejoice in itself [ré-jouir lui-méme].”394  
For Nancy, this “mingling” that the body undergoes in sexual pleasure is a profound 
affirmation of life (the resonances with Nietzsche are as obvious as they are abundant). The 
sexual body “invents itself, recomposes and replays itself.”395 But it does more than this. It 
overcomes itself, transcends itself, “affirms itself” as “a capacity for transforming itself, 
reforming itself, or, perhaps, informing or even exforming itself, passing from conformation, 
even conformity regulated by a collection of social, cultural, and technological practices, to a 
form that is itself always in the process of formation.”396 Said differently, in perhaps a more 
familiar, Nietzschean language, the body of pleasure frees itself from the (social, cultural, 
technological) restraints of the herd and becomes for itself what it truly is—a constant self-
overcoming, a self ever-transcending itself in order to affirm itself as itself. “It reaches its limit, 
it passes its limit, it makes itself limitless.” And it does so “for itself only.”397 It alone exists.398 
How does this body of pleasure transcend itself toward the becoming that it alone truly 
is? “It reforms itself and almost ex-forms itself, indeed de-forms itself in such a way that it is 
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now nothing more than this exposition of self.” That is, it spiritualizes itself by stripping itself of 
all that informs it—all “the functions, actions and representations of daily life”—and by 
exposing itself as ex-formed, stark naked, without structure or configuration. Indeed, this is 
precisely what it means to be a body of pleasure. “The body of pleasure tends toward 
limitlessness, as if it were no longer body at all but pure soul.”399 
Here, then, we begin to see the grave danger of a spiritualized sexuality. For, this “pure 
soul” which exposes itself through the body of pleasure is indeed a “de-formed” thing. It has 
been robbed of all that would make it identifiable as a self. It has no history (no “daily life”), no 
personality (it is “a stranger to itself”), no other (no “relational life”), indeed, no body (no 
“perception,” “operation,” or “sensation”). As such, it is no-body. That is, it is no one’s body—
no one in particular. It is “the dismantling of the self”400 which leaves us with the same fleshless, 
purified spirit that we connected at the end of chapter two with the nothingness of death. 
To be sure, Nancy insists that the “pure soul” of sexual pleasure is born of the body, born 
of “mouth, eye, ear, nostril, sex, anus, skin, skin indefinitely reclaimed and all its pores 
reopened.”401 (So too do all Platonic thinkers begin their ascent away from the body with the 
body in order to move beyond it). And to his credit, Nancy does resist the temptation of fusion or 
identification—which often goes under the guise of “unity”—and instead maintains the pathos of 
distance.402 But even if the “pure soul” of sexuality bursts forth from a pleasure so intense that 
“A body . . . would arise completely from a breast, a palm, a belly,” still Nancy’s insistence that 
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“In sex, bodies testify to a vocation for infinitizing oneself beyond all secondary determinations 
of a given order” remains problematic.403 First, because it is a spiritualization of the highest 
degree; one which threatens to eliminate from the sexual act the actual living, feeling, loving 
persons who alone are capable of experiencing the pleasure of sex. Second, and worse still, 
because if the body of pleasure “illimits the body,” if “It is transcendence,”404 then the body that 
relates itself to itself in order to “rejoice in itself,” to invent itself, affirm itself, transcend itself, 
has lost both itself and its other. Such a body is no longer a self capable of enjoying the other, of 
loving her, rejoicing in her, presenting itself to her as an offering or gift. No, we can’t even say 
that in sex conceived as such the self uses the other. Strictly speaking, there is no self and no 
other. There is no sex. Only the purely masturbatory pleasure of a self seeking to rid itself of 
itself, to expel itself from itself so as to no longer be the self that it is. 
We need not rely upon any technical philosophical argument to understand that the 
(illusory) pleasure of ridding oneself of oneself, reducing oneself to nothing, is a sterile 
perversion, a sign of profound despair (though Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death, for 
instance, provides such an exposition). We need only to recall the example of Augustine who 
confesses above (see 100n322) that the onanistic desire for self-affirmation bears no fruit but 
yields only a harvest of death. 
d. Secret Onanism: Sex as That Which Conceals Perversion  
If our tone in the previous section has made it seem that we somehow disagree with 
Nancy’s analysis, that we take his views to be deficient or perverse, then we must clarify and 
insist that we largely agree with the picture of sex provided above. The spiritualization of the 
flesh, the desire to lose oneself and the other, the masturbatory drive for self-affirmation, self-
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transcendence, which amounts to nothing more a veiled thirst for power, destruction, and death, 
is indeed central to our understanding of human sexuality. We have called it the death-drive. 
Thanatos, perversion, sin. What we do take issue with (if we take issue at all) is the enthusiastic, 
almost celebratory tone with which Nancy describes what we see to be the cause of man’s 
profound despair. That perversion is a fact of human existence is a tautology. That it is therefore 
something to revel in, something to exalt, is a fallacy. And at the bottom of Nancy’s “body of 
pleasure” we find once more the sadist’s pleasure, the desire to be God—which, we have said, is 
“a perversion of a human being who is not and cannot be God.”405 
It goes without saying—or at least, by now, it ought to—that when we speak of 
perversion, of sin, we do not speak in moral terms. Indeed, it would be impossible to understand 
this present text without first grasping the veritable abyss that exists between sin and immorality. 
(So crucial is the distinction that it might be considered the first principle upon which everything 
we have said and will say stands or falls). The picture of sexually painted by Nancy is perverse. 
But we find no fault with its painter for that. For, it is an accurate picture; one which (perhaps 
unconsciously) identifies the dark forces at work beneath the surface of man’s erotic life. 
Freud tells us that masturbation, especially during puberty, is “unavoidable.” He speaks 
of it as “masturbation by necessity” [Notonanie].406 That sex conceals this onanistic impulse—
this autoerotic drive that aims at making me independent of the external world, the author of my 
own pleasure, the author of myself—is a realization that has been brought to light by Nancy’s 
reading of the body of pleasure; and for that, we owe him a debt of gratitude. Is this hidden 
attempt to purchase independence at the expense of the other a perversion? Without question it 
is. (As we have said, the “pure soul” sought by such solipsistic advances represents nothing more 
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than the death of the self, the destruction of the body, the desire for nothingness). Is it therefore 
immoral? The answer could only be provided by moral philosophers, which we make no 
pretenses to be. 
But if we feel uncomfortable calling such desires “perverse,” if we no longer like the 
word “sin” and, following the suggestion of Nietzsche, use instead sickness407—are we any 
better off? Is the pervasiveness of this sickness, the universality of this worm in the heart, the 
way that it infects and pollutes every man’s erotic life, any less grotesque because we now see 
“how inappropriate it is to use the word perversion as a term of reproach”?408 No, to “eliminate 
the concept sin from the world”409 will not do away with sin. (And here, Nietzsche’s thought 
suffers from his inability to separate sin from immorality). If anything, it will only exacerbate the 
problem. For, each of us hides within himself this sadistic desire to be like God. We have 
inherited it through our common ancestry. And to deny that is not only to conceal sin but to 
allow sin to fester. 
“Original sin,” Manoussakis writes, “means simply that sin is just that: original, prior and 
antecedent. That is, inescapable.”410 For him, “sin precedes freedom” and thus the ability to say 
“no” to sin “remains humanly impossible.” “I cannot not sin.”411 And yet, it is this realization—
“revealed only in and through time; for example, through the repetition of sin”—that constitutes 
the undoing of sin itself. “A sin that is aware of itself as sin is already beyond sinfulness, an evil 
that judges itself as evil cannot do this but in the name of the good, by becoming good.”412 Can 
we say, then, that the compulsion to repeat, the nostalgia of sex for sex, the obsession with “the 
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haunting memory of the same” which turns sex into a “hell on earth”413 may in fact provide the 
necessary grounds for the self-deconstruction of sex and thereby constitute its transcendence 
toward something higher? The danger should be immediately apparent. Indeed, it is the danger 
that has dogged us from the start: the flight from the flesh, from this world, Plato’s erotic ascent. 
Let us leave off, then, with this line of questioning and instead take up another. If man’s erotic 
drive is always already perverted by the desire for death, how then does Eros emerge at all? 
e. Cracked: Sex as an Image of God 
We said earlier that for both Manoussakis and Freud, Thanatos is primary. (Manoussakis 
goes so far as to say that sin is “original,” “antecedent,” “inescapable”). But the two differ 
greatly in their understandings of Eros. Whereas Freud offers only the unsatisfying, if honest, 
admission that for him life was awakened in nonliving matter “through the influence of a 
completely inconceivable force,”414 Manoussakis asserts that when man perverts himself by 
playing at God, he does so by denying that he is already like God. Thus, he imitates in a false 
way that which he, in truth, already resembles. “All pleasure . . . is sadistic as all human creation 
is destructive. Yet, as all human creation is an imitation of the Creator (theopoetics), similarly all 
pleasure is an imitation of God (theoerotics).”415 
How do we resemble the Creator who we, in our perverse ways, always try to imitate? 
“God,” Manoussakis proclaims, “is cracked.”416 God is “a God who takes a distance from God,” 
“a God who is free to exist because he ek-sists, that is, because He ‘exits’ and ‘stands beyond’ 
himself,” a God of the perichoretic khora, of the “gap within divinity.”417 “The Logos of God is 
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always a dialogue within God. And a dialogue presupposes a trinity: the two interlocutors and 
the space (khora) which distinguishes them while uniting them precisely as the common ground 
of their dialogical possibility.”418 It is out of that space, that ground, that gap within the Godhead 
that man is born. 
“I wonder,” Manoussakis muses, “whether this sabbatical crack within God finds its 
reflection in the invisible crack that runs through us and splits us asunder? ‘In man,’ Lacan 
writes, ‘there’s already a crack, a profound perturbation of the regulation of life.’ Perhaps we 
could come to recognize in this crack the imago dei, the birthmark of our creation”419—a 
birthmark that each of us bears and one that serves as the wellspring from which our own erotic 
drive toward life, love, and unity bursts forth. For, just as “it is thanks to this ‘sabbatical crack or 
fracture’ [in God] that ‘the life-drive of eros’ emerges in the act of divine creation, so it is with 
the crack in each one of us.”420 It is out of “our continuous and inevitable self-division,” the 
“splitting that we are,” that our artistic, intellectual, and erotic creations arise. 
Yet this life-drive, this creative Eros at the heart of God which is mirrored in the heart of 
man, is not and cannot be understood as some disincarnate, spiritual life-force. For, it is the gap 
of perichoresis—the split that God himself is—that gives rise to otherness and the desire for the 
other. And that desire is fulfilled and overflows when “The self-emptying God becomes what He 
is not, non-God, the sarx [flesh] of the incarnation, by exteriorizing in history the difference 
within God.”421 Thus, Manoussakis insists that spiritualizing or sublimating offers no solution to 
the problem of sin. Rather, “The resolution is to be found in and effected by a descent into the 
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bodily.”422 “It is our body,” he writes in stark contrast to the Platonic prejudices we have been 
battling all along, “that allows us to be united with God.”423 (One can understand why Paul calls 
the carnality of the crucifixion “foolishness” for philosophers (1 Corinthians 1:23)). Here, in this 
body, in the carnality of this flesh, my flesh, I can experience the incredible heights of human 
sexuality. If it is true that the sphere of sexuality is always already tainted by perversion, if no 
sexual act is ever entirely pure, so too does man’s Eros always strive for, reach toward, touch the 
divine. “Christ’s revelation offers something radically new: it offers Himself in flesh. The divine 
Word is not anymore only to be heard but also to be touched.”424 “God is no longer reserved and 
inaccessible, but He has come into contact with our nature on account of the human body that He 
assumed in the Incarnation. His is a body available to our touch and willing to touch us.”425 
Indeed, it is by “entering through our senses [that] He makes Himself manifest.”426 But 
this manifestation takes place not only in those rare, mystical encounters with Christ, as when 
one meets him face to face and experiences him in all of “His physicality, His corporeality that is 
indispensable to Him.”427 It happens also in a mediated way through the encounter with the 
other. (It is telling that Levinas, when asked what he thinks of when he thinks of the face of the 
other, answered “I think of Christ”).428 “The desire for God is not independent from the desire 
for the other human . . . One who has not felt the latter rarely and with difficulty would seek the 
former.”429 
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It is the body’s capacity for sex, Manoussakis writes quoting Ricoeur, “that enables us to 
exist ‘with no distance between us and ourself, in an experience of completeness exactly contrary 
to the incompleteness of perception and spoken communication.”430 Unlike the distance and 
fragmentation presupposed and furthered by vision and language, touch brings unity. Flesh 
fulfills. My sexuality makes me whole. Or at least it has the potential to. The descent into the 
bodily, into the flesh, my flesh, is, according to Manoussakis, “always . . . something desired but 
never completely achieved—the impossibility of desire, the impossibility of ‘existing as body, 
and nothing but body’ is due to the inescapable fact that desire . . . is never simply the desire for 
the Other but the desire for the Other’s desire, the demand ‘Desire me!’”431 
In sex, I never offer myself fully without desiring something in return. I want to give 
myself, yes. But I also want to receive. And I want that which I receive to be given as freely and 
as generously as I have given. More so. (One need not invoke specific perversions to illustrate 
this point. Anyone who has had bad sex—and anyone who has had sex has had bad sex—knows 
that the pain and frustration of bad sex is born of the creeping suspicion, whether warranted or 
not, that the other has held something back, that she has not given herself fully or has not 
received fully the offering of myself, or, conversely, that I have held myself back and not given 
as generously as I have desired to give). And because I desire something from the other—that is, 
her desire—I must of necessity objectify her. She must become for me an object capable of 
fulfilling my desire. Indeed, the object of my desire. A subject will not do. If she is to fulfill my 
desire, she must be a thing, a tool, an instrument which I can manipulate at will. (It is no accident 
that Freud speaks of sexuality in the terms of “object relations”). But if the other has become a 
thing, she has become a dead thing—as, indeed, is true of every object. My desire, then, is a 
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desire for nothing, for no living thing, for a lifeless corpse, for death itself. Thanatos rears its 
ugly head once more. My masturbatory impulse to affirm myself at the expense of the other 
remains ever-present. “Eros is never free but always purchased at the cost of destruction.” 
f. Eschaton: One Flesh or the Time is Now 
If, as Manoussakis asserts, the precondition for authentically giving oneself to the other 
(kenosis) is to exist “as body and nothing but body,” if that is the sincerest form of Eros, 
untainted by the destructive impulse to reduce the other to a thing, and if it is impossible for man 
to ever be free of that impulse, if we can never manifest our sexuality fully, lovingly, generously, 
authentically, that is because none of us is capable of living like “him who becomes fully and 
entirely flesh (John, 1:14) and who is one with the utterance ‘this is my body’—only for him 
who is his body and nothing but his body, the descent to the bodily has not only become possible 
but actual in a desire that is not any longer desired but lived.”432 And yet—one might push back 
at Manoussakis—if we believe that we are “one body in Christ” (Romans 12:5) and if Christ is 
“him who becomes fully and entirely flesh,” then can we really speak of the impossibility of 
desire, the preordained failure of sex to reach the most carnal of heights? Ought we not rather to 
say that “For human beings this is impossible, but for God all things are possible” (Matthew 
19:26)? Ought we not to insist that “The kenosis of the anachorite God does not stop with the 
flesh of the incarnation; it reaches out to the farthest limits of creation, it encompasses every 
aspect of materiality, it reverberates through every word and action”—including sexual love?433 
Who was it, after all, that assured us that in sex man experiences the wedding of two separate 
human bodies into one inseparable flesh? Who was it that joined those two in nuptial unity? 
Whose oneness brought them together (cf. Mark 10:9)? 
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Contrary to the onanistic attempts at self-spiritualization that we have seen at work just 
beneath the surface of human sexuality, Eros himself does not illimit the body by turning it into 
“pure soul.” Rather, he initiates a descent into the bodily by which soul becomes “body and 
nothing but body.” Further, he reveals himself as the one who fashioned our bodies—who made 
us in his image and likeness—when his own body is lifted up (John 8:28); that is, when he has 
become so bodily that he is no longer recognizable as a human being (Isaiah 52:14)—when he 
has become instead Eros crucified. 
That the self-willed kenosis of Eros on the cross opened for us the possibility of 
manifesting our bodies as he so lovingly offered his is gestured at even by Manoussakis. “The 
distance that splits our consciousness,” he writes, “is overcome at the moment of orgasm or 
prayer.” “Thus, for a moment, Psyche ist ausgedehnt—not any more.”434 To offer one’s body as 
body to the other and to receive the other’s body unconditionally and unreservedly is to be 
wedded together as one body; that is, one flesh. This, Manoussakis tells us, occurs first and 
foremost at the Eucharistic table, in the Mass, where the phrase “this is my body”—“an erotic 
declaration” in its own right—is repeated and the eschatological Wedding Feast of the Lamb is 
made present here and now. “The invitation to ‘take, eat, this is my body’ does not inform but it 
performs: it offers unconditionally and unreservedly the Other’s body at a moment—and it could 
only be for a moment—where the torturous stretching of the soul on the rack of time is closed 
over a body infinitely condensed because it condenses infinity in a body.”435 Does this self-
willed kenosis by which the lover (Christ) allows himself to become fully vulnerable and thus 
fully present to the other (us) cease the moment we turn our backs to the altar and exit the 
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church? Or might we say that “it reverberates through every word and action,” that it is played 
out and made manifest again and again every time a lover offers his body to his beloved? 
In The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion grapples with this very question. The 
problem for lovers—as, indeed, has been intimated above (“it could only be for a moment”)—is 
time. “In order to continue the same erotic reduction, it is necessary for us to start all over again 
from the beginning, unceasingly. We only love one another at the price of continued re-creation, 
a continuous quasi-creation, without end or rest.”436 The repetitive nature of sex, as we have 
seen, only serves to underscore its failure. “I find myself, as lover, taken up again in time; we, 
the lovers, find ourselves subjected to a repetition, exposed to the danger of being able to lose 
our [love] at any moment—thus obliged to assure it each time once again. The amorous 
phenomenon thus imposes its repetition in order to hope to save itself.”437 
If, as scripture tells us, the lovers, by joining their bodies, are mysteriously joined 
together as “one flesh” (Mark 10:9), whence comes this failure of love? Whence the compulsion 
to join bodies again and again ad infinitum? Why this tedious obsession with “the haunting 
memory of the same”? According to Marion, although the desire for sex is nostalgic—that is, it 
longs to repeat what in actuality can never be repeated: a singular event—sex itself has about it 
not this desire to recapture an idealized past but rather the expectancy, the promise even, of a 
future made manifest here and now. “At the moment of loving, the lover can only believe what 
he or she says and does under a certain aspect of eternity. The lover just as much as the beloved 
needs the possible conviction that he or she loves this time forever, irreversibly, once and for all. 
For the lover, making love implies irreversibility by definition (just as in metaphysics the 
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essence of God implies his existence).”438 The moment of lovemaking does indeed have the 
power to overcome “the torturous stretching of the soul on the rack of time,” as Manoussakis 
puts it. It does so by individualizing for me a single moment as unrepeatable, utterly unique. “In 
time, I have marked, if only for a time, an eternal moment, which belongs to me, which came 
about only through and for me, and, thus, which individualizes me once and for all. Once and for 
all—to have said it is sufficient to wound me with a wound that marks me forever and delivers 
me to myself.”439 
But I am not the only one irrevocably marked by the wounding of this eternal moment. 
My beloved too is marked. And, to speak more accurately, it is she who marks me, as I mark her, 
with the moment that we have given one another. “Since we have made love one time, we have 
made it always and forever, because what was made cannot not have been made . . . Once a 
lover, I remain so always, for it no longer depends upon me not to have loved—the other will 
always testify, even if I deny her, that I made myself her lover.”440 (Hence the warning of Paul, 
noted above, to avoid copulating with prostitutes, cf. 1 Corinthians 6:16). When we lovers offer 
each other our bodies—wounded, vulnerable, bare—we set one another as seals upon each 
other’s hearts (Song of Songs 8:6), we wound one another eternally by our shared woundedness, 
we share with one another the woundedness that each of us individually is. Does this moment of 
shared woundedness constitute a nuptial unity? Have the two truly been bonded together as one 
flesh? Is the offering of one’s fragile, broken body enough? 
For Marion, the threat that “the next instant can sink into the insignificance of dissipation, 
and thus repetition” cannot be overstated; 441 for, the realization of that threat would mean the 
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end of love. But that very real and devastating possibility does not exclude another: the 
“eschatological” possibility to “love this instant as if you no longer had any other in which to 
love, ever.” That is, to experience this moment not as a mere moment—but as eternity. To do so, 
Marion says, is “to assert as my definitive lover’s status the erotic situation in which that instant 
finds and fixes me.”442 It is to fix the moment of love in the forever of eternity by being willing 
“(and this depends only upon me) to love at each instant for eternity.”443 
The point is to transform one instant among others—a simple insignificant item of 
repetition—into a final instance, or put another way, to render it eschatological by 
setting it up as the third party, which will witness forever [our love], since no 
other will ever succeed it. And this can be accomplished, provided that I decide to 
assume the instant just to come not only as a decisive event, but as the event of 
the final instance—as the advent of the final instance. Which can be done, 
provided that I resolve myself, in this instant, to love as I would want to find 
myself loving (and loved) on the last day and forever, if this instant had to remain 
without another, and freeze my lover’s face.444 
The lover who does this “accomplishes the promises of eternity without waiting, in the present 
instant.” He does not “promise” the beloved eternity but “provokes” it and gives it to her 
“starting now.”445  
As lover, I must, we must, love as if the next instant decided, in the final instance, 
everything. To love requires loving without being able or willing to wait any 
longer to love perfectly, definitively, forever. Loving demands that the first time 
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already coincide with the last time. . . . Thus we have only one single instant at 
our disposal, one single atom of an instant, and it is now. . . . we must love now, 
now or never, now and forever.446 
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The Hermeneutics of Desire: On the Song of Songs 
In his essay “The Nuptial Metaphor,” Ricoeur objects to the narrow readings of the Song 
of Songs—a book which, with its abundant use of erotic language and sexually evocative 
imagery, dramatically differs from the rest of the bible—offered by both modern Judeo-Christian 
commentators and “naturalistic” or erotic interpreters alike. While the former tend to trade in the 
carnality of the text for an overly spiritualized, allegorical reading, the latter reduce the Song to 
“nothing more than an epithalamium, a carnal love song in dialogue form.”447 Both readings, 
Ricoeur argues, “claim to tell us the true meaning that was intended by the author”448—but both 
fall flat. While the strictly allegorical ascends away from the body and thus loses the Eros of the 
flesh, the reductively erotic eliminates the transcendent and thus confines Eros to the biological. 
Neither reading is sufficient. Neither can account for the other. And ironically, both are rooted in 
the same false premise, the belief that “there exists one true meaning of the text namely, the one 
that was intended by its author, authors, or the last redactor, who are held to have somehow 
inscribed this meaning in the text, from which exegesis has subsequently to extract it, and, if 
possible, restore it to its originary meaning.”449 
Echoing Augustine’s realization in Book XII of the Confessions that “A great variety of 
interpretations, many of them legitimate, confronts our exploring minds as we search among the 
words” of scripture,450 Ricoeur rejects the notion that “commentary . . . consists in identifying 
this overall true, intended, and original meaning.”451 Like T.S. Eliot, who reminds us that “No 
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poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone”452 and goes on, in a proto-Barthean 
vein (La mort de l'auteur), to insist that “To divert interest from the poet to the poetry is a 
laudable aim,”453 Ricoeur argues that, even if it were possible to identify the author’s “intended 
meaning”—a dubious prospect in its own right, especially since “We have to admit that we never 
know with certitude who is speaking, to whom, or where”454—still, the Song would not be 
reducible to any one reading. Rather, it is precisely because we never know who is speaking that 
the Song—which is, after all, a song; that is, a poem, a work of art—is “open to a plurality of 
interpretations.”455 As Kearney, a former-student of Ricoeur’s, argues, “the primacy of the 
indeterminately fluid ‘movements of love’ over the specific identities of the lover and the 
beloved guards the open door. . . . This guarding of the Song as an open text of multiple readings 
and double entendres—divine and human, eschatological and carnal—provokes a hermeneutic 
play of constant ‘demetaphorizing and remetaphorizing,’ which never allows the Song to end.”456 
According to Eliot, “Poetry . . . is not the expression of personality, but an escape from 
personality.”457 That is, a true work of art is not the unpacking of the artist’s personal life but the 
creation of “a new art emotion,”458 one which engenders an ongoing need for interpretation. That 
the “movements of love” found in the Song of Songs give voice not merely to the “personal 
emotions” of the lover and beloved, but represent an expression of the fluidity, complexity, and 
irreducibility of desire means that the Song must be interpreted and reinterpreted anew. “The 
Song of Songs confronts us with a desire that desires beneath desire and beyond desire while 
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remaining desire. It is a desire that spills out beyond the limits of the Song itself, sending 
innumerable ripples throughout the many readings.”459 
If, as St. Bonaventure contends, bonum est diffusivum sui (goodness pours itself out), 
then we must insist without hesitation that each new reading of the Song of Songs has the 
potential to further illuminate a text which already overflows with meaning. Thus, in the pages 
that follow, we will not only consider the manifold interpretations that have come before, but 
will venture to offer our own—one which seeks neither to exclude past readings nor to minimize 
the import of the one being offered, but rather to remain open to the plurality of interpretations 
(Ricoeur) while also attempting to bring “conformity between the old and the new” (Eliot). 
a. God, the Husband of Israel 
In his essay “The Shulammite’s Song: Divine Eros, Ascending and Descending,” 
Kearney examines the many readings of the Song of Songs handed down through the centuries. 
Noting that the Song “offers no single, stable perspective” from which it speaks, he writes, “The 
sustained ambiguities of identity and fluid reversals of erotic roles have made this text fertile 
ground for conceiving and reconceiving the mysteries of desire, in particular the mysteries of 
divine desire.”460 Like Ricoeur, who views the Song as opening the space for an on-going play of 
hermeneutic interpretation, Kearney asks, “Does the Song celebrate God’s desire for us? Our 
desire for God? Or both?”461 and ultimately concludes that the richness of the text lies in that fact 
that “We are kept guessing.”462 
Kearney begins his survey of the plurality of interpretations with some of the earliest 
commentaries found in the Talmudic and Kabbalistic traditions. Such readings, he notes, 
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interpret the Song as referring to “the love between God and Israel.”463 In spite of the fact that 
God is never explicitly mentioned in the text—one commentator, however, asserts that the 
presence of the divine can be found in the “all-consuming blaze” of Song 8:6464—nevertheless, 
God is here interpreted as playing the role of Solomon, the Song’s bridegroom. Kearney quotes 
Elliot Wolfson: 
A number of aphoristic comments scattered throughout Talmudic and midrashic 
literature, including the critical exegetical remark that every Solomon mentioned 
in the Song is holy, for the name refers to God, the ‘one to whom peace belongs’ 
(li-mi she-ha-shalom shelo), indicate the allegorical interpretation of the Song for 
some rabbis seems to have been predicated on a theosophical conception that 
attributed gender and sexual images to God.465 
This reading, which finds echoes throughout the Hebrew bible, posits God as the lover, the 
husband of Israel. “You shall call me ‘My husband,’” declares the Lord through the prophet 
Hosea (Hosea 2:18). “Your husband is your Maker,” says Isaiah, “the Lord of hosts is his name, 
your redeemer, the Holy One of Israel, called God of all the earth” (Isaiah 54:5). 
This interpretation has theological implications. The distinctively Judaic emphasis on 
divine transcendence can be traced to the analogy employed here. God is the bridegroom who 
approaches the beloved from without. Creation does not emanate from and return to some 
Plotinian oneness. There is a distance, a space, a gap. Like a husband to his bride, God resists 
identification, remains other, unique. (Žižek, in a fascinating passage, sees this as that which 
establishes “the intimate link between Judaism and psychoanalysis: in both cases, the focus is on 
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the traumatic encounter with the abyss of the desiring Other—the Jewish people’s encounter 
with their God whose impenetrable Call derails the routine of daily existence; the child’s 
encounter with the enigma of the Other’s jouissance”).466 
What is more, this reading begins to shine light upon an idea gestured to but not fully 
unpacked in Part One of this present work: the connection between sex and sin. We said above 
that for Balthasar there is an “adhesion of sexuality to sin.”467 An impartial consideration of the 
prophets’ continuous rebuking of Israel for her adulterous ways reveals as much. As Anna Silvas 
notes, “In the pagan religions surrounding Israel, licentiousness became, in the most literal and 
physical sense, coterminous with religious worship. . . . The idea was imitative magic: cultic 
forms of sexual intercourse were practiced in order to secure agricultural fertility. It was the 
burden of the prophets to recall Israel and Judah from this seductive brew of religious and sexual 
promiscuity.”468 
That Deleuze identifies “a kind of mysticism in perversion . . . [comparable] to a ‘black’ 
theology” ought not to surprise us.469 For, not only did we identify above a drive for self-
affirmation which amounts to a veiled thirst for power and death hidden at the heart of sex, but 
from the beginning of biblical history it has been clear that “idolatry is implicated quite literally 
in sexual sin, and conversely sexual sin is idolatry.”470 (Is it any wonder that Augustine begins 
Book II of his Confessions—the Book in which he famously probes the perplexing nature of 
sin—with considerations of his “sexual awakening” and “adolescent lust”?). 
Every one of Israel’s foes, each of the hostile nations or tribes, is traced back to 
some sexual sin leading to a rupture in the family and to social ruin. The sins of 
                                                          
466
 Žižek, “The Fear of Four Words,” 37. 
467
 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 199. 
468
 Silvas, “Communion with God,” 68. 
469
 Deleuze as quoted in Manoussakis, “Cracked,” 61. 
470
 Silvas, “Communion with God,” 68. 
124 
 
parents in the sexual realm affect the lives of their children, and their children’s 
children, and so on. In fact, there is scarcely a major figure in Genesis untouched 
by sexual sin. As a result, even the great patriarchal families are all in one way or 
another “dysfunctional.” What is depicted in Genesis continues throughout the 
Old Testament. Scarcely a hero of salvation history is uncompromised in his own 
behavior and that of his own family.471  
It is for this reason that, whenever Israel wanders away from God and into idolatry, she is 
compared to an adulterous wife. Sexual sin is idolatry and idolatry is adultery—that is, sexual 
sin. 
Yet saying this does not mean that we must conclude with Kierkegaard that sin and 
sexuality are “inseparable,” that “without sin, there is no sexuality.”472 Perhaps no sexuality as 
we know it, sexuality in which Eros is always bound up with Thanatos, “purchased at the cost of 
destruction.”473 But, as Genesis makes clear, “the first consequence of Adam and Eve’s sin is 
that their sexuality was affected”—they clothed themselves to hide their nakedness (cf. Genesis 
3:7).474 And if their sexuality was affected, that is because it was already an essential aspect of 
their being. (To tangent, for a moment, to a topic not wholly unrelated—one might ask why it is 
that man wears clothes even when there is no need for him to do so; for instance, when he is 
alone in the comfort of his own home. The answer, I think, is rooted in this idea that the fall 
affected man’s sexuality. If we accept Nietzsche’s observation that “The degree and kind of a 
man’s sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of his spirit,”475 then we must conclude that 
the concealing of one’s sexual organs is an attempt to conceal that which is most intimate, one’s 
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secret interiority. But conceal it from whom? There can be no doubt. For, it was not from Eve 
that Adam tried to hide himself: “When they heard the sound of the Lord God walking about in 
the garden . . . the man and his wife hid themselves from the Lord God among the trees of the 
garden. The Lord God then called to the man and asked him: Where are you? He answered, ‘I 
heard you in the garden; but I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid’” (Genesis 3:8-10).476 
And yet, what can be hidden from God? What can man conceal? One may wonder why God 
made circumcision the sign of his “everlasting covenant” (Genesis 17:13). A secret sign, hidden 
from sight. Yet what does the lover desire if not that which is most intimate: the flesh, the 
clandestine interiority, the ultimate pinnacle of the beloved’s spirit? The beloved’s nakedness is 
not for all to see. Such intimacy is reserved for lovers). 
The Song, read in this light, is a song of divine longing. The bride has been unfaithful, 
adulterous, untrue. But still her bridegroom waits. No, not waits: beckons, calls, pursues. “The 
sound of my lover! here he comes springing across the mountains, leaping across the hills” (Song 
of Songs 2:8). “The Lord calls you back, like a wife forsaken and grieved in spirit, a wife 
married in youth and then cast off, says your God. For a brief moment I abandoned you, but with 
great tenderness I will take you back. In an outburst of wrath, for a moment I hid my face from 
you; but with enduring love I take pity on you, says the Lord, your redeemer” (Isaiah 54:6-8). 
Kearney notes that “this reading finds support in the famous view of R. Aqiva that if all of 
Scripture is holy, the Song is the holy of holies, for it suggests that the Song captures, in nuce, 
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the entire matrimonial and erotic charge of the divine revelation of Torah to the people.”477 It 
cries out for the eschatological wedding of God and his chosen ones: “the lover longing for his 
‘promised bride’ anticipates the promised kingdom.”478 
b. Christ, the Bridegroom of the Church 
If the traumatic encounter with the other’s desire is, as Žižek says, that which 
distinguishes the Jewish-psychoanalytic “paradigm” from other worldviews (Platonic, Gnostic, 
Hindu, etc.), it is also that which both aligns it with and differentiates it from the Christian. On 
the one hand, Žižek notes, both Judaism and Christianity share the “notion of an external 
traumatic encounter.” On the other, he asks, “does the latter not ‘overcome’ the Otherness of the 
Jewish God through the principle of Love, the reconciliation/unification of God and Man in the 
becoming-man of God?”479 That God’s desire for man is an inherent part of the Judaic tradition 
has been evidenced by the interpretations of the Song of Songs examined above. Yet there can be 
no doubt that—if, as Kearney says, such readings “anticipate the promised kingdom”—the 
Christian interpreters who follow are want to take matters one step further and declare that “the 
kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matthew 4:17). The adulterous wife of the Hebrew bible has—
through the incarnation, death, and resurrection of her bridegroom—been made new (Revelation 
21:5). 
That “In Jesus of Nazareth, the Bridegroom of Israel so long proclaimed by the prophets 
and in the Song of Songs has come in the flesh”480 is asserted by Paul in the oft-misrepresented 
Chapter 5 of his Letter to the Ephesians. The passage is worth quoting in its entirety: 
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Be subordinate to one another out of reverence for Christ. Wives should be 
subordinate to their husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is head of his wife 
just as Christ is head of the church, he himself the savior of the body. As the 
church is subordinate to Christ, so wives should be subordinate to their husbands 
in everything. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church and 
handed himself over for her to sanctify her, cleansing her by the bath of water 
with the word, that he might present to himself the church in splendor, without 
spot or wrinkle or any such thing, that she might be holy and without blemish. So 
[also] husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his 
wife loves himself. For no one hates his own flesh but rather nourishes and 
cherishes it, even as Christ does the church, because we are members of his body. 
“For this reason a man shall leave [his] father and [his] mother and be joined to 
his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.” This is a great mystery, but I speak 
in reference to Christ and the church. In any case, each one of you should love his 
wife as himself, and the wife should respect her husband (Ephesians 5:21-33). 
There is much to comment on here. Our first observation is one that young couples are not likely 
to receive in their Pre-Cana classes: marriage represents a lifelong crucifixion, an unfolding of 
Christ’s passion over not 3 days but 3 or more decades. Husbands are told to love their wives—
and here’s the kicker—“even as Christ loved the church and handed himself over for her” (5:25). 
Wives are instructed to be “subordinate to their husbands;” and who could fail to hear the 
resonances with Philippians 2:5-8?481 Yes, according to this Pauline injunction, “The path that 
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eros must tread is the path that any love, if it is to be true, must eventually walk: the path of 
crucifixion with Christ.”482 Yet it is only by walking such a narrow and harrowing path that 
spouses can be awakened to a profound mystery: the “intimate connection between the body and 
love.”483 
Paul insists that “husbands should love their wives as their own bodies” (5:28); they 
should nourish and cherish their wives as they do their own flesh. And he goes on to say that in 
doing so husbands resemble Christ and his love for the church (5:29). By identifying wives with 
both the body and the church, Paul resists two dangerous errors—ones which, ironically, 
Christians throughout history have used this very passage to justify. The first is the subjugation 
of women. The second is the spiritualization of the flesh. And the two, as this text makes clear, 
are not unrelated. Hatred of one’s wife is here likened to hatred of one’s own flesh. And the same 
can be said in reverse because to hate one’s flesh is to hate the flesh that is a member of Christ’s 
body, the church—that is, to hate one’s flesh as wife, as bride of Christ. Any movement away 
from the body, away from its needs, wants, and desires, is not only a movement that seeks power 
and control,484 but is also an attempt to defeminize the essentially feminine role of man in 
relation to Christ. 
In a stunning reversal, Paul tells us that it is not the husband but the wife who that takes 
the privileged place. For, the bride is the embodiment of Christ. If we take Paul’s assertion that 
“the husband is head of his wife just as Christ is head of the church” to be an exaltation of the 
husband, that is only because we have failed to understand the radical revaluation introduced by 
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the Christian paradigm. For the Platonist, the head is indeed the privileged position. Christianity, 
however, tells us that “the first shall be last” (Matthew 20:16). It is not the head but “the flesh,” 
as Tertullian insists, that provides “the very condition on which salvation hinges.”485 The wife, 
then, is the necessary condition for the salvation of her husband—think Monica and Patricius—
just as the flesh prepares the way for the salvation of the soul.486 If we push this analogy further 
and consider it in light of Augustine’s claim that “it was not the corruptible flesh that made the 
soul sinful; it was the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible,”487 then we must—contrary to 
the misreadings of Genesis that would pin the fall on Eve—say that the husband is actually the 
corruptor of his spouse. (Did we not argue above that, when the serpent tempted Eve, he was 
actually giving voice to Adam’s internal struggle?).  
And yet, matters more complicated still—this is no mere reversal of classical binaries—
for, husbands are also commanded to act as Christ, “the savior of the body” (5:23). Neither 
spouse, then, is capable of saving him or herself. Each depends upon, needs, the other. (Are we 
willing to extend the metaphor back to the relation between Christ and church as, say, Eckhart is 
want to do?).488 This mutual dependence amounts to a mutual subservience, a continuous 
struggle between the spouses to see who can lower him or herself more, who can make the 
greatest sacrifice, who can raise the other higher, outdo the other in praise. It is “a dynamic of 
giving and receiving, identity and difference, otherness and relationship, a kind of mutual 
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subordination—in short, of Love.”489 Does it offend our contemporary sensibilities to hear that 
“As the church is subordinate to Christ, so wives should be subordinate to their husbands in 
everything” (5:24)? But what does it mean to be subordinate as the church is subordinate to 
Christ—that is, to the one who made himself subordinate to all? The reversals and double 
meanings abound. As is the case with the Song itself, “Throughout this passage Paul weaves so 
closely between human marriage and the metaphor of the Christ/Church union that at times it is 
almost difficult to distinguish which dimension he is referencing.”490 
c. Pornographic Puritanism: Allegorical (mis)Readings 
Both the Judaic and Christian interpretations of the Song of Songs considered above 
hinge upon a sort of this-worldliness that enables them to attend to the transcendent God’s 
concern for creaturely matters. The God of Israel is a God entangled with his people. He is a 
jealous God who cannot stand the thought of his bride having any lover but him (Exodus 20:5). 
Christ is a God who weeps (John 35:11); a God who has been pierced, wounded by this life. And 
yet, the temptation—especially for the philosophically inclined—is to leave this world behind, to 
escape into the purity of ideas. Thus countless commentators in both the Jewish and Christian 
traditions have chosen to vacate the carnality of the Song and replace it with reductively 
allegorical readings. 
Kearney explores such interpretations at length. “Maimonides,” he notes, “like many of 
the Christian medieval commentators indebted to Neoplatonic and Aristotelian sources, takes the 
amorous symbolism as code for the contemplative ideal of union between the rational soul (the 
bride) and the Active Intellect (bridegroom).”491 Such readings seek a “final overcoming of 
carnal desire” by enacting a “certain transformation of the original heterosexual language of the 
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poem into a spiritualized homoeroticism that is itself predicated upon an ascetic renunciation of 
physical, carnal desire.”492 The erotic relationship referred to in the Song is no longer read as 
existing between a man and a woman but “between the soul and God, engendered respectively as 
feminine and masculine.”493 (Again we see that the spiritualization of the flesh leads to the 
marginalization of women. It is worth noting here that Plato’s erotic ascent also excludes 
women. Indeed, they are literally banished, cast out of the party (cf. Symposium 176e)). 
The irony of turning the carnal aspects of the Song—for example the kiss found in its 
opening lines—into a type allegory for “intellectual communion with the lights of the divine 
Intellect predicated on the emancipation of the human mind from the lures of physical 
pleasure”494 is that such readings are, contrary to their intended purposes, hyper-carnal. As 
Augustine notes, “anyone who exalts the soul as the Supreme Good, and censures the nature of 
the flesh as something evil, is in fact carnal alike in his cult of the soul and in his revulsion from 
the flesh, since this attitude is prompted by human folly, not by divine truth.”495 That is, asserting 
that the flesh is more sinful than the soul is a mistake of reason made by those who live under the 
law of the flesh rather than in the freedom of spirit (cf. Galatians 5:13-26). 
Like Ricoeur, Kearney worries about this attempt to spiritualize the Song and thus lose 
the incarnate Eros of bodily desire. He notes that, by means of this more philosophical reading, 
“sex is taken out of the Song” and laments the fact that “Gender becomes a matter of supra-
physical symbolism and sublimation. The bride’s appeal to the kiss of the mouth . . . has little to 
do with love between real lovers and everything to do with . . . the return journey of the lower 
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spirit to the higher Spirit from which it originated.”496 This “ascetic renunciation of the flesh,” 
however, is not confined to the work of Maimonides. Kearney highlights narrow Christian 
readings which eliminate Paul’s insistence on the import of the body in spiritual as well as 
nuptial love and reduce the Song to nothing more than the “symbolic relationship between 
Church and God or soul and Christ.”497 
In Origen’s Homily on the Song of Songs, for instance, “The right use of love . . . is [said 
to be] in the service of a higher truth and wisdom, far removed from the embodied love of flesh 
and blood. Only those who are spiritually detached from their physical desire can raise 
themselves up to this intellectual form of love.”498 For Kearney, this allegorical interpretation 
constitutes an “anti-carnal” reading of desire: “It takes the threat out of the sexual imagery by 
disembodying and depersonalizing the actual lovers in favor of more abstract movements of 
love.”499 These abstractions aim to “subordinate desire to wisdom.”500 Like the more 
philosophical reading offered by Maimonides, Origen’s account attempts to exchange the carnal 
Eros of the body for the spiritual Eros of the soul. For Origen, “All references to the body, the 
senses, flowers, animals, landscapes, nature are no more than ciphers for higher spiritual 
truths.”501 And the Song’s celebrated bride is merely “a thinly disguised emblem of the soul or 
Church” searching for the immaterial, transcendent God.502 
Contrary to what one might assume, the puritanical impulse that motivates this kind of 
overly-spiritualized, allegorical reading shares much in common with the reductive view that sex 
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is “just sex”—a purely biological or naturalistic reality. In his essay on the connection between 
bodily love and the love of God, Conor Sweeney writes: 
[T]here would seem to be a straight line from thinking of love and marriage as 
purely natural or human realities to the radical secularization and deconstruction 
of sexuality, marriage, and love in general. . . . To trap this truly mysterious 
reality in the realm of “nature,” reductively understood, is thus to secularize love 
itself. And the secularization of human love has the undesirable consequence that 
our hearts and desires begin to lose their receptivity to divine love.503 
The risk is real. (Think, for instance, of Marie Bonaparte’s attempt to reduce the mystical 
experience of Teresa of Avila to a “violent venereal orgasm”).504 But to conclude, therefore, that 
“The intuition behind the nuptial mystery is that the human experience of love is actually a 
primer for ultimate fulfillment in Trinitarian love”505 because “The love experienced by human 
persons . . . can never fully satisfy”506 is to run the same risk in the opposite direction—to reduce 
sex and the body to mere steppingstones on the path to transcendence, vestiges of a fallen world 
which, once overcome, can be left behind and forgotten. As Žižek, in his reading of the Song of 
Songs, rightly points out: 
[T]he most perspicacious Bible scholars themselves are the first to emphasize the 
limits of such a metaphorical reading that dismisses the sexual content as “only a 
simile”: it is precisely such a “symbolic” reading that is “purely human,” that is to 
say, that persists in the external opposition of the symbol and its meaning, 
clumsily attaching a “deeper meaning” to the explosive sexual content. The literal 
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reading (say, of the Song of Songs as almost pornographic eroticism) and the 
allegorical reading are two sides of the same operation: what they share is the 
common presupposition that “real” sexuality is “purely human,” with no 
discernible divine dimension.507 
Echoing Žižek’s unexpected coupling, Kearney notes that “pornography is, 
paradoxically, a twin of Puritanism. Both display an alienation from flesh—one replacing it with 
the virtuous, the other with the virtual. Each is out of touch with the body.”508 With the body—
and perhaps with the darker side of desire as well. For, while the puritanical interpretation of 
Eros longs to leave behind the dangers of the flesh and ascend toward purity and light, the 
pornographic watches from a safe and sterile distance, unaffected and uninvolved. In reality, the 
assertions that the Form of Beauty is the ultimate aim of Eros (cf. Symposium 209e-212a) and 
that sex is just sex, an animal activity, are one and the same. Neither is willing to descend into a 
“love as strong as death” (Song of Songs 8:6). Neither is capable of embodying a desire as fierce 
and as frightful “as Sheol” (8:6).509 
d. Love Like Death: Mysticism and the Void 
It is impossible to read an account of a mystical experience without recognizing the 
mystic’s encounter as something at once awesome and awful. It is beautiful and unbearable. The 
sweetest pleasure. The bitterest pain. The mystic is wounded by a love so overwhelming that she 
both gasps for relief and pants with delight. Everything in her wants the intensity to subside. 
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Everything wants it to intensify. It is a spiritual ecstasy that pains the body. It is life so abundant 
that it is as overwhelming as death. 
In his hands I saw a long golden spear and at the end of the iron tip I seemed to 
see a point of fire. With this he seemed to pierce my heart several times so that it 
penetrated my entrails. When he drew it out I thought he was drawing them out 
with it and he left me completely afire with a great love for God. The pain was so 
sharp that it made me utter several moans; and so excessive was the sweetness 
caused me by this intense pain that one can never wish to lose it, nor will one’s 
soul be content with anything less than God. It is not bodily pain, but spiritual, 
though the body has a share in it—indeed, a great share. So sweet are the 
colloquies of love which pass between the soul and God that if anyone thinks I am 
lying I beseech God, in His goodness, to give him the same experience.510 
Here, Teresa joins the choir of saints and mystics who have sung in unison, even when they have 
sung in a plurality of voices. She echoes her friend John of the Cross’s ecstatic exclamation, 
“May the vision of your beauty be my death!”511 
Speaking of the connection between Teresa’s writings and the experiences recounted by 
other mystics, Kristeva notes that the mystic’s relation to God—who is viewed as both “an ideal 
father from a psychoanalytic point of view” and also “a beaten father who is tortured and 
crucified”—is “resexualized” such that an intense “suffering is also aggravated in the mystical 
experience.”512 “This suffering is experienced as pleasure alongside death and vulnerability and 
the castration of the father. He is ideal, but he is suffering and he is a source of ultimate pleasure 
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and ultimate suffering.”513 It ought not to surprise us, then, to find John of the Cross speaking on 
the one hand “of a superabundance of love . . . where the soul may ‘taste a splendid spiritual 
sweetness’” and on the other of “terror and fear before the very force of mystical ecstasy. The 
soul is compelled to beg the beloved to ‘withdraw the eyes I have desired’; it is clearly too much 
for either the senses or mind to endure.”514 
For the mystic, the experience of God is “sensorial and quite disturbing sexually in the 
sense that some mystics—male mystics, for instance—experience themselves as women being 
penetrated by God.”515 Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, life and death, good and evil collide 
and become one in this moment of unspeakable ecstasy. John, who is remembered as both a 
mystic and a stigmatic, opens his Spiritual Canticle with the image of the poem’s speaker being 
wounded by a divine stag. “He has already been shot through with ‘the thrust of the lance,’ 
which now leaves him ‘moaning’ and disoriented—sick with love. And yet this wounding, which 
leaves him in such destitute loss, is also, he avows, something blissful and benign.”516 One is 
reminded of St. Francis of Assisi’s reception of the stigmata which Dante, echoing the language 
of Song 8:6, calls the “final seal” received by the mystic from Christ (Paradiso, XI, 107).517 As 
Francis’s first biographer Thomas of Celano notes, during that mystical experience Francis felt 
“sad and happy, joy and grief alternating in him.”518 His wounds ignited his ecstasy. From the 
depth of his suffering, his bliss sprang forth. 
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According Bataille, the experiences recounted by these mystics share a direct link with 
the Song of Songs. In the second volume of The Accursed Share, he includes a subsection titled 
“From the Song of Songs to the Formless and Modeless God of the Mystics” in which he rejects 
any interpretation of the Song that attempts to reduce its mystical language to a “transposition of 
sexual states.”519 “The whole thrust of my book is contrary to these simplifications. It seems no 
more legitimate to reduce mysticism to sexual eroticism than to reduce the latter, as people do, 
even without saying it, to animal sexuality.”520 Yet even if the burning desire expressed by the 
mystics is not reducible to the passion of sexual eroticism, still the two are analogous to one 
another and Bataille is not afraid to explore the unsettling power that connects them. It is in this 
context that he offers a reading of the Song of Songs darker and more troubling than any of the 
reductive interpreters would dare. 
In sex and in God, Bataille sees death. Like Nietzsche, who finds “a womanly tenderness 
and lust” at the heart of the mystic’s pursuit of a “unio mystica et physica,”521 Bataille identifies 
“a fundamental connection between religious ecstasy and eroticism.”522 (Indeed contrary to the 
distinction insisted upon above, he—in his book On Nietzsche—goes so far as to assert: “There is 
no wall between eroticism and mysticism!”).523 And like Nietzsche, who insists that “the desire 
for a unio mystica with God is the desire of the Buddhist for nothingness . . . and no more,”524 
Bataille is ready admit “the identity of these perfect contraries, divine ecstasy and its opposite, 
extreme horror,”525 the abyss of “religious eroticism” and the nothingness of death. 
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[A]nguish, which lays us open to annihilation and death, is always linked to 
eroticism; our sexual activity finally rivets us to the distressing image of death, 
and the knowledge of death deepens the abyss of eroticism. The curse of decay 
constantly recoils on sexuality, which it tends to eroticize: in sexual anguish there 
is a sadness of death, an apprehension of death which is rather vague but which 
we will never be able to shake off. 526 
Sexuality’s “fragrance of death,” Bataille writes, “ensures all its power.”527 A power at once 
destructive and divine. For, it is “in the darkness of eroticism,” in the encounter with “horror, 
anguish, death,” that “the experience of God is kept alive.”528 “What the mystic glimpses in the 
laceration of his knees is a God dying on the Cross, the horror of death and suffering—a vision 
granted him to the very degree that his strength gives way.”529 
The mystic, like the lover, loses himself in the anguish of this horrific/beatific vision. He 
is overcome by the “desire to blissfully and sublimely dissolve into limitless fusion . . . [into] 
nothingness, death, indifferentiation.”530 “Only eroticism is capable, in silence and transgression, 
of admitting the lovers into that void where even the mumbling is stopped, where no speech is 
conceivable, where it is no longer just the other but rather the bottomlessness and boundlessness 
of the universe that is designated by the embrace.”531 For Bataille, this mystical eroticism 
represents a dark assent to life lived to the point of death, “the desire to fall headlong,”532 “to live 
while ceasing to live, or to die without ceasing to live,”533 “to fall, to fail, and to squander all 
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one’s reserves until there is no firm ground beneath one’s feet.”534 It is “the desire of an extreme 
state that Saint Teresa has perhaps been the only one to depict strongly enough in words: ‘I die 
because I cannot die,’”535 “the complete destruction of the world of common reality, the passage 
from the perfect Being of positive theology to that formless and modeless God of ‘theopathy’ 
akin to the ‘apathy’ of Sade.”536 
In Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose, Adso of Melk—a Benedictine novice who 
serves as the novel’s narrator—recounts the details of his first and only sexual encounter. Like 
Bataille’s lovers, Adso finds that his experience of eroticism leaves him “bereft of any 
expression, because my tongue and my mind had not been instructed in how to name sensations 
of that sort.”537 Overwhelmed by “joy in that moment”—which, we should note, is a carnal joy 
born of intimacy with a “human reality” and “not a vision”538—Adso recalls “other words, heard 
in another time and in other places, spoken certainly for other ends, but which seemed 
wondrously in keeping with my joy . . . as if they had been born consubstantially to express 
it.”539 “Suddenly the girl appeared to me as the black but comely virgin of whom the Song of 
Songs speaks.”540 
In the pages that follow, Adso’s reflections seem to confirm not only Bataille’s reading of 
the Song but also the connection he draws between mysticism, eroticism, and death. Noting that 
there is nothing “more sweet and terrible” than sexuality’s “invitation of [the] whole spirit to lose 
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all memory in bliss,” “as if one no longer existed, not feeling one’s identity at all, or feeling 
lowered, almost annihilated,”541 Adso writes: 
As a little drop of water added to a quantity of wine is completely dispersed and 
takes on the color and taste of wine, as red-hot iron becomes like molten fire 
losing its original form, as air when it is inundated with the sun’s light is 
transformed into total splendor and clarity so that it no longer seems illuminated 
but, rather, seems to be light itself, so I felt myself die of tender liquefaction, and I 
had only the strength left to murmur the words of the psalm: “Behold my bosom 
is like new wine, sealed, which bursts new vessels” . . . Then I understood the 
abyss, and the deeper abysses that it conjured up.542 
To his surprise and horror, Adso soon realizes that “to describe my wicked ecstasy of that instant 
I have used the same words that I used . . . to describe the fire that burned the martyred body of 
the Fraticello Michael.”543 “Why,” he asks, “did I . . . depict the ecstasy of death that had 
impressed me in the martyr Michael in the words the saint had used for the ecstasy of (divine) 
life, and yet I could not refrain from depicting in the same words the ecstasy (culpable and 
fleeting) of earthly pleasure, which immediately afterward had spontaneously appeared to me as 
a sensation of death and annihilation?” “What was similar in Michael’s desire for death, in the 
transport I felt at the sight of the flame consuming him, in the desire for carnal union I felt with 
the girl, in the mystic shame with which I translated it allegorically, and in the desire for joyous 
annihilation that moved the saint to die in his own love in order to live longer and eternally?”544 
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For Bataille and for Nietzsche, the answer to these questions is clear: without the “fragrance of 
death” sexuality “would not be erotic”545 nor would God be divine.546 
e. A Reading “More Dark and Awful” 
In his consideration of the mystical theology of Meister Eckhart, Žižek criticizes 
Eckhart’s “refusal (or inability) to endorse Christ’s full humanity,” his reducing of “Christ to an 
ethereal being foreign to earthly reality.”547 “Eckhart avoids the monstrosity of Christ’s 
Incarnation, he is unable to accept Christ’s full humanity: ‘When Eckhart speaks of Christ, he 
almost always stresses his divinity at the expense of his humanity. Even in the scriptural texts 
clearly describing the humanity of Jesus, he still finds ways of reading his divine nature.’”548 
That Eckhart’s mysticism is predicated upon a desire to return to “the abyss of Godhead, the 
Nothingness of the Ungod”549—which, for him, precedes the existence of God who only comes 
into being through man550—is a direct consequence of his minimizing the import of the 
incarnation. 
When Eckhart writes that anyone who wants to receive Jesus must become as free 
of all representations “as he was when he was not yet,” before his birth on earth, 
he is, of course, referring to Plato, to the Platonic notion of the soul prior to its 
bodily dwelling; however, in contrast to Plato, this preexistence does not involve 
a soul which, uncontaminated by the images of sensory things, beholds eternal 
                                                          
545
 Bataille, The Accursed Share, 100. 
546
 Nietzsche calls the Christian God “nothingness deified, the will to nothingness sanctified.” See, Nietzsche, Anti-
Christ, (§18). 
547
 Žižek, “The Fear of Four Words,” 33. 
548
 Ibid, 40. 
549
 Ibid, 36. 
550
 “[For Eckhart] it is not just that God gives birth to—creates—man, it is also not merely that only through and in 
man, God becomes fully God; much more radically, it is man himself who gives birth to God.” Ibid, 33. 
142 
 
ideas, but one which purifies itself of all “things,” ideas included (and including 
God himself as a Thing)—more a kind of tabula rasa, an empty receptacle.551 
For Eckhart, “God is not a person.”552 In fact, “God is nothing outside man.”553 He is “Nothing 
itself, Godhead as the abyss of Unding.”554 But “this nothing is not a mere nothing;” it is “the 
abyss of Godhead prior to God”—an abyss into which the mystic longs to descend, a formless 
and modeless abyss in which “all opposition is effaced” and “the very difference between God 
and man is annihilated-obliterated.”555 
If this exposition of Eckhartian mysticism seems to confirm Nietzsche’s critique that “the 
desire for a unio mystica with God is the desire of the Buddhist for nothingness, Nirvana”556—
that is, the nihilistic desire for death—that is because it does. And herein lies the problem. 
“Eckhart in effect misses the central feature of the Judeo-Christian tradition, in which man’s 
encounter with divinity is not the result of withdrawal into the depths of my inner Self” but “the 
shock of the external encounter.”557 It is the encounter with the “unfathomable otherness” of the 
other, the refusal to seek deliverance by means of “the ‘inner journey’ of spiritual self-
purification, the return to one’s true Inner Self, the self’s ‘rediscovery,’” that for Žižek rescues 
the Jewish-Christian paradigm from the accusation of nihilism levelled above.558 
Quoting Laplanche—“the otherness of the other is [one’s] response to his unconscious, 
that is to say, to his otherness to himself”—Žižek goes on to make a startling theological claim 
(one which resonates with Manoussakis’s notion of the “cracked God” examined above): 
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Is it not crucial to accomplish this move also apropos of the notion of Dieu 
obscur, of the elusive, impenetrable God: this God has to be impenetrable also to 
himself, he has to have a dark side, an otherness in himself, something that is in 
himself more than himself? Perhaps this accounts for the shift from Judaism to 
Christianity: Judaism remains at the level of the enigma of God, while 
Christianity moves to the enigma in God himself. . . . it is precisely because God 
is an enigma also in and for himself, because he has an unfathomable Otherness in 
himself, that Christ had to emerge to reveal God not only to humanity, but to God 
himself—it is only through Christ that God fully actualizes himself as God.559 
The implications of this assertion are far-reaching. For one, it means that, as Chesterton says, 
“omnipotence made God incomplete. . . . God, to be wholly God, must have been a rebel as well 
as a king.”560 But a rebel in rebellion against what? His own kingship? Here we begin to touch 
upon “a matter more dark and awful than it is easy to discuss”561—the notion that an 
“antagonism [is] inscribed into the very heart of God,” “a contradiction tearing apart the very 
unity of the All.”562 And it is one short step from this claim to the appalling assertion that “God 
is not primary Reconciliation but the infinite pain of self-tearing-apart.”563 (Is this, one might 
ask, the Christian God or the god of Nietzsche: “the suffering Dionysus of the Mysteries,” “the 
original and primal cause of all suffering,” “a dismembered god” who has been “torn to pieces” 
and “possesses the dual nature of a cruel, barbarized demon and a mild, gentle ruler”?).564 
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What does this have to do with our reading of the Song of Songs? A love song? A song 
which so passionately celebrates life? As we make our way through the scriptural text, we cannot 
help but to be struck by an unexpected repetition. The repetition of a color. Not the green of 
springtime: the vegetation, the gardens, the fields, and the fruits. No, another color. A violent 
color. The deep red of the rose of Sharon. The darkness of the rose, as black as blood. The dark 
night of abandonment. A bride, forlorn. Lost and alone. Left to search the streets for her missing 
lover (Song of Songs 3). She is wounded, beaten, her mantle is torn (5:7). Her lover is gone. He 
has left her and cannot be found (5:6). 
The bride is the rose—comely and dark (1:5), trampled underfoot. In contradistinction to 
the Song’s green and vibrant setting, she fixes herself at the center of the poem. But who is this 
rose? Why has she been wounded? Forsaken by the one that she loves? Žižek quotes Chesterton: 
When the world shook and the sun was wiped out of heaven, it was not at the 
crucifixion, but at the cry from the cross: the cry which confessed that God was 
forsaken of God. And now let the revolutionists choose a creed from all the creeds 
and a god from all the gods of the world, carefully weighing all the gods of 
inevitable recurrence and of unalterable power. They will not find another god 
who has himself been in revolt. Nay, (the matter grows too difficult for human 
speech) but let the atheists themselves choose a god. They will find only one 
divinity who ever uttered their isolation; only one religion in which God seemed 
for an instant to be an atheist.565 
This dark insight is, for Žižek, “the central mystery of Christianity.” “In the standard form of 
atheism, God dies for men who stop believing in him; in Christianity, God dies for himself.”566 
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“In his ‘Father, why have you forsaken me?’, Christ himself commits what is for a Christian the 
ultimate sin: he wavers in his Faith. While, in all other religions, there are people who do not 
believe in God, only in Christianity does God not believe in himself.”567 
St. Bernard of Clairvaux, in his reading of the Song, tells us that from the opening line—
“O that you would kiss me with the kisses of your mouth!” (1:1)—we find ourselves in the 
presence the Trinity: “The Father kisses. The Son is kissed. The Holy Spirit is the kiss.”568 Who, 
then, is the rose of Sharon, the Song’s abandoned bride? Can there be any doubt? She is “Christ, 
the ultimate divine Fool, deprived of all majesty and dignity.”569 Her bridegroom, the Father, has 
hidden his face. He has left her “sick with love” (5:8), sick with the Spirit who is her longing for 
her missing lover.570 This bride is the revelation of her bridegroom’s “name” (John 17:6); it is 
through her suffering that his name becomes “oil poured out” (Song of Songs 1:3). She is “a lily” 
and “a rose” (2:1)—spotless and crucified. She is “a lily among brambles” (2:2), sent like a 
sheep in the midst of wolves (Matthew 10:16). From the cross, she seeks her lover; but she finds 
him not. “I called him, but he gave no answer” (Song of Songs 5:6). She must lower herself 
(Philippians 2:8), must descend “from the lairs of lions, from the leopards’ heights” in order to 
meet her lost lover in his hidden dwelling place (Song of Songs 4:8). Where does her bridegroom 
dwell? Where does he does he make his abode? “In the clefts of the rock, in the secret recesses of 
the cliff” (2:14)—that is, a tomb cut out of the rock (Mark 15:46), the secrecy of the grave. 
This, then, is the meaning of that terrible phrase “love is strong as death, longing is fierce 
as Sheol” (8:6). Only a love which descends to the depths—to sin, death, godlessness itself—can 
be the love of God. If, as Origen says, one cannot “be blamed if he calls God eros, just as John 
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called him agape,”571 then we must proclaim along with Ignatius of Antioch that “Eros has been 
crucified.”572 And we must insist that there can be no greater love than this. Indeed, in this 
love—a love which is death itself, a death as “meaningless” as any other573 and yet “More 
profound than . . . ordinary human death” in that it represents the full “‘realization’ of all 
Godlessness, of all the sins of the world, now experienced as agony and a sinking down into the 
‘second death’ or ‘second chaos,’ outside the world”574—in this love, all other loves are 
grounded and contained. (As Balthasar is want to say, “Everything temporal takes place within 
the embrace of the eternal action and as its consequence;”575 and “the Father’s self-surrender to 
the Son and their relationship in the Spirit” “grounds everything”).576 
How horrible, then, is this God of love? How monstrous? How strange? Marion’s pious 
assertion, “God precedes and transcends us, but first and above all in the fact that he loves us 
infinitely better than we love, than we love him. God surpasses us as the best lover,”577 takes on 
a terrible new tone and tenor when considered in light of what that love means, what it costs. In a 
startling and paradoxical move, Eros reveals himself to be both Eros and Thanatos.578 He is an 
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Eros who descends into Thanatos, who is literally “made to be sin” (2 Corinthians 5:21).579 He is 
not a God who brings unity, reconciliation, but—the sword: “God is . . . the infinite pain of self-
tearing apart.” How is man to relate this God, this apish God who is love itself? Žižek does not 
mince words: “humiliation and pain are the only transcendental feelings: it is preposterous to 
think that I can identify myself with the divine bliss—only when I experience the infinite pain of 
separation from God do I share an experience with God Himself (Christ on the Cross).”580 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
emergence at the end of the novel “resolves this tension of God’s two faces” (Žižek, 53)—also Syme’s beloved? Or, 
said differently, to what degree is every ‘beloved’ a mask (a travesty) of the lover, Eros crucified? 
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In De Trinitate, Augustine warns against conceiving of the love of God in human terms. 
Bodily images won’t do. Analogies drawn from experience, from this world, mislead.581 Yet 
analogical reasoning, he also insists, offers insights into the things we cannot access through 
experience alone. It is that which allows us to live in relation to others, to love others, and 
ultimately to love God.582 Thus we should take seriously Augustine’s suggestion that the nuptial 
metaphor is an apt analogy for the inner-life of the divine, even if he insists that that analogy 
only represents an “imperfect image.”583 To say that God is love (1 John 4:6) presupposes an 
understanding of love.584 And that is precisely what Augustine’s analogy offers: “Behold, when I 
. . . love something, then three things are found: I, what I love, and the love itself. For I do not 
love love, unless I love a lover, for there is no love where nothing is loved. There are, therefore, 
three things: the lover, the beloved, and the love.”585 
Love is, by its very nature, triune. It depends upon the trinity of lover, beloved, and the 
love that unites them—a pure and generous overflow. Understanding this metaphor is the key to 
grasping the interpretation of the Song of Songs offered in the previous chapter. For, if the bride, 
the “one who brings peace” (Song of Songs 8:10), is Christ, the “prince of peace” (Isaiah 9:5), 
and if the name of the bridegroom, Solomon, “refers to God, the ‘one to whom peace belongs’ 
(li-mi she-ha-shalom shelo)”586—that is, God the Father—then we must conclude along with 
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Balthasar that “in Trinitarian terms . . . the Father, who begets [the Son] . . . appears primarily as 
(super-)masculine; the Son, in consenting, appears initially as (super-)feminine.”587 We must say 
that “in some mysteriously analogous way, the man-woman pair is the image of the Trinitarian 
God.”588 
Yet to reiterate our reading of the radical revaluation of gender relations introduced by 
the Christian understanding of sacramental sexuality, such an interpretation does not privilege 
masculinity at the expense of feminine desire (en plus). Rather, as Kearney notes, the uniqueness 
of the Song of Songs resides in the fact that in it “divine love finds privileged expression in the 
voice of a young woman. It is the Shulammite who takes most of the initiative and does most of 
the talking in the Song of Songs. And if the lover-king-Solomon speaks at some length in his 
own voice, his discourse often quotes the Shulammite and harks back to her as its source of 
reference.”589 It is as if without the Son (the Word) the Father is mute; as if without the bride the 
bridegroom cannot be revealed, not even to himself; as if, as Žižek contends, “it is only through 
Christ that God fully actualizes himself as God.”590 
a. Triune Love 
Kearney tells us that the Song of Songs is “a ‘woman's song’ from first to last.”591 It is a 
song in praise of carnal, bodily desire. One which proposes an erotic descent into the flesh, the 
world, the messiness of lived experience. We have argued that it is a song sung from Father to 
Son, from Son to Father, a love song which expresses the love that “grounds everything.” At the 
end of our last chapter, we asserted that the triune love articulated in the Song of Songs makes 
possible every other form of love. In order to substantiate this claim, we ought now to consider 
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what such love entails. What does it mean for divine love to find “privileged expression in the 
voice of a young woman”? What does it mean for Eros to no longer represent an ascent away 
from the corporeal, but a descent into the worldly, the bodily, the flesh that dwells among us? 
In order to grapple with such questions, we must better understand the nature of triune 
love. Here, the novel interpretation of Trinitarian relations proposed by Balthasar is instructive. 
For, if Augustine identifies the nuptial metaphor as a possible analogy for the love that God 
himself is, Balthasar gives that analogy its clearest articulation. Considering the mysterious 
inner-life of the Trinity—a consideration which distinguishes him already from thinkers like 
Žižek who insist that “The point of the Incarnation is that . . . the whole idea of approaching a 
transcendent God becomes irrelevant;”592 that is to say that “God is entangled in the world 
process . . . that God ‘needed’ the world process and the Cross in order to become himself”593 
(which, incidentally, would mean that God is not love, as C.S. Lewis rightly points out)594—
Balthasar writes: “The immanent Trinity must be understood to be that eternal, absolute self-
surrender whereby God is seen to be, in himself, absolute love.”595 Self-surrender thus becomes 
synonymous with love. It is the kenosis of God, the kenosis that he himself is, that defines triune 
Eros. 
According to Balthasar, this absolute self-surrender occurs within the Godhead and is 
primarily seen in the begetting of the Son by the Father. “The Father’s self-utterance in the 
generation of the Son is an initial ‘kenosis’ within the Godhead that underpins all subsequent 
kenosis. For the Father strips himself, without remainder, of his Godhead and hands it over to the 
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Son; he ‘imparts’ to the Son all that is his.”596 In response to this fully gratuitous gift-of-self, the 
Son offers his own surrender in return; he gives back to the Father the loving kenosis that he both 
receives and is. “The Son’s answer to the gift of Godhead (of equal substance with the Father) 
can only be eternal thanksgiving (eucharistia) to the Father, the Source—a thanksgiving as 
selfless and unreserved as the Father’s original self-surrender.”597 In his reception of the Father’s 
kenotic self-emptying, the Son empties himself in thanksgiving and offers himself back to the 
Father as self-giving, self-receiving gift. Thus God reveals himself to be a “unity of omnipotence 
and powerlessness;”598 “an absolute renunciation;” a God who “will not be God for himself 
alone.”599 
Because “the whole divine essence” is contained “in this self-surrender,”600 because God 
“is this movement of self-giving that holds nothing back”601 (jouissance), the love of God which 
pours itself forth is as much a part of triune Eros as are the lover (Father) and beloved (Son).602 
“Proceeding from both, as their subsistent ‘We’, there breathes the ‘Spirit’ who is common to 
both: as the essence of love, he maintains the infinite difference between them, seals it and, since 
he is the one Spirit of them both, bridges it.”603 This Spirit of divine love “does not want 
anything ‘for himself’ but, as his revelation in the world shows, wants simply to be the pure 
manifestation and communication of the love between Father and Son (John 14:26; 16:13-
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15).”604 He is their consubstantial We, the cause of their union, the eternal third who binds Father 
to Son and Son to Father, the essence of their love. “Thus the absolute is manifest as ‘We’ in the 
identity of the gift-as-given and the gift-as-received in thanksgiving, which can only be such by 
attesting, maintaining and fueling the infinite distinction between Father and Son. Thus, within 
the distinction, the gift is not only the presupposition of an unsurpassable love: it is also the 
realized union of this love.”605 
This image of the divine bears a striking resemblance to the understanding of Eros we 
have offered from the start—an understanding which posits Eros as a unitive drive, a drive that 
necessitates otherness, that finds its fulfillment in communion with the other, rather than one that 
seeks wholeness at the expense of the other. According to Balthasar, such parallels are not 
accidental. “For any world only has its place within that distinction between Father and Son that 
is maintained and bridged by the Holy Spirit. The drama of the Trinity lasts forever: the Father 
was never without the Son, nor were Father and Son ever without the Spirit. Everything temporal 
takes place within the embrace of the eternal action and as its consequence.”606 Or, said 
differently, “eros is the glue that holds together both the universe and the Church.”607 Yet if this 
is indeed the case, if God “is the cause of eros in all things,”608 how then have we ended up with 
an image of Eros as egocentric, solipsistic, shot through with sin? How has Thanatos been so 
adept at concealing itself behind an erotic mask? 
b. Fracturing the Godhead: the Unforgivable Sin 
In the Gospel of Mark, Christ makes a startling claim. Every sin, he tells us, every 
blasphemy “will be forgiven” (3:28). There is nothing that man can do that is beyond the reach 
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of God’s willingness to forgive. (Even the murder of God can be forgiven, is forgiven; and not at 
some later date, after the fact, but at the very moment that God himself bleeds to death under our 
knives (cf. Luke 23:34)). “But,” Christ continues, “whoever blasphemes against the holy Spirit 
will never have forgiveness, but is guilty of an everlasting sin” (Mark 3:29). When taken 
seriously, these words fill one with dread. First, because they reveal that there exists something 
that is beyond the will of God, something with the power to resist God’s desire to forgive. (If it is 
true that “God our savior . . . wills everyone to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth” 
(1 Timothy 2:4), then the possibility of committing an “everlasting sin” means the real 
possibility of rejecting God’s will, denying him that which he desires). Second, because it is not 
entirely clear what constitutes a blasphemy “against the holy Spirit.” What is this sin that lasts 
forever? 
Prior to offering this stark warning, Christ is accused of being possessed, of using the 
power of demons to cast out demons (Mark 3:22). His response to his accusers is illustrative: 
“How can Satan drive out Satan? If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot 
stand. And if a house is divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand. And if Satan 
has risen up against himself and is divided, he cannot stand; that is the end of him” (Mark 3:23-
26). In a parallel passage found in the Gospel of Matthew, Christ adds, “Whoever is not with me 
is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters” (Matthew 12:30). “Therefore,” he 
concludes, “every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven people, but blasphemy against the Spirit 
will not be forgiven” (12:31). As the context makes clear, the blasphemy of which Christ speaks 
is more than the sin of attributing to Satan the works of God. It is the sin of dividing that which 




As we noted above, it is the diastemic nature of the fallen creation that separates man 
from God. Yet in this passage Christ tells us that the greatest blasphemy is to project that same 
division back into the Godhead, to put asunder the love that binds the triune God together as one. 
If the Spirit represents the “union” of God, if he is the “the essence of love,” the one who 
“maintains the infinite difference between” Father and Son while also bridging that difference 
and uniting the two,609 then anything that threatens to undermine the unitive nature of the Spirit 
is a blasphemy against him. Anything that eliminates otherness or refuses the possibility of 
communion with the other in love constitutes a sin against love, an unforgivable sin which denies 
that salvation comes from without, comes from the other. 
When read together with a second passage that occurs later in Mark’s Gospel, Christ’s 
words become clearer still. In the famous prohibition against divorce, Christ asserts, “what God 
has joined together, no human being must separate” (Mark 10:9). And yet, the Pharisees contend, 
“Moses permitted [a husband] to write a bill of divorce and dismiss [his wife]” (10:4). Why then 
forbid it? Christ’s response further supports our reading of the analogy between human and 
Trinitarian love: “Because of the hardness of your hearts [Moses] wrote you this commandment. 
But from the beginning of creation, ‘God made them male and female. For this reason a man 
shall leave his father and mother [and be joined to his wife], and the two shall become one flesh.’ 
So they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, no human 
being must separate” (10:5-9). (This seemingly nonsensical assertion—how can two separate 
persons become “one flesh”? Certainly husband and wife share no visible, physical unity—
becomes comprehensible when one considers the distinction introduced by phenomenology 
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between the objectified physical body (Körper) and the flesh (Leib), that which unifies lived-
experience).610 
The unity of husband and wife, like the unity of God, is a unity of two made one by 
virtue of a third: by the power of the Spirit who is the love that binds them. Christ’s insistence 
that this has been the case “from the beginning” underscores the significance of the nuptial 
metaphor as an image of the divine. For, as Augustine reminds us, the Son “is ‘the Beginning’ 
who speaks to us. In this Beginning you [God] made heaven and earth . . . You made them in 
your Word, your Son, your Power, your Wisdom, your Truth, wonderfully speaking and in a 
wondrous way creating.”611 The Son is the beginning through whom “the world came to be” 
(John 1:10), the beginning through whom “God made them male and female,” the beginning 
whose Spirit, whose love, weds two separate individuals together as “one flesh.” The unitive 
power of Eros, Christ says, has been present from the start. Yet the hardness of our hearts will 
not allow us to see it. Our denial of love, our rejection of the other, our revulsion at the idea of 
communion—think of Sartre’s famous quip: “hell is other people”—condemns us with the wages 
of an everlasting sin. 
c. Solipsism, Necrophilia, and the Wages of Sin 
 “There is no other”—thus proclaims Manoussakis in his recent essay, “Dying to Desire: 
Soma, Sema, Sarx, and Sex.” Like Nancy, who tells us that “the body of pleasure” “is not turned 
toward . . . the other with whom—since we’re talking about sexual pleasure—it is engaged in an 
exchange,” but “is a body mingled with itself . . . with self as other,”612 Manoussakis refuses to 
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allow us “to find comfort in the illusion that the beloved is an Other.”613 It is not the other 
himself, not the other as a self, he claims, that my desire desires. Rather it is “the object in the 
Other, the object of the Other, that very same Other whom our desire has reduced to its 
object.”614 
What sort of object is this objectified other? What has my desire reduced him to? 
Manoussakis is clear: “That object in the Other or the objectified Other is nothing other than 
myself as another, as othered by desire.”615 The other has become for me, as Nancy says, a 
means for my own self-transcendence, a way of mingling myself with myself “as other.” By 
objectifying the other, my desire is able to turn my body into “a stranger to itself” so that it can 
“relate to itself as another or even itself as the other who encroaches upon it and besieges it, in 
order to enjoy it [jouir de lui] and also rejoice in itself [ré-jouir lui-méme].”616 And the body of 
the other? It has become a mirror which reflects back to me an image of myself: “The stigmata of 
eros are cyphers curved on the lover’s flesh displaying to the beloved, as if on a mirror, that very 
desire he ignited in the first place.”617 
This depersonalization of the other at the behest of my desire confirms for Manoussakis 
that, following the Freudian formulation, “‘the pleasure principle [Eros] seems actually to serve 
the death instincts’ [Thanatos]”618—or, said differently, “desire is the desire of Thanatos.”619 “I 
don’t know how to love, except by killing what I love.”620 Yet this reading of Eros as a covert 
manifestation of “the death drive” which “seeks my self-destruction not directly, as one may 
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suppose, but rather obliquely, by a detour through the Other” comes not primarily from Freud 
but from Manoussakis’s reading of Plato. “Socrates,” he reminds us, “confesses that when it 
comes to beautiful boys he cannot tell the difference: to him they are all equally beautiful 
(Charmides, 154b). Their beauty has a blinding effect on him, for he is unable to see them as 
them, that is, as anything else other than beautiful and, with respect to their beauty, equally 
interchangeable.”621 (One is perhaps reminded of the distinction introduced by C.S. Lewis in The 
Four Loves between venus—which is directed at no specific individual but merely “wants a 
pleasure for which [any] woman [or man] happens to be the necessary piece of apparatus”—and 
eros which “in some mysterious but quite indisputable fashion” causes the lover to desire “the 
Beloved herself, not the pleasure she can give”).622 
That Socrates should express such disregard for the individuality of the beloved ought not 
to surprise. (Indeed, this lack of concern for the individual is the impetus driving the 
Kierkegaard contra Socrates dialectic that is Kierkegaard’s corpus). Yet as Manoussakis shows, 
it is rooted in a more nefarious commitment than Socrates’s espoused devotion to the Form of 
Beauty. In his reading of the pederastic structure of Eros laid out in the Phaedrus, Manoussakis 
writes: 
[W]hat is the lover’s desire for the beloved if not the desire for himself? As the 
lover of his beloved, the lover has taken the place—and, in a sense, he has re-
placed—his lover; that is, that lover from the time when he (the lover) was 
himself the beloved. For the lover was not long ago another’s beloved, as this 
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beloved now will become one day the lover of yet another beloved. Therefore, the 
lover’s desire for the beloved is for the lover a desire for his younger self. The 
lover is in love with his past self or with the specter of himself, that is, with what 
lies now in the past, dead. Insofar as the present lover was the past beloved, his 
desire for the present beloved is the desire that he, as a beloved, had. Now, as the 
lover, he can finally satisfy his desire in the only way possible: by becoming his 
own lover . . . in order to do now to the beloved (that is, to the image of his 
younger self, to himself) that which his lover did or did not do to him then. All the 
lover really wants is to fuck himself, his younger self, a self past and dead.623 
That this understanding of Eros is true to the one put forth by Plato is illustrated by 
Manoussakis’s close and careful reading of the text (with a particular focus on 255b-e). Yet 
whether this portrait paints an accurate picture of Eros is another question. For, if, as 
Manoussakis is want to say, “Desire is . . . the name of a nostalgia for a time before time, the 
attempt, always failing and always recommencing, ‘to return to the inanimate state,’ before 
corporeal existence” then he is right to conclude that “desire is the desire of Thanatos,”624 that 
“we never desire the Other; we never desire the Other’s body,”625 only a corpse,626 a dead thing, 
myself as dead. But if this is in fact the case, whence the discussion quoted above of the 
“sabbatical crack” in God which accounts for the Eros is man?627 Whence the notion of love—
existing “from the beginning”—which is predicated on the existence of the other? 
Commenting on the “violently obsessive” character of “male desire,” Žižek writes, “it is 
the very excessive-possessive nature of male desire which makes it destructive of its object—
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(male) love is murder.”628 The qualifier here is essential. Love itself is not murder. Only a 
particular kind of love, the kind that wants to grasp, possess, subjugate, take ownership of the 
other. Only male love—that is, sadism.629 (As Lacan notes, “The act of love is the male’s 
polymorphous perversion”).630 We alluded earlier to the fact that Plato’s account of Eros is based 
upon a pederastic structure which excludes female jouissance. (One wonders whether the lover 
would see in the beloved “his past self or the specter of himself” if the beloved was not a young 
man—that is, someone who resembles a younger version of himself. What happens to this 
scheme when the lover’s beloved is a woman ten years his senior?) 
If, as Manoussakis says, “the death drive is first and foremost directed toward” the object 
of my love, if “my desire knows of no other object than a corpse,”631 that is perhaps because the 
desire being expressed here is mimetic desire—the perverse desire for sameness which quickly 
devolves into a desire for oneness, unity at the expense of the other. Such desire, as Girard so 
convincingly argues, cannot but lead to violence: I must destroy that which resembles me before 
it replaces me. And yet, this frantic attempt to destroy the copy of myself also leads to my own 
self-destruction. Once the other has been eliminated, my solipsism turns in upon itself, collapsing 
into a void of perfect identity and, subsequently, death. 
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Mimetic violence, rooted in my identification with the other, accounts for the fact that “in 
sex I always find in the other an image of myself,”632 a self I desire to “fuck” and destroy. That 
this is the case with male/sadistic sexuality—which finds pleasure in power, in the perverse 
desire to subjugate, to be God—is obvious enough. The question is whether all human sexuality 
is tainted by this perversion; whether, as Nietzsche says, “Sexual love betrays itself most clearly 
as a lust for possession: the lover desires unconditional and sole possession of the person for 
whom he longs; he desires equally unconditional power over the soul and body of the beloved; 
he alone wants to be loved and desires to live and rule in the other soul as supreme and 
supremely desirable.”633 We might be tempted to dismiss Manoussakis’s (and Nietzsche’s and 
Plato’s and Freud’s) picture of Eros. But something tells me we would be wise not to. For, if 
anyone is free of the sadistic lust for power, the Adamic desire “to be like gods”—a temptation 
which tempted the first man and woman alike—it is only the one who, “though he was in the 
form of God, did not regard equality with God something to be grasped,” only the one who 
“emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, coming in human likeness; and found human in 
appearance, humbled himself, becoming obedient to death, even death on a cross” (Philippians 
2:6-8). If we are not ready to love with a love that forgoes power, that refuses to objectify, to 
subjugate, to grasp, if we will not instead surrender, renounce, abandon ourselves with a divine 
recklessness, a divine love, if we will not become vulnerable, powerless, obedient to a love as 
strong and as fierce as death, that is “because, unlike Christ, we’re not ready to die.”634 
d. The Idiocy of Love 
At the end of our last chapter we spoke of a love as strong as death, a love that descends 
to the depths, that resists neither sin nor death nor godlessness—the love of God which is God’s 
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very self. As we have suggested, Christ is the incarnation of that love.635 He is the embodiment 
of the “tripersonal self-gift,” “the exteriorisation of God” made manifest in the world of flesh and 
blood.636 He is Eros crucified, the one who—by his death and resurrection—frees us from the 
bonds of solipsism and makes possible the union of self and other, the one-flesh communion of 
triune love. Thus if we are to understand the radical metamorphosis of Eros being proposed in 
this text, we must look to the love who became man, who assumed our “concrete destiny with all 
that entails—suffering, death, hell.”637 We must consider the implications of saying that “The 
Son of God took human nature in its fallen condition, and with it, the worm in its entrails—
mortality, falleness, self-estrangement, death.”638 We must allow Christ to reveal “an altogether 
decisive turn-about in the way of seeing God. God is not, in the first place, ‘absolute power’ but 
‘absolute love,’ and his sovereignty manifests itself not in holding on to what is its own but in its 
abandonment.”639 We must appreciate the lunacy of love, the folly of the cross.640 
To do so, we will consider “the problem of the psychology of the redeemer”641 as 
examined by Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ. That Nietzsche, in a text which bears as its title a 
seeming denunciation of Christ, offers one of the most insightful depictions of the god-man 
ought not to surprise us. (If, as Paul suggests, the “children of God” have been “clothed . . . with 
Christ” (Galatians 3:26-27), who has “put on” Christ (Ephesians 4:24) more than the man who 
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named his autobiography Ecce Homo and who, when he lost his mind, began identifying himself 
as “The Crucified”?). No, it would be a profound misreading of Nietzsche to see him as an 
enemy of the “free spirit” called Jesus.642 (As for the decadent organized religion known has as 
Christianity—or what Kierkegaard calls “Christendom”—that is another story. I take it as no 
accident that Der Antichrist could just as easily be translated The Anti-Christian). 
In his consideration of “the psychology of the redeemer,” Nietzsche approaches Christ as 
a human being—that is, as someone with “an extreme capacity for suffering,” someone capable 
of experiencing “irritation,” “unbearable displeasure,” and “the fear of pain.”643 These human, all 
too human characteristics are, for Nietzsche, the grounds of Christ’s love: “Instinctive exclusion 
of all aversion, all enmity, all feeling for limitation and distancing: consequence of an extreme 
capacity for suffering and irritation which . . . knows blessedness (pleasure) only in no longer 
resisting anyone or anything, neither the evil nor the evil-doer—love as the sole, as the last 
possibility of life.”644 
According to Nietzsche, this love—which overcomes all “opposites,”645 which “is not 
angry, does not censure, does not defend itself . . . does not prove itself,” but “is every moment 
its own miracle, its own reward, its own proof, its own ‘kingdom of God,’”—this love, the sole 
possibility of life, “lives.”646 It “resists formulas.” It is “opposed to any kind of word, formula, 
law, faith, dogma.” The “experience ‘life’” is the only thing it knows, the only thing it feels.647 
Such love (jouissance) is, in its essence, unthinkable. It cannot be understood, cannot be 
conceptualized—that is, grasped—it must be experienced, lived from within. Because such love 
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“stands outside of all religion, all conceptions of divine worship, all history, all natural science, 
all experience of the world, all acquirements, all politics, all psychology, all books, all art—
[because its] ‘knowledge’ is precisely the pure folly of the fact that anything of this kind 
exists”648—Nietzsche insists that Christ is no genius. (One is reminded of the distinction 
introduced by Kierkegaard between the genius and the apostle, and also Kierkegaard’s insistence 
upon the unthinkablity of faith). Rather, Nietzsche asserts, “quite a different word” should be 
used to describe the redeemer: “the word idiot.”649 
Yet, as is the case with Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin, Christ’s idiocy is not a fault but a 
supreme virtue. It is the idiocy of love itself; a love which reveals the perversity—the 
psychosis—that plagues the (phallic) world of culture, society, civilization, thought.650 For 
Christ, there is no enmity, no exclusion, no “distance.” Every attempt at “grasping” causes him 
to “shrink back in horror.”651 “He is not angry with anyone, does not disdain anyone.”652 His 
love longs to bring people together. It seeks communion, unity. (Anticipating our earlier 
discussion of the “unforgivable sin,” Nietzsche tells us that the man who loves with the love of 
Christ shares Christ’s unitive “instinct”: “Under no circumstances, not even in the case of proved 
unfaithfulness, does he divorce his wife”).653 
Like Balthasar,654 Nietzsche identifies self-surrender as the hallmark of Christ’s love: 
“Jesus definitively claims nothing for himself alone.”655 The redeemer, he tells us, “denies any 
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chasm between God and man, he lives this unity of God and man as his ‘glad tidings.’”656 From 
now on, “Everyone is a child of God,”657 “every kind of distancing relationship between God and 
man is abolished.”658 Christ rejects moralism, legalism, phariseeism of any kind.659 His life does 
not vindicate “the good and the just,” “the saints of Israel,” “the social hierarchy.” Just the 
opposite: he is “a political criminal” who stands “against caste, privilege, the order, the social 
form”; a “holy anarchist who roused up the lowly, the outcasts and ‘sinners.’”660 
If “Jesus is . . . misunderstood,”661 if “The word ‘Christianity’ is already a 
misunderstanding,” that is because “only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the 
Cross lived, is Christian.”662 Love, understood as such, is “Not a belief but a doing, above all a 
not-doing of many things, a different being.” Belief in the existence of God, Nietzsche suggests, 
is easy. It costs nothing. “States of consciousness, beliefs of any kind, holding something to be 
true for example . . . are a matter of complete indifference.”663 By contrast, “The Christian acts, 
he is distinguished by a different mode of acting. . . . it is through the practice of one’s life that 
one feels ‘divine,’ ‘blessed,’ ‘evangelic,’ at all times a ‘child of God.’”664 
Yet if Christ introduces “A new way of living, not a new belief,”665 if “What he 
bequeathed to mankind is his practice”666—still, we resist. We reject this new life, this narrow 
path, and flee from the love that would free us from bondage, from the strictures of our own 
depravity. For, if “evangelic practice alone leads to God, it is God,” and if “the life of the 
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redeemer was nothing else than this practice”—so too was his death “nothing else.”667 It is “his 
bearing before the judges, before the guards, before the accusers and every kind of calumny and 
mockery—his bearing on the Cross”—that constitutes a life lived (and bore and suffered) in 
love.668 It is the fact that “He does not resist, he does not defend his rights, he takes no steps to 
avert the worst that can happen to him—more, he provokes it”—that reveals his godliness. If we 
are to love with the love of Christ, we must love like Christ. We must practice his love, his life, 
his way of being-in-the-world. Christ “entreats, he suffers, he loves with those, in those who are 
doing evil to him.”669 Are we capable of such love? Would we even recognize it as love? “Not to 
defend oneself, not to grow angry, not to make responsible . . . not to resist even the evil man—
to love him”—can we follow this strange and horrible example?670 
No, if we are to be honest, we must admit that “in reality there has been only one 
Christian, and he died on the Cross”671— 
e. Can You Drink the Cup? 
And yet . . . “Even today, such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, 
primitive Christianity will be possible at all times.”672 What does such a life look like? Who is 
capable of loving with the love of Christ, the love of he who has been crucified for love? Would 
it be too provocative, too scandalous, to suggest that Nietzsche sees himself as the type of man 
who finds “genuine, primitive Christianity” not only “possible” but “necessary”? Who conceals 
the profundity of his love behind a mask? Whose “highest insights must—and should—sound 
like follies and sometimes like crimes when they are heard without permission by those who are 
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not predisposed and predestined for them”?673 Certainly he gives us reason to suspect that he 
would rather be misunderstood than understood,674 that he “write[s] books precisely to conceal 
what [he] harbors,”675 that his “strongest words” bury “something in silence,”676 that his pride, 
his hubris, actually represents “the proper disguise” for his “shame,” the “shame” of a 
“mystic”677 who lives the “unity of God and man as his ‘glad tidings.’”678 What else are we to 
make of Nietzsche’s odd assertion that he possesses “the prerequisite for understanding 
something nineteen centuries have misunderstood”—that is, the life of Christ?679 
In a fascinating passage from Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche reveals what this 
prerequisite might be. Musing on the fate of “great men”—those whose image is venerated by 
the multitude while they themselves are lost, concealed behind their works: “the crowd adored a 
god—and that ‘god’ was merely a poor sacrificial animal”680—he moves from a discussion of the 
love of “woman” (jouissance)—a love which pities the fractured souls of “these men”—to the 
love of Christ (jouissance); and he seems ready to connect the two: 
[W]oman—clairvoyant in the world of suffering and, unfortunately, also desirous 
far beyond her strength to help and save— . . . would like to believe that love can 
achieve anything—that is her characteristic faith. Alas, whoever knows the heart 
will guess how poor, stupid, helpless, arrogant, blundering, more apt to destroy 
than save is even the best and profoundest love! It is possible that underneath the 
holy fable and disguise of Jesus’ life there lies concealed one of the most painful 
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cases of the martyrdom of knowledge about love: the martyrdom of the most 
innocent and desirous heart, never sated by any human love; demanding love, to 
be loved and nothing else, with hardness, with insanity, with terrible eruptions 
against those who denied him love; the story of a poor fellow, unsated and 
insatiable in love, . . . who finally, having gained knowledge about human love, . . 
. has mercy on human love because it is so utterly wretched and unknowing. 
Anyone who feels that way, who knows this about love—seeks death.681 
But one need not seek it. Death is the consequence of such love. It is the consequence of 
weakness, vulnerability, an extreme capacity for suffering, a faith that love can help and save, 
that one can “feel oneself ‘in Heaven,’ . . . while in every other condition one by no means feels 
oneself ‘in Heaven,’”682 that “the ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ is a condition of the heart,”683 a 
manifestation of the power of love, a love which one neither sees nor knows but lives, practices, 
experiences within one’s heart. 
Balthasar tells us that “the ‘recklessness’ of divine love, in its self-giving, observed no 
limits and had no regard for itself.”684 Christ’s life, from the beginning, was therefore “ordered to 
the Cross as its goal”685 (as, indeed, is every life lived in love). “If one examines this mystery, 
one will prefer to say not that his death was a consequence of his birth, but that the birth was 
undertaken so that he could die.”686 Such a shameful and meaningless death—which, as 
Nietzsche reminds us, “was in general reserved for the canaille alone”687—represents “the 
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(divine) extreme in loving,” the fullest “revelation of love.”688 It represents love’s violent 
confrontation with the frailty of human love—that arrogant, blundering, destructive love which is 
no more than death in disguise (Thanatos). It represents love’s refusal to close itself off, to 
condemn, reject, harden its heart. True love—sacrificial love, the love of God—remains open 
even to the point of death. Indeed, death cannot but result from the kenosis, the absolute gift-of-
self, the pouring forth of divine love in the face of human depravity. 
That Nietzsche hopes to embody such love—to swallow the bitter cup and remain, all the 
while, open to the overfullness of life (en plus)—is conjecture. But it is not conjecture made 
without evidence. Consider, for instance, the line that immediately follows the block quote cited 
above: “But why pursue such painful matters? Assuming one does not have to.—”689 Assuming, 
that is, that one is not already a follower of Christ, a practitioner of (female) love, one who lives 
life with openness, abandonment, a loving receptivity to everything and everyone—even the 
blows of fate.690 (Again we see an overlap between Eros crucified—for whom, “Denial is 
precisely what is totally impossible,” who makes “no objection,”691 loves his “fate” (“the 
Cross”),692 and clings to it, demanding that his followers do the same (Luke 9:23)—and 
Nietzsche’s “concept of Dionysus himself” who represents “the eternal Yes to all things, ‘the 
tremendous, unbounded saying Yes and Amen.’— ‘Into all abysses I still carry the blessings of 
my saying Yes’”).693 
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Such a life, Nietzsche tells us, is one of profound misunderstanding, one in which even 
expressions of “kindness may look like malice,”694 in which “The discipline of suffering, of 
great suffering” leads the way forward.695 “He shall be greatest who can be loneliest” is its first 
rule.696 And yet, such a life—as the example of Christ has shown—is a life lived in unity with 
God, a life defined by love. If Christ “denies any chasm between God and man,”697 Nietzsche is 
ready to follow suit: “In man creature and creator are united: in man there is material, fragment, 
excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-giver, hammer 
hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day.”698 Seventh day: the ability and responsibility to 
bring about “the coming of the Kingdom.”699 “It is telling,” Kearney writes, “that the Lord did 
not make anything on the seventh day, leaving it free for humans to complete. The unfinished 
Sabbath is a gap calling for perpetual recreation—in imagination and action. . . . [Human beings 
are a] race capable of fashioning a Kingdom in the image of their God.”700 More. For, as 
Nietzsche emphasizes, “the kingdom of God is among you” (Luke 17:21), within you, it “is a 
condition of the heart.”701 
f. The Kingdom Within or the Time is Now 
In The Brothers Karamazov, Father Zosima tells us to “look at the divine gifts around us: 
the clear sky, the fresh air, the tender grass, the birds, nature is beautiful and sinless, and we, we 
alone, are godless and foolish, and do not understand that life is paradise.” The minute we do 
understand, he says, or “only wish to understand,” then paradise itself “will come at once in all 
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its beauty, and we shall embrace each other and weep.”702 This strange, mystical perspective is 
one that Zosima received in his youth from his brother Markel, a “freethinking” atheist who, on 
his deathbed, underwent a radical conversion: 
Life is gladsome, joyful! . . . do not weep, life is paradise, and we are all in 
paradise, but we do not want to know it, and if we did want to know it, tomorrow 
there would be paradise the world over. . . . Yes . . . there was so much of God’s 
glory around me: birds, trees, meadows, sky, and I alone lived in shame, I alone 
dishonored everything, and did not notice the beauty and glory of it all. . . . I am 
weeping from gladness, not from grief; I want to be guilty before [all], only I 
cannot explain it to you, for I do not even know how to love them. Let me be 
sinful before everyone, but so that everyone will forgive me, and that is paradise. 
Am I not in paradise now?703 
It is only by knowing “how to love”—that is, how to make oneself weak, vulnerable, how to 
offer oneself, abandon oneself, efface oneself, find oneself “guilty in everything before 
everyone”704—that one experiences “paradise now,” in the present instant, now and forever. As 
another of Zosima’s confidants puts it: “Paradise . . . is hidden in each of us, it is concealed 
within me, too, right now, and if I wish, it will come for me in reality, tomorrow even, and for 
the rest of my life. . . . And as for each man being guilty before all and for all . . . indeed it is true 
that when people understand this thought, the Kingdom of Heaven will come to them, no longer 
in a dream but in reality.”705 
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That Nietzsche’s portrait of the life of Christ echoes this understanding of the Kingdom 
as an inner-reality which can be experienced here and now is beyond dispute: “True life, eternal 
life is found—it is not promised, it is here, it is within you: as life lived in love, in love without 
deduction or exclusion, without distance.”706 “Blessedness is not promised, it is not tied to any 
conditions: it is the only reality.”707 For Nietzsche, Christ’s example reveals that “The ‘kingdom 
of God’ is not something one waits for; it has no yesterday or tomorrow, it does not come ‘in a 
thousand years’—it is an experience within a heart; it is everywhere, it is nowhere.”708 It is 
present, it is now. In another work on Nietzsche, I offer the following reading of his notion of 
eternal recurrence: 
Heidegger reminds us that, from the moment of birth, each of us carries 
with him his own mortality. Death is at every instant the possibility of the end of 
all possibilities, the unrealized reality that lies at the heart of things. . . . [Death is] 
a fate not reserved for some far-off tomorrow but ever present, the inner-most 
reality of our being. Yet this is only a sliver of a much larger truth. Not just death, 
but life—all of life, every encounter, every experience, the whole drama of 
existence—is contained within this very instant. From the moment we are born, 
each of us carries with him all that has been and all that will be—a cosmos 
unfolded and unfolding in the stillness between each breath. 
All that has happened has happened exactly as it had to in order to bring 
about this present moment. Everything has aligned to make this moment that is. 
Within this moment, all that has been subsists. Within this moment, the whole of 
the past recurs once more in the eternity of right now. That is why at odd times a 
                                                          
706
 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, (§29). 
707
 Ibid, (§33). 
708
 Ibid, (§34). 
172 
 
memory will come, uncalled for, unprovoked. A memory not remember but 
relived. A memory of what is rather than what was—the past made present in a 
present that forever bears witness to its past, that carries its past along with it, that 
makes of its past a repetition forward, an eternal recurrence, repeated again and 
again at every instant, every day. 
But it is not just the past that returns to us eternally. Like women who, at 
birth, already house within themselves the ova that will one day be their children, 
all that will happen, all that is to come—already is. The present is a present 
pregnant with the future. The future remains latent, hidden within. Prophets and 
seers of all ages have attested to this fact. Their gifts are the fruits of a future ever 
with us, a future gathered together with the past in this moment, here and now, at 
the still point of the turning word.709 
This reading is not the only possible interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence nor is it the 
one that I hope to put forward in this text. But it is related to the one that I hope to put forward. 
Criticizing the notion of “personal immortality,” Nietzsche condemns “the doctrine of the 
Resurrection with which the entire concept ‘blessedness’, the whole and sole reality of the 
Evangel, is juggled away—for the benefit of a state after death!”710 Yet what might it mean to 
say that the resurrection is not something that one experiences after death but—like Zosima’s 
paradise—a living, breathing reality that can be manifested today, lived even in the face of a 
brutal world? What might it mean to ask, along with Shelley Rambo, whether “resurrection” 
“can testify to the ambiguities of living in the aftermath of trauma,” “whether it can testify to 
divine presence” in this life rather than offering “a triumphalistic account of life overcoming 
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death”?711 Can, that is, “the resurrection story . . . be a story of estrangement beyond 
recognition” and still be a story of love, a story of hope?712 Can it represent “a Yes-saying 
without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and 
strange in existence”?713 
Miguel de Unamuno opens his nivola Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr with a quotation from 
St. Paul (one which Nietzsche vehemently denounces): “If in this life only we have hope in 
Christ, we are all men most miserable” (1 Corinthians 15:19).714 Yet his story follows a priest, 
Don Manuel, who cannot get himself to hope for anything more: “There is no other life but this, 
no life more eternal.”715 This belief (or lack thereof), this “truth”—“so unbearable, so terrible, so 
deadly, that simple people could not live with it”716—becomes for Manuel an “obsession [that] 
haunt[s] him,”717 “an infinite, eternal sadness which the priest conceal[s] from the eyes and ears 
of the world with heroic saintliness.”718 It is something that torments him, that pushes him to the 
brink of self-destruction: “as we were walking along beside the lake he said ‘There lies my 
greatest temptation . . . a temptation to commit suicide . . . How that water beckons me with its 
deep quiet!’”719 
Yet even while “this struggle [grows] to be his life,” still Don Manuel works to help the 
“poor villagers to die well.” Fully aware of “the black abyss of their life-weariness,”720 he 
nevertheless instills in them a belief that “The most important thing . . . is for people to be happy; 
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everyone must be happy just to be alive.”721 For Don Manuel, death is the greatest cruelty—and 
an untimely death most of all: “it was his opinion that the old wives’ saying ‘from the cradle to 
heaven’ and the other one about ‘little angels belong in heaven’ were nothing short of 
blasphemy. The death of a child moved him deeply. ‘A stillborn child, or one who dies soon after 
birth, are like suicides, the most terrible mystery to me. . . . Like a child crucified!’”722 
But if the story of Manuel Bueno reveals anything, it is that this life—which, as 
Augustine says, is “but a dying”723—is perhaps also “Heaven, the Heaven we can see;”724 it is 
that God “is all around us, and you will see Him from here, right from here. And all of us see in 
Him, and He in all of us.”725 In a strange afterword, Unamuno suggests that Don Manuel’s life 
testifies to a faith of which the priest himself is unaware: “if Don Manuel . . . had confessed [his] 
convictions to the people, they . . . would not have understood. Nor, I should like to add, would 
they have believed [him]. They would have believed in [his] works and not [his] words. And 
works stand by themselves, and need no words to back them up. . . . one makes one’s confession 
by one’s conduct.”726 
Yet this understanding of faith as that which is lived, not believed, seems only to skim the 
surface of what is going on in this fantastical text. Unamuno’s afterword continues: 
I am well aware of the fact that no action takes place in this narrative, this 
novelistic narrative, if you will—the novel is, after all, the most intimate, the 
truest history, so that I scarcely understand why some people are outraged to have 
the Gospels called a novel, when such a designation actually sets it above some 
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mere chronicle or other. In short, nothing happens. But I hope that this is because 
everything in it remains, remains forever like the lakes and the mountains and the 
blessed simple souls, who, beyond faith and despair, the blessed souls who, in the 
lakes and the mountains, outside history, took refuge in a divine novel.727 
The “simple souls” depicted in this work—like each of us?—“remain forever,” not in the “mere 
chronicle,” mere chronology, of history, but “outside history” in a “divine novel.” They remain 
forever on the page, to be read and reread again. 
The real after-life, Unamuno seems to suggest, is not after life, but after a certain way of 
experiencing life: after letting go of the belief in “life beyond the grave” which causes one to 
“despise this life as a transitory thing;” after giving up the utopian hope which “looks forward to 
some vague future society” at the expense of “finding consolation” in life as it is;728 after 
viewing life as “a mere chronicle” which “comes to us moment by moment,” “One moment 
disappears before the next comes along.”729 Perhaps the resurrection is not an endpoint, not a 
goal, but a way of seeing life differently, of living it artfully, like a character in a novel—“the 
most intimate, the truest history.” Perhaps it is a doing, a being, a rebirth in the world of flesh 
which opens us to the fact that “Two kingdoms exist in this world,”730 one which passes with 
time, the other which—unconditioned by time—repeats what was and is eternally and begs for 
infinite rereading.731 (As Kearney writes, “Resurrection is to be understood . . . as the event that 
returns us to the world, to the secula seculorum, so that we may live more abundantly”).732 
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That Nietzsche views life as work of literature—as a novel in which we, the characters, 
have the ability (the prerogative) to fashion ourselves—is a reading not original to me but one 
that I find compelling.733 In his nivola, Unamuno suggests something similar: “for all I know, 
perhaps I created real, actual beings, independent of me, beyond my control, characters with 
immortal souls. For all I know, Augusto Perez in my novel Mist was right when he claimed to be 
more real, more objective than I am, I who thought I had invented him.”734 Might such an 
understanding of our engagement with the world shine new light upon the notion of eternal 
recurrence (and, likewise, resurrection)? What is eternal recurrence but the insistence that the 
story of one’s life is worth telling and retelling again and again in the divine novel of eternity? 
In The End of the Affair, a beautiful book, Graham Greene employs a similar analogy: 
Always I find when I begin to write there is one character who obstinately will 
not come alive. There is nothing psychologically false about him, but he sticks, he 
has to be pushed around, words have to be found for him, all the technical skill I 
have acquired through the laborious years have to be employed in making him 
appear alive to my readers. . . . Every other character helps, he only hinders. . . . I 
can imagine a God feeling in just that way about some of us. The saints, one 
would suppose, in a sense create themselves. They come alive. They are capable 
of the surprising act or word. They stand outside the plot, unconditioned by it. But 
we have to be pushed around. We have the obstinacy of nonexistence. We are 
inextricably bound to the plot, and wearily God forces us, here and there, 
according to his intention, characters without poetry, without free will, whose 
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only importance is that somewhere, at some time, we help to furnish the scene in 
which a living character moves and speaks, providing perhaps the saints with the 
opportunities for their free will.735 
What would it mean to be such a saint, to no longer be “bound to the plot,” to “stand outside” 
time, “unconditioned by it,” to “create” oneself, truly exercising one’s “free will”? 
Maurice Bendrix, Greene’s narrator, depicts Sarah, the novel’s saint, as someone who has 
“no doubts,” someone defined by “surrender,” “abandonment,” “love.”736 In a passage oddly 
reminiscent of Manoussakis—“The distance that splits our consciousness . . . is overcome at the 
moment of orgasm or prayer”737—Bendrix reflects on the “abandonment” of Sarah, a word used 
to describe, at once, “the strange sad angry cry” of her orgasm,738 the selflessness with which she 
loves Bendrix,739 and her desire to give up everything for the sake of God.740 For Sarah, “The 
moment only mattered. Eternity is said not to be an extension of time but an absence of time and 
sometimes it seemed to me that her abandonment touched that strange mathematical point of 
endlessness, a point with no width, occupying no space.”741 (“Thus, for a moment, Psyche ist 
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ausgedehnt—not any more”).742 As someone capable of standing “outside the plot,” “outside 
history,” Sarah operates—at least at times—in an ever-present moment, a timeless time of 
freedom and love: “I [Bendrix] felt that afternoon such complete trust when she said to me 
suddenly, without being questioned, ‘I’ve never loved anybody or anything as I do you.’ It was 
as if . . . she was abandoning herself as completely as she had done [during her orgasm]. We 
most of us hesitate to make so complete a statement—we remember and we foresee and we 
doubt. She had no doubts. The moment only mattered.”743 
Bendrix, on the other hand, does not share Sarah’s “capacity for love.”744 He “sticks,” he 
“will not come alive,”745 because he can never let go of “the I, I, I”746—the prison of himself: 
“When I replied that I loved her too in that way, I was the liar, not she, for I never lose the 
consciousness of time.”747 That Bendrix has “always found it hard to feel sexual desire without 
some sense of superiority” is telling.748 (Indeed, even as Sarah abandons herself in lovemaking, 
Bendrix clings to his superiority, emphasizing his ability to make her orgasm—something that 
her husband, “Poor Henry,” has never been able to do, “not in the whole ten years” of their 
marriage).749 His love is not love but, as he repeats time and again, “hate.” That is, “ordinary 
human love” (sadism, Thanatos) which is “jealous,” seeks possession, would rather see the 
beloved dead “than with another man.”750 Bendrix does not love with recklessness, with 
abandonment, surrender. He is incapable of existing at “the moment of absolute trust and 
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absolute pleasure, the moment when it [is] impossible to quarrel because it [is] impossible to 
think.”751 That moment—“a moment [which] might well be eternity long”752—is reserved for 
those who live “outside history,” outside chronology, in the eternal present of a love made 
manifest here and now. 
Still, Greene suggests, such a moment is not beyond our reach. It is, in fact, open to us at 
every instant—even in the depths of our depravity. (As Time magazine so aptly put it, “Adultery 
can lead to sainthood”).753 Commenting on the salacious events of “the Bolton Case,” Parkis—
the private eye employed by Bendrix to follow Sarah—describes how he unexpectedly 
uncovered a love triangle: “It made a great stir, sir, at the time. Lady Bolton, her maid and the 
man, sir. All discovered together. . . . It’s all human nature, sir, isn’t it, and human love. Though 
I was surprised. Not having expected the third.”754 The third—his presence is indeed a surprise, 
that which upends our human nature and unsettles our human love. Two pages on, we read in 
Sarah’s diary of another ménage à trois—one in which Sarah unknowingly participated, one 
between Bendrix, herself, and God: “even the first time, in the hotel near Paddington, we spent 
all we had. You were there, teaching us to squander, like you taught the rich man, so that one day 
we might have nothing left except this love of You.”755 Nothing but the love of God (jouissance). 
A love which is a squandering, an abandoning, a death of all that one has and all that one is: “If I 
begin to love God . . . If I ever loved like that, it would be the end of everything. . . . I’d cease to 
be Bendrix. Sarah, I’m afraid.”756 
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Thanatos: Descent Into the Id 
The perceptive reader will no doubt have noticed that, toward the end of our last chapter, 
a shift in the way of discussing “the Kingdom” of the present moment occurred as we 
transitioned from the works of Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Unamuno to the novel by Graham 
Greene. That shift—subtle though it may have seemed—actually represents the essential point, 
the point upon which everything hinges. For Nietzsche (and, to a lesser extent, Dostoevsky and 
Unamuno) the Kingdom of Christ is within. It is “hidden in each of us” and “will come . . . in 
reality” only when we “wish” it to.757 For Greene, however, the “abandonment” of Sarah—which 
touches “that strange mathematical point of endlessness,” “eternity”758—is provoked from 
without. It is caused by a rupture, a trauma, which will not allow her to continue living in the 
“ordinary corrupt human love” she so desperately desires.759 It is the appearance of the 
unexpected third—the intercession of God in her sex life (recall our discussion of Paul and his 
odd assertion that grace binds together as “one flesh” even those who copulate with prostitutes (1 
Corinthians 6:16))—that leads her to sanctity.760 
Žižek, we said earlier, identifies “the shock of the external encounter” as that which 
defines the Jewish-Christian paradigm: “the central feature of the Judeo-Christian tradition [is 
that] man’s encounter with divinity is not the result of withdrawal into the depths of my inner 
Self and the ensuing realization of the identity of the core of my Self and the core of Divinity 
(atman—Brahman in Hinduism, ect.).” Rather, while “both paganism and Gnosticism . . . 
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emphasize the ‘inner journey’ of spiritual self-purification, the return to one’s true Inner Self, the 
self’s ‘rediscovery,’” Christianity—like Judaism before it—depends upon “an external traumatic 
encounter.”761 Unlike Nietzsche’s Christ, who teaches us the inner-reality of a life lived in love, 
the God depicted by Greene is one who violates us from without: “You’re a devil, God, tempting 
us to leap. But I don’t want Your peace and I don’t want Your love. I wanted something very 
simple and very easy; I wanted Sarah for a lifetime and You took her away. With Your great 
schemes You ruin our happiness like a harvester ruins a mouse’s nest.”762 
The violence of God has always been a problem. (Think of what it means to say that “you 
[God] use pain to make your will known . . . and even kill us lest we die away from you”).763 
Many Christians do not know what to do with it, which is why, as Kierkegaard says, “we seldom 
hear [of] it.”764 Yet if we are “to be sufficiently honest,” we ought not to minimize what is 
“terrifying” about the divine in an attempt to “smuggle Christianity into the world.”765 We ought 
to recognize the horrible reality that “the one whom God blesses he curses in the same breath,” 
that God’s love is a love that “infringes” upon us, ruins our happiness.766 Indeed, in spite of 
Nietzsche’s protestations,767 Christ himself insists, “I have come to bring not peace but the 
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sword” (Matthew 10:34). And, as if to ratify the Žižekean point, he plainly states: “Nothing that 
enters one from outside can defile that person; but the things that come out from within are what 
defile . . . From within people, from their hearts, come evil thoughts, unchastity, theft, murder, 
adultery, greed, malice, deceit, licentiousness, envy, blasphemy, arrogance, folly. All these evils 
come from within and they defile” (Mark 7:15-23). 
Love, Christ tells us, is not a condition of the heart. It is the heart that corrupts, the heart 
that perverts the Eros of God and turns it into the Thanatos of man. (“Because of the hardness of 
your hearts . . .”). The Kingdom is not within you. It is “among you” (Luke 17:21) but not of you. 
(The meanness of man, as Ivan Karamazov points out, is crueler, more malicious than even the 
most savage of beasts: “people speak sometimes about the ‘animal’ cruelty of man, but that is 
terribly unjust and offensive to animals, no animal could ever be so cruel as a man, so artfully, so 
artistically cruel”).768 Indeed, as both Dostoevsky and Unamuno—contrary to the passages cited 
above—suggest, paradise is found in the “birds, trees, meadows, sky,”769 in “the rocks, the 
clouds, the trees, and the water,”770 in the outside world, the strangeness, the otherness that 
encroaches—“that enters one”—from without. 
a. The Aesthetics of Violence 
In the fifth episode of the first season of True Detective, Rust Cohle—the haggard, burnt-
out ex-detective played by Matthew McConaughey—recounts the events that led to the 
discovery of the bodies of two small children who had been abducted and tortured by pedophiles 
in the Louisiana bayou. Reflecting on the absurd brutality of the crime, he says, “Someone once 
told me, ‘Time is a flat circle.’ Everything we’ve ever done or will do, we’re gonna do over and 
over and over again. And that little boy and that little girl, they’re gonna be in that room again 
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and again and again forever.” This realization alone is enough to shatter the “divine” vision of 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence.771 That the Kingdom of Heaven could be built upon the heads of 
murdered children is, as Ivan Karamazov so fervently argues, too monstrous to accept. 
But if Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence falls, so too falls the understanding of the 
resurrection, the “paradise” of the present moment, offered in our previous chapter. (As Flannery 
O’Connor so artfully testifies: “the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent bear it 
away” (Matthew 11:12)).772 To that end, Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian—which depicts in 
harrowing detail the once profitable scalping trade that existed on the borderlands of America—
reveals just how unbearable Nietzsche’s “greatest weight” actually is. Written as if in response to 
Nietzsche’s challenge that we “crave nothing more fervently”773 than “to have what was and is 
repeated into all eternity,”774 Blood Meridian never tires of showing us the insane and arbitrary 
nature of violence, the inhumanity that resides in each of our hearts. To do so, it doubles and 
triples and repeats again and again the same scenes of savagery, the same bloody massacres, over 
and over ad infinitum. 
Just a few passages will serve to make the point: When the kid, the novel’s main 
character, first sees the Glanton gang—the group of scalpers with whom he will butcher 
hundreds of American Indians—the gang is described as  
. . . a pack of viciouslooking humans mounted on unshod ponies riding half drunk 
through the streets, bearded, barbarous, clad in the skins of animals stitched up 
with thews and armed with weapons of every description, revolvers of enormous 
weight and bowieknives the size of claymores and short twobarreled rifles with 
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bores you could stick your thumbs in and the trappings of their horses fashioned 
out of human skin and their bridles woven up from human hair and decorated with 
human teeth and the riders wearing scapulars or necklaces of dried and blackened 
human ears and the horses rawlooking and wild in the eye and their teeth bared 
like feral dogs and riding also in the company a number of halfnaked savages 
reeling in the saddle, dangerous, filthy, brutal, the whole like a visitation from 
some heathen land where they and others like them fed on human flesh.775 
Compare that description with the introduction of the Comanche—carrying “flutes made from 
human bones”—who the kid runs into as a member of Captain White’s gang some thirty pages 
earlier: 
A legion of horribles, hundreds in number, half naked or clad in costumes attic or 
biblical or wardrobed out of a fevered dream with the skins of animals and silk 
finery and pieces of uniform still tracked with the blood of prior owners, coats of 
slain dragoons, frogged and braided cavalry jackets, one in a stovepipe hat and 
one with an umbrella and one in white stockings and a bloodstained weddingveil 
and some in headgear of cranefeathers or rawhide helmets that bore the horns of 
bull or buffalo and one in a pigeontailed coat worn backwards and otherwise 
naked and one in the armor of a Spanish conquistador, the breastplate and 
pauldrons deeply dented with old blows of mace or sabre done in another country 
by men whose very bones were dust and many with their braids sliced up with the 
hair of other beasts until they trailed upon the ground and their horses’ ears and 
tails worked with bits of brightly colored cloth and one whose horse’s whole head 
was painted crimson red and all the horsemen’s faces gaudy and grotesque with 
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daubings like a company of mounted clowns, death hilarious, all howling in a 
barbarous tongue and riding down upon them like a horde from a hell more 
horrible yet than the brimstone land of christian reckoning, screeching and 
yammering and clothed in smoke like those vaporous beings in regions beyond 
right knowing where the eye wanders and the lip jerks and drools.776 
These Comanche, falling upon their victims, set about “hacking and chopping at the bodies, 
ripping off limbs, heads, gutting the strange white torsos and holding up great handfuls of 
viscera, genitals, some of the savages so slathered up with gore they might have rolled in it like 
dogs and some who fell upon the dying and sodomized them with loud cries to their fellows.”777 
They do so in just the same way—with the same sadistic sensuality—that Captain White’s gang 
had prepared a recent evening’s meal: “The skinners . . . commenced cutting up the gutted 
antelopes in the floor of the wagon with bowieknives and handaxes, laughing and hacking in a 
welter of gore, a reeking scene in the light of the handheld lanterns.”778 
The repetitions in this text abound—the reader cannot go more than a few pages without 
hearing echoes from earlier in the work—and the scenes of savagery in particular recur so often 
that one must either put the book down or harden his heart, numb himself to them, and carry on. 
(The repetitions, however, are not limited to depictions of violence. For example, a beautiful 
echoing occurs in the first few pages which connects the suffering of the wandering kid—
“walking the sand roads of the southern night alone, his hands balled in the cotton pockets of his 
cheap coat”779—with the suffering of the “Blacks in the fields, lank and stooped, their fingers 
spiderlike among the bolls of cotton.” That the latter represent “A shadowed agony in the 
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garden” reminds us that suffering is that which connects us not only with one another but also 
with the god who suffers).780 Why this recurrence? Why this onslaught of brutality? 
In a 1992 interview with the New York Times, McCarthy tells us that “The novel depends 
for its life on the novels that have been written.”781 A sentence later, he remarks that “good 
writers” are those who “deal with issues of life and death.” That his criteria for assessing authors 
should echo the words of another author is telling. Is it merely a coincidence that Flannery 
O’Connor—to whom McCarthy is compared in that same article782—writes, in the Author’s 
Note to the second edition of Wise Blood (notice the doubling in McCarthy’s title): “That belief 
in Christ is to some a matter of life and death has been a stumbling block for readers who would 
prefer to think it a matter of no great consequence”?783 Is it not more likely that, to borrow 
another phrase from O’Connor, the world depicted in Blood Meridian—in spite of all of its 
barbarism, senseless violence, and gore (or perhaps because of it)—is a thoroughly “Christ-
haunted” world? (Why the title Blood Meridian? one might ask. The answer I believe lies in The 
Cross, a poem by John Donne, which finds in all created things an image of the crucified Christ: 
“Look down, thou spiest out crosses in small things;/ Look up, thou seest birds raised on crossed 
wings;/ All the globe’s frame, and sphere’s, is nothing else/ But the meridians crossing 
parallels”).784 
Indeed, for all of the cruelty expressed therein, McCarthy’s novel is filled with small, 
subtle, almost imperceptible gestures—of kindness. Some examples: when the kid is shot, he is 
nursed back to health by a “tavernkeeper’s wife” who “attends him” and “carries out his 
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slops;”785 when he is alone in the wilderness, he is given food and “an old greenriver knife” by a 
group of cattle drovers so that he can fend for himself786 (their act is explicitly called 
“kindness”);787 when he loses his mule, “a black”—who has no reason to help the white kid and 
plenty of reason to wish him ill—points him in the right direction;788 when he is lost and 
dehydrated in a foreign land, he is given a drink of water by a group of Mexican bandits—who, 
again, have no cause to help him;789 when he is imprisoned in a Mexican jailhouse, “A woman 
brought [him] bowls of beans and charred tortillas on a plate of fried clay. . . . she had smuggled 
[him] sweets under her shawl and there were pieces of meat in the bottom of the bowl that had 
come from her own table;”790 and on, and on. These moments of genuine human empathy are 
easily missed, swept away in the flood of violence. But they are there all the same, coming to the 
kid from without, as if inviting him to something better, some more. They watch him like the 
“eye” of God that he sees painted on a wagon carrying “the host to some soul.”791 Chase him like 
the hound of heaven.792 But will they catch him? 
At times, the kid seems ready to respond in kind, ready to open his arms to the stranger, 
the other, those in need. When one of his fellow scalpers is dying, “skewered through with a 
lance,” he “wade[s] out of the water and approach[es] him,” as if driven by an instinct for 
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care;793 when another “carried an arrow in his thigh, fletching and all, and none would touch it,” 
he volunteers to pull it out;794 and when he draws the short straw and is ordered to kill a 
wounded comrade, he refuses to murder the injured man and instead leaves him with a canteen 
full of water and a chance, however bleak, to survive.795 Perhaps, then, Blood Meridian is a story 
of redemption, a testament to the fact that the darkness of this world is not enough to extinguish 
its light? No, just the opposite. For the deeper we descend into this hellish tale, the more we 
recognize that “hell is nothing more and nothing less than the self itself—a self that has infected 
itself with the sickness unto death.”796 
b. The Judge Within or the Self in Hell 
“Is it possible,” Manoussakis asks, “to understand hell as a self-inflicted punishment?”797 
Augustine thinks so: “You do not want to be saved by [Christ]? Then you will be judged by 
yourself.”798 Indeed, for him one is not condemned to hell by God but, in wandering away from 
God, becomes a wasteland unto himself.799 This understanding of damnation as a judgement that 
one passes upon oneself—is it Dante who suggests that hell is locked from within?—is not 
without its bearing on our present conversation. From the first lines of Blood Meridian—which 
echo the opening of the Inferno: “In the middle of life’s journey, I found myself in a dark 
wood”—we are aware that we are about to enter hell: “Outside lie dark turned fields with rags of 
snow and darker woods beyond that harbor yet a few last wolves.”800 
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It is into these “darker woods” that the kid will soon venture, running away from home, 
yet unable to escape the darkness in himself: “See the child. He is pale and thin, he wears a thin 
and ragged linen shirt. . . . He can neither read nor write and in him broods already a taste for 
mindless violence. All history present in that visage, the child the father of the man.”801 That the 
kid—who will later be referred to as “the man”—already harbors within him a “taste for 
mindless violence,” and that, at this moment, he prefigures all that he will be, his whole future, 
the entirety of his personal history, is a point that cannot be emphasized strongly enough. It is the 
key to understanding the rest of the novel. 
We said above that the world of Blood Meridian is a Christ-haunted world. Yet there is 
another figure who looms over the work, a more pernicious figure, the figure of the Judge. In The 
Wasteland—another hellish work which undeniably influenced the writing of Blood 
Meridian802—Eliot’s narrator makes it clear that we are living after the death of Christ, in a 
world devoid of divine presence, with nothing left to do but wait for death ourselves: 
After the torchlight red on sweaty faces 
After the frosty silence in the gardens 
After the agony in stony places 
The shouting and the crying 
Prison and palace and reverberation 
Of thunder of spring over distant mountains 
He who was living is now dead 
We who were living are now dying 
With a little patience.803 
 
Yet even in this wasteland, even in this desert where “one can neither stand nor lie nor sit,” there 
is the presence of a third. 
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Who is the third who walks always beside you? 
When I count, there are only you and I together 
But when I look ahead up the white road 
There is always another one walking beside you 
Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle, hooded 
I do not know whether a man or a woman 
—But who is that on the other side of you?804 
 
The importance of this third, this man or woman who “will foller ye always even unto the end of 
the road,”805 has been discussed at length above. What I want to draw our attention to here is the 
final line just quoted. Read it again: “—But who is that on the other side of you?” It is not the 
third who walks beside you, not Christ on the road to Emmaus, but a different figure, a more 
pernicious one. 
Judge Holden is, if not a god, certainly a devil. His power extends beyond that of any 
mere human being. (Harold Bloom calls him “violence incarnate. The Judge stands for incessant 
warfare for its own sake”).806 Power is what he lusts for, what he demands. “War,” he tells us, “is 
the truest form of divination.”807 It is “a forcing of the unity of existence. War is God.”808 The 
Judge desires “to dictate the terms of his own fate,” to “take charge of the world” such that 
“nothing [is] permitted to occur upon it save by my dispensation.”809 He is a philosopher, one 
whose pursuit of knowledge is a pursuit of power, a lust for control: “Only nature can enslave 
man and only when the existence of each last entity is routed out and made to stand naked before 
him will he be properly suzerain of the earth”—that is, the earth’s “keeper or overlord.”810 
Yet what is most fascinating about the Judge is neither his preternatural intelligence nor 
his demonic charm. Taken as a character in himself, his appeal soon fades, his evil becomes, if 
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not banal, then disgusting. (The allure of the Judge wares off right around the time it is revealed 
that he has a proclivity for small children. As Lolita has taught us, even the most literary of 
pedophiles is, at the end of the day, just a sad pedophile). The most fascinating thing about him 
is his relation to the kid. For, what is Judge Holden if not the “visage” of “the man,” the 
embodiment of the kid’s “taste for mindless violence,” his death-drive working at every moment 
for his destruction? (As Holden himself will say, “What do you think death is, man? . . . What is 
death if not an agency? And whom does he intend toward?”).811 
That the Judge represents something like man’s collective unconscious—harboring 
within himself all of the knowledge accumulated and forgotten over the course of human 
history—is clear from the start. The notebook in which he sketches the items he collects as the 
gang makes its way across the frontier is used to “expunge” that which it documents “from the 
memory of man.”812 And as if to underscore the fact that knowledge is destruction—that is, in 
order to know something one must destroy the thing-in-itself, one must negate it and turn it into 
an object of thought—every time the Judge draws an item in his book, he subsequently destroys 
it. So it is with all things in the mind of man: “Men’s memories are uncertain and the past that 
was differs little from the past that was not.”813 
The kid, who can “neither read nor write,” whose father “quotes from poets whose names 
are now lost,”814 finds himself both attracted to and repulsed by this man who is “a hand at 
anything,” who is “clever,” fluent in multiple languages, understands botany, geology, has read 
the classics.815 Like the other members of the gang—all of whom claim to have “encountered 
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that sootysouled rascal in some other place”816—the kid has seen the Judge several times before. 
And the Judge seems always to be watching him, as if directing him by his gaze, influencing his 
every choice with the look of his all-seeing eye.817 
In the penultimate scene, the kid and the Judge meet in a tavern in Fort Griffin after years 
of being apart. The Judge asks the kid his reason for coming to the bar that night. “Everybody 
dont have to have a reason to be someplace,” the kid replies.818 “That’s so, said the judge. They 
do not have to have a reason. But order is not set aside because of their indifference. . . . Let me 
put it this way . . . If it is so that they themselves have no reason and yet are indeed here must 
they not be here by reason of some other? And if this is so can you guess who that other might 
be?”819 (“—But who is that on the other side of you?”) Who, if not the Judge? He is the “malign 
thing set against” man, the “power,” the “force,” Thanatos itself which governs this world and 
yet is in each of us: “Can [man] believe that the wreckage of his existence is unentailed?”820 
That the kid—“father of the man”—has had “a taste for mindless [that is, unconscious] 
violence” brooding within him from the start reveals his affinity for the Judge, who eradicates 
understanding while provoking continued destruction. Indeed, he is not like the Judge but is the 
Judge, or at least his offspring, who carries the worm of destruction in his heart. As the 
individual unconscious is grounded in the collective, as my Thanatonic drive toward annihilation 
is rooted in the Thanatos that lives in all of us,821 so the kid is made in the image and likeness of 
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the Judge, is trapped in his own personal hell where he must stand as the judge for himself: “You 
do not want to be saved [from without]? Then you will be judged by yourself [from within].” 
c. A Reading Too Dark and Awful 
If the continuous carnage depicted in Blood Meridian is not enough to convince us of this 
fatalistic reading, if the synoptic chapter headings that open each chapter are not an indication 
that what will happen has already been predetermined from the start, orchestrated by some 
malignant “power” who sets the events in motion, then perhaps we ought to turn to the novel’s 
ending, which has given rise to much speculation and which, it is my contention, underscores 
this point. In the final scene, the kid—now the man—exits the tavern and makes his way down to 
the jakes to relieve himself. There, he opens the door and finds “The judge . . . seated upon the 
closet. He was naked and he rose up smiling and gathered him in his arms against his immense 
and terrible flesh and shot the wooden barlatch home behind him.”822 We do not see what 
happens in the jakes. We only know that a short time later, two more men make their way down 
from the bar to the outhouse. When they do, they find that  
A third man was standing there urinating into the mud. Is someone in there? the 
first man said. The man who was relieving himself did not look up. I wouldnt go 
in there if I was you, he said. Is there somebody in there? I wouldnt go in. He 
hitched himself up and buttoned his trousers and stepped past them and went up 
the walk toward the lights. The first man watched him go and then opened the 
door of the jakes. Good God almighty, he said.823 
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“The prevailing interpretation of this enigmatic scene,” writes Patrick Shaw, “is that 
Holden simply murders the unsuspecting kid.”824 It is typically assumed that what is found in the 
jakes is the mutilated body of the man which has been violated and left out in a public place for 
all to see. But a closer consideration of the text ought to give us pause before adopting this 
standard reading. First, who is “The man who was relieving himself” outside of the jakes? Why 
is he so unmoved by the horrific crime that lies within? Next, what are we to make of the fact 
that, immediately before the man enters the jakes, we are told that “In the street men were calling 
for the little girl whose bear was dead for she was lost. They went among the darkened lots with 
lanterns and torches calling out to her”?825 That girl is not mentioned again. Why is she brought 
in at this point? Finally, how should we interpret the kid’s (apparent) impotency with the “dark 
little dwarf of a whore” prior to his exiting the bar to the jakes? “Let’s go, she said. I got to go. . . 
. You cant lay there. Come on. I got to go. He sat up and swung his legs over the edge of the 
little iron cot and stood and pulled his trousers up and buttoned them and buckled his belt. . . . 
You need to get down there and get you a drink, she said. You’ll be all right.”826 
Now, the mere fact that the “third man” standing by the jakes is referred to as “The man” 
is enough to raise our suspicions. That we are told that he “buttoned his trousers” a single page 
after the kid “pulled his trousers up and buttoned them” is striking too. Would it be too much to 
suggest that what is found in the outhouse is not the kid but what he left behind, not his mutilated 
body but the body that he mutilated? Would it be too much to posit that the degradation of the 
missing “little girl” is that which is too dark and awful to show? (If it is true that “The novel 
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depends for its life on the novels that have been written,” then one could not miss the parallel to 
another little girl desecrated and “locked all night in the outhouse”).827 
This, we must remember, would not be the first child who—having been murdered by the 
man—has had her body manipulated. After being shot, the young boy Elrod is discovered “lying 
on his back with his hands composed upon his chest.”828 Might the lost girl have been 
“composed” in a manner too atrocious to depict? That is, might the embrace of the Judge not 
represent a literal, physical embrace but a succumbing of the man to the darkness, the mindless 
violence within? (In Kierkegaardian terms might it represent his “qualitative leap” into the 
sinfulness that already exists in him through heredity?). He is now in the Judge’s clutches. He 
has given himself over to him. 
“I’d have loved you like a son,” the Judge tells the kid. But in the end, the kid is revealed 
to be more than the Judge’s son. He is the one who sits “in judgement on [his] own deeds,” “the 
person responsible,” the one who bears “witness against [himself].”829 He cannot escape the 
condemnation of his own judgements, he stands as “a thing already accomplished,”830 already 
lost. At the novel’s end, the kid has become the Judge (of) himself, “Dauphin,” heir to a 
monstrous throne.831 In his dream, he sees the Judge with “another man,” a “man he could never 
see in his entirety but he seemed an artisan and a worker in metal.”832 
The judge enshadowed him where he crouched at his trade but he was a 
coldforger who worked with hammer and die, perhaps under some indictment and 
an exile from men’s fires, hammering out like his own conjectural destiny all 
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through the night of his becoming some coinage for a dawn that would not be. It 
is this false moneyer with his gravers and burins who seeks favor with the judge 
and he is at contriving from cold slag brute in the crucible a face that will pass, an 
image that will render this residual specie current in the markets where men 
barter. Of this is judge judge and the night does not end.833 
Who is this other “man,” this “false moneyer,” ever seeking “favor with the judge”? Who if not 
the kid himself—the kid who, prior to entering the jakes, is “enshadowed” by the Judge’s “great 
corpus”;834 who uses a “chit,” “a stamped brass token,” to enter the dance that night;835 who is no 
more than the “false coin” flung by the Judge into “the darkness beyond . . . the firelight” only to 
return “back out of the night” at the Judge’s command? “The arc of circling bodies is determined 
by the length of their tether, said the judge. Moons, coins, men.”836 
And yet, if the kid is condemned from the start, caught in the hell of the Judge’s (his 
own) snares, so too are all of us. We all live in a world ordered by the death-drive, a world of 
“false coins” (cf. Matthew 22:20-21) in which power is bought with violence and violence is “the 
truest form of divination,” the means by which we seek to make ourselves like gods. Each of us 
is, to follow the suggestion of Nietzsche, an anti-Christ. Each sets himself up in opposition to the 
God of powerlessness, the God of love. That the kid succumbs to the Judge’s disturbing 
predilection—that he ends by debasing a child—ought not to surprise us. Indeed, it is the logical 
conclusion of the pursuit of power. Power, in all of its forms, ends with the victimization of the 
weak and vulnerable, the destruction of the “little ones” (18:6), the degradation of the “least of 
these” (25:40). (Think of Herod’s massacre of the holy innocents and its consequents that 
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continue to this day—a good reason to be leery of every movement (religious or political) that 
seeks to preserve power or calls for future empowerment—). 
If this realization is unsettling, Blood Meridian seems to suggest, that by no means makes 
it untrue. The book opens with an epigraph that quotes from a report in the Yuma Daily Sun: 
“Clark, who led last year’s expedition to the Afar region of northern Ethiopia, and UC Berkeley 
colleague Tim D. White, also said that a re-examination of a 300,000-year-old fossil skull found 
in the same region earlier showed evidence of having been scalped.”837 It ends with the image of 
the Judge, naked and dancing, “Towering over” a room full of dancers. “They are dancing,” we 
are told. Not were. Are. “He is a great favorite, the judge.” He has always been a great favorite, 
from the moment the first man attempted to bring about his own divinization. And he still is 
today: “He is dancing, dancing. He says that he will never die.”838 
d. Thanatos Reconsidered: On Being All Id 
It is fitting at this point that we should return to the understanding of the death-drive 
offered earlier and attempt to develop it a bit further. In our first chapter, we spoke of the feeling 
of oceanic oneness, the regression to the unboundedness of infancy, the desire to return to a state 
of limitlessness, eternity, undifferentiated unity. This, we said, is the experience that man’s 
Thanatonic drive seeks to recapture, the original stasis which it longs to repeat. (It is by no 
means an accident that the Judge speaks of war as “a forcing of the unity of existence.”839 As 
Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor notes, it is in the service of “communality”—that is, unity, 
“universal worship”—that men “have destroyed each other with the sword”).840 Yet the desire 
for such a primordial unity is, we have also said, illusory: “nostalgia is the desire to return, to go 
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back to an idealized past that never was.”841 (That the Judge is described as a being devoid of 
“history,” as being “something wholly other” than “his antecedents,” arising out of “a void 
without terminus or origin” is not accident either).842 This desire, this destructive impulse, exists 
in all of us. It is the inescapable sin at the heart of the human condition. And, as McCarthy’s 
novel so aptly depicts, it is there from the start. 
To this end, Augustine tells us that “The only innocent feature in babies is the weakness 
of their frames; the minds of infants are far from innocent.”843 Why the minds? Earlier we 
discussed how “Augustine’s emphasis on the literal meaning of infancy, as his ‘unspeaking 
stage’ in life” reveals man’s “fundamental experience of a primordial separation”—that is, the 
separation caused by time and space.844 To this understanding of the “sinfulness of infants” our 
forgoing discussion forces us to add another. Is it not the case that the minds of infants are sinful 
because, as Freud would say, they are infantile—that is, oceanic, believing that they constitute 
the whole of existence? Does not the infant see himself as God? Or, said differently, isn’t the 
infant all Id? 
In a recent paper which draws upon the work done in his 2018 book Ca n'a rien a voir, 
Falque writes, “death is not only the destruction of the self, but also an entry into the ‘Id.’”845 It 
is a descent into chaos, meaninglessness, “eternal contradiction, father of all things.”846 Thus to 
enter the Id is to “succumb to self-oblivion,” to lose the “principium individuationis,” to plunge 
headlong into the depths of the “primal unity,” the “hidden substratum of suffering,” “Excess 
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revealed . . . as truth.”847 It is to be, as Augustine would say, “at odds with myself, fragmenting 
myself,”848 to become a “disintegrated self.”849 (Anyone who has been present during the death 
of another can attest to the meaningless character of such a descent. The dying person, he will 
tell you, was unmade, fragmented before his very eyes). Yet, as infancy reveals, death is man’s 
primal state: “The infant without words and without image is formless: asemic. [He] remains 
submerged in an undifferentiated and absolute whole which, to the extent that [he] knows of no 
difference, allows him no identity.”850 (Hence, life is “but a dying”).851 
What is interesting for Augustine (and for Freud) is that upon leaving the disordered (that 
is, formless, chaotic, deathlike) stage of infancy, man seeks to return to it again and again. Thus 
we hear in Book II of the Confessions of how the pubescent Augustine—“intent on pleasing 
myself” and spurred on by “restlessness,” the desire for “excesses,” “the frenzy of lust,” “the 
floodtide of my nature”852—ends by pursuing the most destructive of impulses. In recounting the 
famous story of his theft from a neighbor’s pear tree, Augustine meditates on the absurdity and 
meaninglessness of sin. 
Enable my heart to tell you now what it was seeking in this action which made me 
bad for no reason, in which there was no motive for my malice except malice. The 
malice was loathsome and I loved it. I was in love with my own ruin, in love with 
decay: not with the thing for which I was falling into decay but with decay itself, 
for I was depraved in soul, and I leapt down from your strong support into 
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destruction, hungering not for some advantage to be gained by the foul deed, but 
for the foulness of it.853 
Reversing the Ancient assumption that evil is only committed out of ignorance—that sin is 
merely the confused pursuit of a false good in place of a true one—Augustine asserts that man 
desires evil “for its own sake.”854 “To do what is wrong simply because it was wrong” represents 
“a seduction of the mind,” “a craving to do harm for sport and fun.”855 
Yet if this “craving” compels us to leap down into destruction “for no reason,” still, 
Augustine asserts, it does represent a kind of “mimicry” of God (sadism): “All those who wander 
far away and set themselves up against you are imitating you, but in a perverse way.”856 Such “a 
perversion of the human being who is not and cannot be God”857 can only be achieved by 
attempting—under the influence of the death-drive—to return to the (imaginary) oneness of 
infancy, to submerge oneself in the undifferentiated and absolute whole, to descend into the Id. 
(“It would be possible,” Freud writes, “to picture the id as under the domination of the mute but 
powerful death instincts, which desire to be at peace and (prompted by the pleasure principle) to 
put Eros, the mischiefmaker, to rest”).858 But here a question arises: if at bottom we human 
beings are all Id such that “the ego” is merely “that part of the id which has been modified by the 
direct influence of the external world;”859 if, as Lacan’s mirror stage posits, prior to being 
formulated as a subject by seeing his reflection, the infant is “nothing,” a “formless” mass that 
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“knows of no difference,” has “no identity;”860 what then is man’s Eros if not Thanatos called by 
a different name? 
In The Ego and the Id, Freud likens the ego—“in its relation to the id”—to “a man on 
horseback.” “The ego,” he writes, “is in the habit of transforming the id’s will into action as if it 
were its own.”861 Who could fail to hear the resonances with Plato’s Phaedrus in which the soul 
is compared to a chariot being led by two winged horses? It is up to the charioteer, Plato tells us, 
to struggle with the horses, transforming their wills into action in order to direct them upward 
toward the ideal realm of the gods (246a-254e). This is the erotic ascent, the striving of man’s 
Eros toward truth and light. Yet, as Freud’s repetition of this metaphor makes clear, it is not the 
(rational) charioteer who is in control: “Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is 
obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of 
transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own.”862 The ego guides the Id where it 
wants to go. But where does the Id want to go? The answer is clear: “If we may accept as an 
observation without exception that every living being dies for internal reasons, returning to the 
inorganic, then we can only say that the goal of all life is death, and, looking backwards, that the 
nonliving existed before the living.”863 Eros too is Thanatos. For, at bottom, we are all Id—
incapable of ascent. 
We would do well, I think, to remember that even Plato’s erotic ascent is predicated on 
the soul’s separation from the body “after death” (256b). 
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 Resurrection Ex Nihilo: From Nothing to All Things Made New 
To return now to the question with which we began our last chapter—the question of 
violence: man’s violence and the violence of God—we should first reiterate that it is by violence, 
by destruction, by will to power and the pursuit of death that man seeks to make himself God. 
Thanatos, the sadistic lust for mastery and control, is man’s means of self-divinization—perverse 
and futile as it may be. This insight finds an excellent expression in a recent novel by Donald 
Ray Pollock: Willard, one of the main characters in The Devil All the Time, begins offering 
sacrifices to God in hopes of curing his wife’s cancer. At first, he presents small offerings, 
prayers, fasts, bodily mortifications. Then he collects the carcasses of dead animals—roadkill 
and the like—to nail to crosses he has constructed in his backyard. But when his prayers (his 
demands) go unanswered, he begins to increase his use of violence in an attempt to force the will 
of the divine. He moves from sacrificing small animals to killing his son’s dog and ultimately 
ends by murdering another human being and painting the crosses with his blood. Still, try as he 
might, he cannot make God’s will conform to his own. No matter what he does—“it don’t 
work.”864 
Yet if the perverse desire to be God accounts for the sadistic cruelty of man, how then 
should we understand the violence of God? John Donne, in one of his memorable Divine 
Meditations, prays: “Batter my heart, three-personed God.” After begging the deity to “o’erthrow 
me,” “to break, blow, burn, and make me new,” he concludes: “Except you enthral me, never 
shall [I] be free,/ Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.”865 In this chapter we will suggest that, 
if it is by violence that man seeks to make himself God, it is by violence that God makes himself 
                                                          
864
 Pollock, The Devil All the Time, 68. 
865
 Donne, The Complete English Poems, 314-315. 
203 
 
man and makes man anew. The insertion of the divine into the human condition—the entrance of 
God from without—cannot but be met with conflict, resistance. Grace is always felt to be an act 
of violation, a traumatic intrusion into what is most intimately mine—my self-willed defilement, 
the hardening of my heart—one which demands of me a radical conversion, a rebirth. Grace, as 
Graham Greene so eloquently depicts, ruins our happiness. It destroys “our old self,” crucifying 
it along with the crucified God (Romans 6:6). 
C.S. Lewis speaks of grace as confronting us with a new kind of life, one which is “not 
only different” but “actually opposed” to life as we know it.866 “The natural life in each of us is 
something self-centered, something that wants to be petted and admired, to take advantage of 
other lives, to exploit the whole universe.” It is the life of Thanatos, the life that seeks death as its 
secret goal. And it “wants to be left to itself” because “It knows that if the spiritual life gets hold 
of it, all its self-centeredness and self-will are going to be killed.”867 The grace of God is the 
destruction of that self. It is the descent of the divine into our fallen, fragmented condition. Such 
a descent undoes man’s Thanatos from within, sowing seeds of life into the inorganic clay from 
which we were made and to which we long to return.868 
a. Descent Into the Id 
In his recent work on Freud, Falque tells us that to be “submerged in the Id” is to “sink 
into the inorganic,” to enter a “quasi-mineral or lapidary human state.”869 Comparing such an 
experience to that of “sloth”—the oft-forgotten deadly sin—he quotes from the 16th century 
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thinker Charles de Bovelles: “sloth throws man down to the very lowest rank and makes him 
similar to minerals (sicut mineralia).” 
In fact, like minerals (mineralia), which are placed in the last rank, [such men] 
possess nothing else but being itself. To those, it is not permitted to exercise any 
natural operation or to move on their own. Whomsoever this dreadful monster of 
sloth possesses in this manner, firmly passes away into a permanent sleep 
(assiduo ferme somno consopescunt). They are deprived of any act and operation 
(ab actu omni et operatione remittuntur), they persevere unmoved like stones 
(immoti ut lapides perstant), as if mother nature had only granted them a simple 
being, without any obvious strength or any capacity for laudable actions.870 
Recalling our earlier discussion of the connection between death and the Id—“death is not only 
the destruction of the self, but also an entry into the ‘Id’”871—we are now prepared to approach 
the mystery of death in a new light. What does it mean to enter into the Id? What does it mean to 
exist in a “quasi-mineral” state? 
In his exceedingly accessible little book Life Out of Death, Balthasar tells us that “Death 
is the withdrawal of all life and its functions; it is, therefore, not nothingness or mere 
annihilation, although we cannot imagine this state of having life withdrawn as such; this state in 
which the body returns to the earth, and the life to God who gave it . . . It is like God breathing 
out and breathing in again.”872 “The dead person,” Balthasar insists, “is not nothingness.”873 Nor 
is he, à la Plato, an immortal soul which will be judged and deemed worthy of reward or 
punishment. Rather, he descends into the mineral, the inorganic, the chaos of clay which is not 
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annihilated but rather decomposed, dispersed, scattered about. He is in Sheol, the Judaic 
underworld from which “one does not return.”874 
Citing extensively from scripture, Balthasar informs us that “To existence in death there 
belong darkness . . . and even eternal darkness,” “dust,” “silence,” “No activity goes on there,” 
“there is no joy,” “no knowledge of what happens on earth,” “There is no more praise of 
God.”875 “Deprived of all strength and vitality (Isaiah 14, 10), the dead are called refa’im, the 
powerless ones. They are as if they were not (Psalm 39, 14; Sirach 17, 28). They dwell in the 
country of forgetfulness (Psalm 88, 13).”876 Said another way, death is an entry into the 
inorganic, the lifeless, disordered flux that grounds our existence. (Philosophers who would 
speak of death would do well to consider the principle of mass conservation. If the matter that 
assembles itself into a human person cannot be destroyed, only broken down and dispersed—
what then does this suggest about the psyche which arises from such matter?). Death is not the 
obliteration of the self but the self’s decomposition, its unmaking, its descent into the Id “which 
is by definition the end from which [man] cannot return.”877 
And yet for Falque, the Id is precisely where God meets man. God is with us, he says, 
“dans le Ça”—in the Id.878 Christ’s descent into our humanity means that he descends to its 
darkest depths. According to Balthasar, “to become man is for [Christ], in a most hidden yet very 
real sense, already a humiliation—yes, indeed, as many would say, a deeper humiliation than the 
going to the Cross itself.”879 For, it is a complete self-emptying, a complete abandonment of 
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what it is to be divine. “For God, the Incarnation is no ‘increase,’ but only emptying.”880 It is an 
emptying of the Godhead into the chaos of the Id, the mindless violence of the human heart. If 
Plato would have us ascend from Thanatos to Eros, from the filth and contamination of this 
world to the purified realm of the gods (a movement which, as Freud has shown, is never really 
possible), Christ introduces a new path, a narrow path—the descent of Eros into Thanatos, into 
the Id, the inorganic, the shit of this world,881 the meaninglessness of death. Yet it is by making 
such a descent, by building his home in the chaos that we are (cf. John 1:14), that Christ 
introduces life into the very heart of death. It is by his death, that Eros crucified resurrects our 
Eros anew.882 
b. Anti-Oedipus: the New Adam 
In their landmark work Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and 
Guattari criticize “the incurable familialism of psychoanalysis” which “enclose[es] the 
unconscious within Oedipus.”883 Noting that “Freudian psychoanalysis made a somewhat 
intensive use of the family”884 and lamenting how the “trinitary formula” of father-mother-child 
leads the individual, “forced and constrained, back to Oedipus” by convincing him that “getting 
well amounts to getting oedipalized,”885 the duo suggest that what is needed—rather than a 
return that would bring us from “the rupture with families . . . back again to families”886—is the 
opening of the individual to the outside world: “There is no Oedipal triangle: Oedipus is always 
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open in an open social field. Oedipus opens to the four winds, to the four corners of the social 
field (not even 3 + 1, but 4 + n). A poorly closed triangle, a porous or seeping triangle, an 
exploded triangle from which the flows of desire escape in the direction of other territories.”887 
Such is the revolutionary vision of a desire finally freed from the oppression of the oedipal 
model: “The revolutionary is the first to have the right to say: ‘Oedipus? Never heard of it.’”888 
And yet—whence such freedom? Who among us is revolutionary enough to escape the 
bonds into which he is born, the strictures of heredity? In our opening chapter, we sought to 
establish a link between the first man and the oedipal subject, suggesting that the complex is as 
inescapable as—if not identical to—man’s fallen nature, original sin. Following this logic, we 
have argued that (human) desire is synonymous with the desire for death: “desire is the desire of 
Thanatos.”889 Otherness—at least from the solipsistic perspective of a fallen world—is 
impossible. (On this point, we are in agreement with as seemingly divergent of thinkers as 
Augustine, Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, and Manoussakis). Who then is capable of opening himself 
“to the opening of the world”?890 Who can expose himself to “the four winds,” make himself 
vulnerable to the otherness that encroaches from without, become “a porous or seeping triangle, 
an exploded triangle from which the flows of desire escape in the direction of other territories”? 
“The very form of the Cross,” Balthasar observes, “extending out into the four winds, 
always told the ancient Church that the Cross means solidarity: its outstretched arms would 
gladly embrace the universe.”891 In a language oddly reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari, 
Balthasar tells us that “the Cross explodes all systems.”892 (Including the oedipal?). It is perhaps 
                                                          
887




 Manoussakis, “Dying to Desire,” 126. 
890
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 96.  
891
 Balthasar, Heart of the World, 13. 
892
 Balthasar, Theo-drama vol. 4, 319. 
208 
 
unsurprising that we should suggest here that the only one truly capable of reversing the complex 
so ingrained in our nature is the one who descends into our humanity in order to experience “the 
human condition ‘from within,’ so as to re-direct it from inside.”893 Indeed, it is on the cross that 
Christ reveals himself as the true revolutionary,894 anti-Oedipus incarnate. (If, as was suggested 
in our previous chapter, each of us is an anti-Christ, then it follows that Christ—the new Adam—
is, as it were, an anti-Adam). 
Articulated in the most basic of terms, the Oedipus complex can be summarized as the 
individual’s desire to kill his father and reclaim unrestricted access to his mother. In a stunning 
reversal, the Gospels tell us of Christ’s submission to his Father to the point of death (Matthew 
26:39; Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42), a death which deprives him of access to his mother and instead 
opens his mother to us all: “When Jesus saw his mother and the disciple there whom he loved, he 
said to his mother, ‘Woman, behold, your son.’ Then he said to the disciple, ‘Behold, your 
mother.’ And from that hour the disciple took her into his home” (John 19:26-27).895 
Such an opening of the followers of Christ to a world beyond the confines of their (self-
inclosed) oedipal family structures is emblematic of the revolution realized by Christ on the 
cross—a revolution he calls for again and again, one which is misrepresented or ignored by those 
who lack the ears to hear it. Not only does the nuptial unity of two made one-flesh discussed at 
length in this work entail a breakdown of the narrow “familialism” decried by Deleuze and 
Guattari—“For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother”—Christ constantly 
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challenges us to open ourselves to that which is truly other. Seemingly incomprehensible 
statements—such as his insistence that “If any one comes to me without hating his father and 
mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple” 
(Luke 14:26) and, similarly, “Whoever loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me” 
(Matthew 10:37)—take on a new tone and tenor when read as an undermining of the oedipal 
structure, a breaking of the complex that perverts our Eros and fills us with a lust for violence 
and death. 
On the cross, Christ reveals to us how “the flows of desire” (Eros) can extend outward 
rather than turning back in on the self (Thanatos). The masturbatory aim of man’s will to power 
is reversed in what might be called Christ’s will to powerlessness. Offering himself, emptying 
himself, giving up his will to the will of another, Christ reconciles the world to himself (2 
Corinthians 5:19) by pouring himself out for the world, “making peace by the blood of his cross” 
(Colossians 1:20). If “whoever does the will of my heavenly Father is my brother, and sister, and 
mother” (Matthew 12:50), that is because “in love” the will of the Father has “destined us for 
adoption” (Ephesians 1:5). The “familialism” which continues the oedipal cycle by allowing 
every Oedipus to marry (the image of) his mother and reproduce offspring who inherit his 
complex (sin) can only be overcome when those “born not by natural generation nor by human 
choice nor by a man’s decision” are granted the “power to become children of God” (John 1:12-
13). And this can only happen when the Eros of God is “richly poured out on us,” when his 
blood becomes “the bath of rebirth” (Titus 3:5-6). 
c. Coincidence of Opposites: God and the Abyss 
Speaking of the “exclusive and unique” character of Christ’s death—which is, in one 
sense, “inclusive” in that it is experienced in “solidarity with the dead” and yet remains unique in 
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that it spares the dead “the integral experience of death”—Balthasar tells us that Christ took “the 
whole experience [of death] upon himself” and, in so doing, revealed himself “as the only one 
who, going beyond the general experience of death, was able to measure the depths of that 
abyss.”896 What are those depths? How deep does Christ’s descent go? To answer this, we must 
be willing to approach “a deeper silence and a darker abyss than pure philosophy can know.”897 
Indeed, if we grant that “the Redeemer placed himself . . . in the supreme solitude”—unthinkable 
to the likes of man—then we will have to admit that such an inquiry goes “beyond what [even] 
theology can affirm.”898 Nevertheless, such reflections are “not prohibited as a form of pious 
contemplation” and thus we will offer some brief speculations, not committing ourselves but 
suggesting what we take to be a reasonable hypothesis all the same.899 
Falque opens The Guide to Gethsemane with a meditation on Matthias Grünewald’s 
iconic Isenheim altarpiece which depicts in graphic detail the ugliness of the crucifixion. For 
Falque, Christ’s “repulsive appearance demands simply that we see, or dare look at, what a 
mutilated body really is.”900 The hideousness of Christ—recalling Isaiah 52:14: “so marred were 
his features, beyond that of mortals his appearance, beyond that of human beings”—“shows us 
‘exposure’ rather than ‘purification,’ . . . his face swollen, neck broken, skin distended, muscles 
wasted, articulations dislocated, and skin cracked open.”901 The cross is the icon of ugliness, the 
incarnation of everything that is putrid and unclean: “the crucifixion stands as a universal 
metaphor for injustice, torture and death. These are among the chief moral and physical evils of 
the human condition that repel us in their ugliness. . . . A ‘scandal’ to the Greeks and an 
                                                          
896
 Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 168. 
897
 Ibid, 66. 
898




 Falque, The Guide to Gethsemane, xx. 
901
 Ibid, xxi. 
211 
 
‘absurdity’ to reason (1 Cor. 1:23), [the cross] seems devoid of the power to delight. This is 
because it seems devoid of symmetry and intelligibility.”902 
Writing, albeit it in a different context, on the essence of “ugliness,” Manoussakis tells us 
that “a body is less naked when nude. Nakedness—‘that real nakedness’ as Levinas explains—‘is 
not absence of clothing, but we might say the absence of forms.’ ‘A form is that by which a thing 
shows itself and is graspable.’”903 But the “exposure” of Christ on the cross is not something 
“graspable,” not “intelligible,” not a thing to be known. The “visibility of the flesh” laid bare, 
striped of its forms, robbed of its meaning, left utterly naked, exposed, reveals not a “catharsis 
for our transgressions”904 but simply humiliation, degradation, death. “Striped of one of the 
highest forms, the form of beauty, [such a] body is form-less and, thus, ‘humble, bare and 
ugly.’”905 It is a meaningless body, one which can hide behind no signifier, which cannot be 
made sense of, cannot be clothed in human understanding. 
This “body stripped of its bodily forms,” this “body without properties,”906 is not unlike 
the egoless infant which has yet to see itself in the mirror: “that which the mirror reflects . . . 
prior to its reflection,” Manoussakis writes, is “nothing.”907 But it is not just nothing. 
Paradoxically, it is nothing and everything: the nothing of disorder—“That ineffable and 
unrepresentable sarx, that ‘fragmented body,’ as Lacan calls it”908—the everything of oceanic 
oneness, infinity, likeness to God. (Hence the desire to return to the infantile state). It is here that 
I would like to posit an idea that I am not committed to and one which is not easy to explain: is it 
possible that Christ on the cross is both nothing and everything? The coincidence of opposites 
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taken to its utmost extreme? The identity of beauty and ugliness? The overcoming of good and 
evil? The unity of Eros and Thanatos? The overfullness of God poured out into an endless abyss? 
It is “in the uttermost form of a slave,” Balthasar tells us, that “the Son’s glory breaks 
through.”909 But I want to propose something more: Is it not at the moment of the crucifixion, at 
the moment of his hideous death, when Christ has surrendered his will completely to the will of 
the Father, that he has become so identical with the Father that he no longer exists?910 Much has 
been written on the last words of Christ as recorded in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark: “My 
God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” Often this is read as an acknowledgement that Christ 
was abandoned by the Father. (“Death-of-God” theology takes its point of departure here). Yet 
what if Christ’s last words signal not abandonment by but identity with the Father—the unity of 
the two which collapses into oneness, swallowing up distinction, eradicating difference, erasing 
otherness completely? On the cross, Christ’s will and the will of the Father become so perfectly 
aligned that one has become the other and the other has disappeared. 
To grasp what is being proposed here, one must keep two seemingly contradictory 
thoughts in mind: first, that Christ’s death represents “the supreme obedience of the Son towards 
the Father”—that is, it is the Father whose will is accomplished through the Son on the cross in 
love.911 Second, that that same death represents—simultaneously and paradoxically—“the 
‘realisation’ of all Godlessness . . . ordained from the beginning by God . . . so it is really God 
who assumes what is radically contrary to the divine, what is eternally reprobated by God.”912 
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Said differently, the Son—who is the revelation of the Father (Matthew 11:27)—reveals that he 
and the Father “are one” (John 10:30) at the very moment that he is made “to be sin” (2 
Corinthians 5:21), at the moment when “God himself is forsaken by God because of man’s 
godlessness.”913 “In the humility of his obedient self-lowering to the death of the Cross he is 
identical with the exalted Lord.”914 Identical. (As Karl Barth asks: “Where and when is [Christ] 
not both the humiliated One and the Exalted One: already exalted even in his humiliation, and 
still the Humiliated One even in his exaltation?”).915 
“Evil,” Augustine tells us, “is nothing but the diminishment of good to the point where 
nothing at all is left.”916 What can “the plunging down of the ‘Accursed One’ (Galatians 3, 13) 
far from God, of the One who is ‘sin’ (II Corinthians 5, 21) personified, who, falling where he is 
‘thrown’ (Apocalypse 20, 14), ‘consumes’ his own substance” be but the complete excarnation 
of the incarnate God to the point where nothing at all is left? What can the personification of sin 
be but the extreme unmaking of he who is unmade, he who is personhood itself? 
If Jesus Christ, as the doctrine teaches, was both man and god, should we not 
conclude that it was not merely Christ’s human nature, but at least ‘One of the 
Trinity’ (eis tès triados pathoon)—hence God himself—who suffered and died on 
the cross? According to a Syrian Monophysite formula ‘God has been dead.’ 
Nietzsche’s madman, then, only uttered the distant echo of something already 
found at the origins of Christianity.917 
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No, not merely the origins but the heart of Christianity, the heart of God himself: “the Son’s 
Cross is the revelation of the Father’s love,”918 a love which is nothing but “folly and 
weakness,”919 which epitomizes “God’s self-abnegation,”920 which descends to the depths and, in 
so doing, shows that “love is strong as death, longing is fierce as Sheol” (Song of Songs 8:6)—a 
“Love that stoops down.”921 
d. After the Death of God 
The death of God is, according to Balthasar, “the wellspring of salvation”922 only in so 
far as it is understood “in light of the event of Easter.”923 For others, however, God’s death alone 
is enough to bring about a kind of salvation—one experienced here and now, not after this life 
but lived within it. Žižek, for instance, tells us that it is in the death of Christ “that human 
freedom is grounded.” “It is neither as payment for our sins nor as legalistic ransom, but by 
enacting [an] openness that Christ’s sacrifice sets us free.”924 The freedom of which Žižek speaks 
is the openness left by the absence of God, an empty space which man alone can fill. (We might 
recall here Kearney’s observation that “the Lord did not make anything on the seventh day, 
leaving it free for humans to complete.”925 Such freedom, Žižek seems to say, is the death of 
God; freedom is occasioned for us by his loss). In God’s stead, we must “become gods” (to quote 
Nietzsche) and see to the completion of the “divine creation” which has been left to us as our 
inheritance. 
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As if responding directly to the challenge levelled by Ivan Karamazov against the 
Boethian solution to the problem of theodicy—“if everyone must suffer, in order to buy eternal 
harmony with their suffering, pray tell me what have children got to do with it? . . . I absolutely 
renounce all higher harmony. It is not worth one little tear of even one tormented child”926—
Žižek insists that “Christ’s death on the Cross means that we should immediately ditch the notion 
of God as a transcendent caretaker who guarantees the happy outcome of our acts, the guarantee 
of historical teleology—Christ’s death on the Cross is the death of this God, . . . it refuses any 
‘deeper meaning’ that obfuscates the brutal reality of historical catastrophes.”927 Christ—who 
refuses to remain “wholly transcendent,” a “supreme Creator who knows and directs everything 
and thus has no need to get involved in earthly accidents with partial passion”—“intervenes in 
creation as an engaged and combative figure,” following the logic of abandonment to the most 
extreme of ends.928 In so doing, he shows us that—à la Ivan—“we should pass this gap that 
separates the entire harmonious picture from the stains it is composed of in the opposite 
direction—not withdrawing from meaningless stains to the wider harmony, but moving forward 
from the appearance of global harmony to the stains that compose it.”929 We should descend like 
the God who descends, embracing the messiness of the world, of human existence in all of its 
strangeness and beauty, excluding neither the heights nor the depths of the sacredly profane.930 
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If, Žižek continues,  we are “still too frightened today to assume all these 
consequences,”931 if we seek “support in the authority of some presupposed figure of the ‘big 
Other,’”932 preferring “to stay with the comfortable image of God sitting up there, benevolently 
watching over our lives . . . or, even more comfortably, just with some depersonalized Higher 
Force,”933 that is because “what really frightens [us] is that [we] will lose the transcendent God 
guaranteeing the meaning of the universe, God as the hidden Master pulling the strings.”934 Yet it 
is here—in our fear and brokenness—that Christ meets us and helps us to confront the anxiety 
that enslaves: 
When we are afraid of something (and fear of death is the ultimate fear that makes 
us slaves), a true friend will say something like: “Don’t be afraid, look, I’ll do it, 
what you’re so afraid of, and I’ll do it for free—not because I have to, but out of 
my love for you; I’m not afraid!” He does it and in this way sets us free, 
demonstrating in actu that it can be done, that we can do it too, that we are not 
slaves . . . This is the way Christ brings freedom: confronting him, we become 
aware of our own freedom.935 
For Žižek, Christ represents “a God who abandons [his] transcendent position and throws 
himself into his own creation, fully engaging himself in it up to dying, so that we, humans, are 
left with no higher Power watching over us, just with the terrible burden of freedom and 
responsibility for the fate of divine creation, and thus of God himself.”936 
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And yet, Ivan might rebuff, it is not the fear of death but of a fate more awful than death 
that enslaves man: “Did you forget that peace and even death are dearer to man than free choice 
in the knowledge of good and evil? There is nothing more seductive for man than the freedom of 
his conscience, but there is nothing more tormenting either.”937 Indeed, Ivan has “not forgotten” 
about “the ‘only sinless One’ and his blood! . . . on the contrary, I’ve been wondering all the 
while why you hadn’t brought him up for so long, because in discussion your people usually trot 
him out first.”938 (Can we group Žižek together with Alyosha—and perhaps ourselves?—as the 
“people” who trot Christ out to bolster an argument?). Against such readings of the death of God 
as that which ushers in an age of unparalleled freedom, Ivan’s Grand Inquisitor challenges 
Christ: “You want to go into the world, and you are going empty-handed, with some promise of 
freedom, which they in their simplicity and innate lawlessness cannot even comprehend, which 
they dread and fear—for nothing has ever been more insufferable for man and for human society 
than freedom!”939 
If, as Žižek contends, fear “makes us slaves,” what could be more oppressive than “the 
terrible burden of freedom and responsibility for the fate of divine creation”? How will we 
handle such freedom? How have we been handling thus far? Are we not, after the death of God, 
condemned to a world in which the only God is the “innate lawlessness” of the human heart, “the 
lust for power, for filthy earthly lucre, enslavement” in the extreme?940 This is the world of 
Blood Meridian, a world devoid of Christ in which the redeeming power(lessness) of Christ 
plays no part, in which the Eros of God has accomplished nothing by its descent into the 
Thanatos of man: 
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You desired the free love of man, that he should follow you freely, seduced and 
captivated by you. Instead of the firm ancient law, man had henceforth to decide 
for himself, with a free heart, what is good and what is evil, having only your 
image before him as a guide—but did it not occur to you that he would eventually 
reject and dispute even your image and your truth if he was oppressed by so 
terrible a burden as freedom of choice? They will finally cry out that the truth is 
not in you, for it was impossible to leave them in greater confusion and torment 
than you did, abandoning them to so many cares and insoluble problems. Thus 
you laid the foundation for the destruction of your own kingdom.941 
e. Aesthetics as First Philosophy:942 Nietzsche and the Anatheistic Return 
Freedom is an ethical category. As such, it has posed countless philosophical problems 
for those who would judge God by ethical standards. Questions of punishment and reward, free 
will and predestination, the arbitrary or meaningful nature of suffering, the problem of evil, etc., 
are all rooted in the assumption that God is primarily an ethical deity. But perhaps the time has 
come to revaluate the criteria by which we judge the divine? Perhaps our emphasis on the 
goodness and the justice of God have obscured our vision, prevented us from seeing him in his 
ugliness and his beauty? 
Nietzsche began work on The Birth of Tragedy only weeks before heading to the 
frontlines as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War. He finished it shortly after returning 
home, having contracted diphtheria and dysentery at the front, and having witnessed the carnage 
of war with his own eyes, having held the wounded and dying in his hands. “Life,” he 
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understandably asserts, “is something essentially amoral.”943 War had taught him as much. Yet in 
a surprising move, he does not use the brutal and senseless nature of the world to justify an 
argument against the existence of God. (The problem of theodicy—like the problem of 
freedom—is an ethical one: “If God is wholly good, why then does he allow for the existence of 
evil?). Nor does he uphold a nihilistic worldview, bemoaning the utter meaninglessness of life, 
the need to—as Silenus would advise—“die soon.”944 Rather, he suggests that there is perhaps 
“an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events—a ‘god,’ if you please, but certainly 
only an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building 
or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory—one who, creating worlds, frees 
himself from the distress of fullness and overfullness and from the affliction of the contradictions 
compressed in his soul.”945 
For Nietzsche, “the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.” 
It is art that gives life its meaning, its value—note that these are aesthetic, as opposed to ethical, 
categories—“art, and not morality, is . . . the truly metaphysical activity of man.”946 If man is 
made in the image and likeness of his God, Nietzsche contends, he is made to be an artist, not a 
moralist, a creator of worlds, not one of “the good and the just,” “the saints of Israel.”947 God, he 
insists, is not the God of “absolute standards.”948 He is rather the “true author” of this world, the 
one who writes the drama of our lives. Employing an analogy which we have identified in the 
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works of Greene, Unamuno, and C.S. Lewis—and which appears in everyone from Augustine949 
to Aquinas950 to Kierkegaard951—Nietzsche writes: 
The entire comedy of art is neither performed for our betterment or education nor 
are we the true authors of this art world. On the contrary, we may assume that we 
are merely images and artistic projections for the true author, and that we have 
our highest dignity in our significance as works of art—for it is only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified—while 
of course our consciousness of our own significance hardly differs from that 
which the soldiers painted on canvas have of the battle represented on it. Thus all 
our knowledge of art is basically quite illusory, because as knowing beings we are 
not one and identical with that being which, as the sole author and spectator of the 
comedy of art, prepares a perpetual entertainment for itself.952 
Yet even if “we are not one and identical” with “the sole author” of our novelistic lives, still, 
Nietzsche tells us, the individual artist, “in the act of artistic creation,” can access “the eternal 
essence of art” by drawing near to the “primordial artist of the world.”953 The more closely I 
imitate my creator, the more creative, and thus like him, I become. 
Recently, Kearney’s work has developed along similar lines. Speaking of art as the realm 
of “divine-human interplay,”954 he writes, “This play of mutual recreation between human and 
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divine . . . involves creatures cocreating with their Creator.”955 “Artists often speak of feeling as 
though they are called to compose, as if they are giving themselves over to something deeper, 
higher, stranger. Their works are called into being, inspired by some inexpressible otherness, and 
they themselves are the vessels through which that mysterious surplus [jouissance] enters the 
world.”956 This quasi-mystical experience of creating a work of art has been understood since the 
time of the Greeks as a making that makes manifest the divine. (It is easy to see how Nietzsche 
settled upon his interpretation of Greek tragedy). It is referred to as “theopoetics”—the divine 
(theos) made manifest in and through making (poiesis). 
For Kearney, there is an “ongoing double creation” at work in the world: “God making 
mortals and mortals making God.”957 “In this view, God codepends on us so that the promissory 
word of Genesis may be realized in embodied figures of time and space, image and flesh, art and 
action.”958 Like Nietzsche—who sees the creative impulse as being driven by God’s 
“overfullness” (jouissance) which inspires in man “joy, strength, overflowing health, overgreat 
fullness”959—Kearney asserts that it is God’s kenotic desire to empty himself and overflow into 
creation that gives rise to man’s desire to make: “in forming the human, God bore witness to a 
gap within divinity, a sabbatical cleft or crack from which the life-drive of Eros could emerge as 
desire for its other. . . . Creation is a love affair. God is cracked about us. Theopoetics is 
theoerotics.”960 
This linking of the artistic impulse to divine desire is a furthering of Nietzsche’s 
refutation of the old Platonic moralism: “In truth, nothing could be more opposed to the purely 
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aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world which are taught in this book than the 
Christian [read, Platonic] teaching, which is, and wants to be, only moral and which relegates art, 
every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, 
it negates, judges, and damns art.”961 (Here, perhaps, we begin to appreciate Dostoyevsky’s 
enigmatic statement: “if someone were to prove to me that Christ was outside the truth, and it 
was really the case that the truth lay outside Christ, then I should choose to stay with Christ 
rather than with the truth”962—especially if we couple it with his oft-quoted maxim “Beauty will 
save the world”). 
Yet if Kearney, like Nietzsche, is ready to “abandon the old God of sovereignty and 
theodicy,”963 if he agrees that after the death of God we must “become gods,” we must be artists, 
we must create, he goes one step further still, pushing “Godlessness to the point of a return to 
Godliness.”964 The death of God, he writes, “gives birth to the God of life.”965 Anatheism is not 
simply a return to God after the death of God but, more profoundly, the return of God after the 
death of God. Here the problem with Žižek’s freedom is overcome. For, if in dying Christ sets us 
free, in rising he reveals the meaning of our freedom: “to follow Christ the God-Man in 
completing the ‘New Creation.’”966 Descending into the “innate lawlessness” of our hearts, he 
turns our perversion into a wellspring of life. Dying, he destroys our death-drive. Rising, he 
resurrects our Eros anew. 
Such an extreme remaking cannot but entail violence. Rebirth, like birth, demands the 
outpouring of blood. (To paraphrase Barthes, the birth of us characters must be ransomed by the 
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death of our Author). Out of nothing, God originally made us. But that first creation demanded a 
second—“creation again (ana).”967 So into the nothing Christ descended. And on the third day, 
he rose again, showing us that the way to life is through death, the way to love is through 
surrender, and out of nothing—resurrection ex nihilo—all things can be made new (Revelation 
21:5). 
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Three Aftersongs: a Theopoetic 
I. Creation 
If touch awakens flesh and soul 
And touching part touches the whole 
Then wake me with your sacred flesh 
And bless me with your love-caress. 
 
Kiss with mouth both chaste and true. 
Whisper songs ancient and new. 
Nurse with overflowing breasts. 
And in your arms give restless rest. 
 
With lilac perfume earth and air. 
Let song birds nest within your hair. 
Your belly, plump and ripe with fruit. 
Your body sings. Your lips are mute. 
 
With toes and teeth and finger tips 
A child wraps about your hips. 
He knows the mystery inside. 





Through earth and air the angel glides 
With flames for hair and fallen eyes 
From silent lips, ecstatic cries 
My Lover has been crucified! 
 
With leaf and fig our fruits we hide 
Beneath the tree where shadows lie 
No spoken word, just muffled sighs 
 My Lover has been crucified! 
 
In dirt and dark we poor abide 
With breaking bones and broken pride 
Our brows are damp, our mouths are dry 
 My Lover has been crucified! 
 
Eyes cast down but hands inside 
While trumpet blasts resound on high 
Mother weeps. Child dies. 
 My Lover has been crucified! 
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O lay me down within the stone 
Where ash is ash and dust is bone 
And I will build a wedding bed 
For toes and teeth and hands and head. 
 
O lay me down within the rock 
No breaking day, no waking cock 
And next to you I will reside 





Batter my flesh. 
Do with me what thou desireth. 
The body is a prison? No. 
A tomb in which you sow 
Seeds fallen and left unbloomed 
Until the springtime 
Of your decomposition 
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